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PREFACE 
The Idea of Authenticity 
It is sometimes suggested that existentialism is a bygone cultural 
movement rather than an identifiable philosophical position. Some critics of 
existentialism have gone so far as to announce its death claiming that nothing of 
any relevance remains to be explored further. However a thought can be 
considered as living which holds the potentiality to encourage activity and a 
capacity to reorganize certain forms of behaviour, i.e. to move people either to 
feel, or to think, or to act in a specific manner. It is true that as a cultural 
movement, existentialism belongs to the past but as a philosophical inquiry that 
introduced a new norm, namely authenticity^ for understanding what it means to 
be human - a norm tied to a distinctive, post-Cartesian concept of the self as a 
practical, embodied being-in-the-world - existentialism has continued to be of 
immense importance to contemporary thought. The society for phenomenology 
and existential philosophy, as well as societies devoted to Heidegger, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, Jaspers, Marcel, Simone de Beauvoir and other existential 
philosophers, provide a forum for ongoing work - both of a historical, scholarly 
nature and of more systematic focus - that derives from classical existentialism, 
often bringing it into confrontation with more recent movements such as 
structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, and feminism. 
After years of being out of fashion in France, existential motifs have once 
again prominence in the works of leading thinkers. Faucault's embrace of a 
certain concept of freedom, and his exploration of the 'care of the self, recall 
debates within existentialism, as does Derrida's work on religion without God 
and his reflections on the concepts of death, choice, and responsibility. A re-
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appraisal of the legacy of existentialism has become an important agenda for 
contemporary philosophy. In some sense, existentialism's very notoriety as a 
cultural movement may have impeded its serious philosophical reception. It may 
be that what we have most to learn from existentialism still lies before us. 
While a philosophical definition of existentialism may not entirely ignore 
the cultural fate of the term, the concept picks out a distinctive cluster of 
philosophical problems and meaningfully identifies a relatively distinct current 
of twentieth and now twenty-first century philosophical inquiry - one that has 
significant impact on fields such as theology and psychology as well. What 
makes this current of inquiry distinctive is not its concern with 'existence' in 
general, but rather its claim that thinking about human existence requires new 
categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modem thought; 
human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor 
as atomic subjects primarily inter lacing with a world of objects. 
The term authenticity is used in contexts so diverse that it resists any 
identification. However the most crucial problem that arises in trying to define it 
lies in the philosophical nature of its meaning. Even to say 'the nature of 
meaning' implies an essentialism, which happens to be a perspective of 
objectivity absolutely alien to authenticity. As Sartre pointed out, authenticity 
does not denote 'objective qualities' which are qualities predicted of 'the 
person', in the same way as one asserts, for instance, that the table is round or 
square'. The notion of authenticity signifies something beyond the domain of 
objective language as opposed to attributes to which language can refer to 
directly. 
The existentialists reiterate that to acquire an understanding of a human 
being, it is not enough to know all the truths that natural science - including the 
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science of psychology - could deliver. The non-reductive dualist has no 
advantage in this regard over the physicalist. Nor does it suffice to adopt the 
point of view of practice and add categories drawn from moral theories. Thus 
neither scientific nor moral inquiry can completely capture what it is that makes 
me myself my 'own most' self. With due regard to the validity of scientific 
categories which are governed by the norm of truth and to moral categories 
upholding the norms of the good and the right existentialism may best be 
described as the philosophical theory which confirms that a fiirther set of 
categories, governed by the norm of authenticity, is necessary to grasp human 
existence in its entirety. To approach existentialism through this categorical 
route may seem to conceal what is often taken to be its 'heart' - (Kaufinann, 
1968, p. 12) namely, its character as a gesture of protest against academic 
philosophy, its anti-system sensibility, its departure from the 'iron cage of 
reason'. But while it is true that the major existential philosophers wrote with a 
passion and urgency rather uncommon to our times, and while the idea that 
philosophy caimot be practiced in the disinterested manner of an objective 
science is indeed central to existentialism it is of utmost importance that all the 
themes popularly associated with existentialism - dread, boredom, alienation, 
the absurd, freedom, commitment, nothingness and so on - find their 
philosophical significance in the context of the search for a new categorical 
framework, together with authenticity as its governing norms. 
The quest for authenticity acquires a certain urgency in extreme situations 
which are confined not only to personal and external crises, but also significant 
social and historical crises such as that arising from the decline of the powerful 
and long-ending ethos of objectivity, rationality and enlightenment. Recalling 
Nietzsche's terms, this era of the twilight of the idols and the death of God 
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reopens the issues of personal identity and meaning frequently referred to as 
central dilemmas of the postmodern world. 
Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can 
provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify a particular way of life. 
Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what is done as 'myself and 
as 'anyone', so in the sense existing is something that either succeeds or fails. 
Authenticity in German, Eigentlichkeit - names that attitude in which an engage 
with one's projects is taken as ones own (eigen). 
Thus, the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of 'transparency' with 
regard to ones situation with a recognition that I am a being who can be 
responsible for who I am. A choice made in the light of this norm as the guiding 
principle becomes instrumental in the recovery of the self from alienation, from 
absorption in the anonymous 'one-self that characterizes a person in his 
everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity, thus, indicates a certain kind of 
integrity which is not a pre-given whole but that of a project to which I can 
either commit myself and thus became what it entails or else simply occupy for a 
time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. To take it further, the 
measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative that to be a self is 
to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of 
oneself as a unique individual. In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one 
without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the 
world. 
Authenticity defines a condition on self-making. The problem to be dealt 
with becomes do J suceee^ in maidng myseif, or wiU who 1 am merely be a 
function of the roles I find myself in? thus, to be authentic can also be thought as 
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a way of being autonomous. In choosing 'resolutely' - that is, in committing 
myself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world. The 
inauthentic person, in contrast, merely occupies such a role and may do so 
'irresolutely' without commitment. It is here that existentialism locates the 
singularity of existence and identifies what is irreducible in the first person 
stance. At the same time authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life 
as a norm: It does not distinguish between projects that I might choose. Instead it 
governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects - either as 'my own' 
or a what one does transparently or opaquely. 
Thus, existentialism's focus on authenticity generally leads to a 
distinctive stance towards ethics and value-theory. The possibility of authenticity 
is a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism 
approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable 
doctrines. 
The question arises can authenticity be a viable ethical norm or is it a 
romantic ideal, an immature protest against the leveling process of the 
unidimensional objectivity that dominates the modem, excessively technological 
civilization. Most existentialists in one way or another committed themselves in 
postulating authenticity as an ideal that is necessary if we are to become what we 
are given a cultural and social context that undermines authentic selfhood. 
In existentialist ethics, authenticity "refers to an individual's autonomy in 
making moral choices that are not bound by society's norms... (It)... replaces 
conformity and shifts moral choices from the society to the individual. ... 
Authentic person acts from a sense of innate principles and does not depend on 
social acceptance for his or her standards of ethics" (Roth, 1996, p. 69). The 
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term 'authenticity' opposes the objectivity. It does not point towards any 
particular mode of existence. Existentialists advocate that individual is the 
ultimate authority of value. It holds that "we create our authenticity: it is not 
delivered to us by higher authorities" (Golomb, 1995, p. 25). 
The existentialist encourages, creativity, originality and radically different 
patterns of life. Authentic existential behaviour is truly original, not determined 
by social influence. It enshrines a search for unique, unoccupied modes of 
existence. In doing so a clear demarcation between sincerity and authenticity has 
been drawn. Sincerity I the agreement between what one speaks, doe sand feels. 
Authenticity is boldly revealing the essence of the persons; not a given essence 
but a created one. Authenticity suggests "a more strenuous moral experience 
than 'sincerity' does, a more exigent conception of the self and of what being 
true to it consists in, a wider reference to the universe and man's place in it, and 
a less acceptant and genial view of the social circumstances of life" (Trilling, 
1972, p. 11). Sincerity simply refers to correspondence between attitudes and 
actions, between moral code and moral action whereas authenticity is the defies 
any such correspondence for it has no reference to anything static. It is a 
relentless ongoing self-creation with its gaze beyond any consequences. 
The existentialists do not offer rational arguments to convince us of the 
need for authenticity because it in their spirit to doubt objectivity and rationality. 
They make use of various literary styles to induce the reader changing frOm one 
literary form to another defying any systematization. Heidegger resorted to 
lectures, essays, dialogues and poetry. While others made use of short stories, 
novels, poems, aphoristic essays, fictions, diaries, biographies and 
autobiographies as a medium of their expressions. The purpose behind this form 
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of exposition was to evoke in the reader a sense of the pathos of authenticity. 
Their aim was to restore the lost willpower of the individual that leads to a sense 
of selfhood. It was, "to block off certain avenues of escape and bring about 
fundamental changes in our lives, ... (they)...use fictional portraits and dramatic 
descriptions of extreme situations, it is up to us to create our own selves" 
(Golomb, 1995, p. 25). Instead of arguing, they portrayed heroic and original 
patterns of life with great power. Their effort has been to encourage the reader to 
choose random types of action since the 'how' is more important than the 'whaf. 
Thus, in existentialist philosophy, authenticity means creating our own 
comprehensive life-meanings - our 'Authentic-project of being'. When we 
recenter and reintegrate our lives around our feely choosen purposes, we become 
more focused, unified and decisive. We gain greater autonomy and increase our 
capacity to resist and transcend enculturation. This approach to life was 
developed by such existential philosophers as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, 
Camus and so on clearly guiding the individual to uniquely evolve the contents 
that would occupy the structure of authentic existence. 
We notice that from a particular point of view, the existentialists are 
roughly divided between writers and philosophers. The philosophical 
existentialists are further divided between theistic and atheistic. The theistic 
existentialist, Soren Kierkegaard 'the ultimate anti-Christianity Christian' was 
considered to be the father of them all and friedrich Nietzsche 'the ultimate anti-
christ philosopher' was a crucial figure at the origins of the development of 
atheistic existentialism. Religious existentialists include both; Jews such as 
Martin Buber 'the Protestant Jew' and Christians such as Paul Tillich. Other 
religious existentialists include Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel. The atheistic 
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existentialists include Martin Heidegger 'the non-Christian atheist though he 
denied that he was an existentialist, and Jean-Paul-Sartre the ultimate atheist. 
Today the ideal of existential authenticity is not only of no concern to 
analytic philosophers, who in any case have never been keen on it, but also other 
traditions. However if authenticity really be such a redundant and irrelevant 
notion then an inclination to explore more than a century-long continental 
involvement with it would be natural. 
This work seeks to explore the thoughts of a few thinkers held together in 
their effort to understand and set out the concept of authenticity though means 
that were truly existential in nature. The selection however is not arbitrary. An 
effort has been made to bring together a broad gamut of positions; similar in as 
much they bear the mark of existentialism and dissimilar in the nature of the 
journey they chose towards the one common goal - the idea of authenticity. 
The structure of our thesis is simple and direct. The chaptensation 
observes the major bifurcation present in the expression of existentialism. We 
first deal with the positions held by Kierkegaard, Buber, Tillich, Jaspers, and 
Marcel respectively as exponents of theistic existentialism followed by an 
expression of atheistic existentialism, the proponents being Sartre and 
Heidegger. 
In the first chapter entitled, "Exploration of Existentialism: Some 
Recurrent Themes" we have explore the historical background of existentialism, 
the causes responsible for the emergence of the movement, and sonie recurrent 
themesjike, existence, freedom and most importantly authenticity. 
The second chapter is entitled "An Irrational Passion". In this chapter we 
make a study of Kierkegaard's two tired attack i.e. upon Hegelianism and 
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Christianity, followed by his exposition of the three stages of life. We, find-that 
the^most authentic moment, for him resides in the religious stage, where an 
individual surrenders himself unconditionally in a surge of an irrational passion 
before the_will of God. 
The third and fourth chapters deal with two philosophers of Neo-
orthodoxy, namely Martin Buber and Paul Tillich respectively. The third 
chapter entitled "Meeting Through Dialogue" dealing with the philosophy of 
Martin Buber indicates that authenticity can be gained only in the genuine 
dialogue between two individuals. His notion of authenticity lies in his formation 
to the I-Thou and I-It relationship. An individual can discover his true authentic 
existence when he treats other fellow beings as Thou rather than an It. 
Paul Tillich, the second philosopher of Neo-orthodoxy has been dealt 
with in the fourth chapter, entitled "Inspirations of Ultimate Concern". Tillich 
was of the conviction that when an individual transcends from the courage to be 
as a part and the courage to be as oneself or from the God of Mysticism and the 
God of theism then he comes face to face with an absolute faith which he calls 
'God beyond God'. This absolute faith, he says, should be the ultimate concern. 
This ultimate concern, according to him, determines our being and non-being. In 
absolute faith which is an ultimate concern authentic existence is revealed. 
The fifth chapter entitled "Illumination of Existenz" deals with Jaspers, 
who points out that the realization of authenticity is actualised through the 
channels of communication. Jaspers considers philosophizing to a movement of 
transcending the world of empirical and rational realities, not on account of any 
dogmatic commitments but by a kind of revelation revealed in the phrase the 
illumination of existenz. 
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In the sixth chapter entitled "Encounter in Creative Fidelity" we have 
dealt with philosophy of Marcel who professes a primacy of faith which alone 
holds the promise of a meaningful life. He holds that the individual can discover 
his authenticity only under the condition that the subject-object dichotomy be 
dissolved. This dichotomy of subject and object is dissolved in creative fidelity, 
which unites 'me' and 'thee' into an unbreakable cohesion. 
Chapter seven entitled "Creating Meaning in a Meaningless World" is a 
departure to a study of atheistic existentialism where we bring in consideration 
the philosophical ideas of the major force behind the inception and sustainance 
of the entire movement: Jean - Paul Sartre. Authenticity for Sartre primarily 
involves acknowledging the realities of the human condition and explicitly 
accepting their consequences. This entails accepting the power to choose anew 
in each situation, taking on the situation - rather than trying to ignore or distance 
oneself from it, and accepting responsibility for choices and the model they offer 
to others in similar circumstances. Thus, an authentic individual, according to 
Sartre, is one who accepts his situation as it truly is; who does not flee from it in 
self-delusion. He accepts the responsibilities and dangers that his situation 
involves fully conscious of the finality of his decision - making. 
Chapter eight moves on to Martin Heidegger, the title of the chapter 
being "Awakening from Lostness in the They". Heidegger's account of 
authenticity and inauthenticity is largely based on a fundamental crisis i.e. the 
forgetfulness of the question of Being. He equates forgetfiilness with 
'inauthenticity' while on the other hand, the overcoming and recollection of this 
forgetfulness is 'authenticity'. Both 'authenticity' and 'inauthenticity', according 
to him, are the possible ways for Dasein to-be-in-the-world. Dasein as to-be-in-
10 
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the-world, is inclined to be content with things, lose itself among the things of 
the world, and forget himself as that unique being which has a special openness 
to Being. As Dasein is a being of fallenness, it will never fully escape from this 
tendency. At certain moments however, Dasein obtains a sense of the uniqueness 
of its own being, of the finite openness to Being that Dasein is. It is this self-
comprehension which marks the authenticity or the overcoming of the crisis of 
forgetfulness. 
The last chapter titled "A Summing Up: Reaching Authentic Existence" 
consist of a final interlacing of the broad gamut of committed positions taken up 
by the existentialist philosopher under consideration in the course of this 
dissertation. It explores how authenticity located in the existentialist milieu takes 
on a distinctive stance towards ethics and value-theory clearly stating that the 
possibility of authenticity is a mark of an individual's freedom. It is through 
freedom that existentialism approaches questions of value, leading to many of its 
most recognizable doctrines. But instead of normative ethics they make their 
arguments on the metaethical level which is based on freedom. 
A clear cut conclusion would perhaps become absolutely antithetical to 
the idea of authenticity hence a postscript imparts the final words to this humble 
study 
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Exploring Existentialism: Some Recurrent Themes 
f Existence-philosophy is the way of thought by means of 
vwhich man seeks to become himself; it makes use of expert 
knowledge while at the same time going beyond it. 
(Jaspers, 1959, p. 159) j 
Existentialism is a twentieth century movement which involves itself with 
the problems and conditions that are in direct relation to man and the life that he 
lives. It rescues philosophy from the clutches of empty abstractions with a 
purpose to shift the focus of their enquiry to the concrete existence of human 
beings. Instead of identifying itself as a specialized theoretical discipline 
existentialism is a commitment to an existence which encapsulates a complete 
vision of man and his interactions with the world he lives in, an endeavour 
common to the Greek philosophers. Unlike the past philosophies beginning from 
Plato down to Hegel which takes a reductionist point of view regarding the 
understanding of man, existentialism instead has attempted to gather all the 
elements of human reality in creating a comprehensive picture of man. It does 
not confine itself to one predominant aspect of human reality i.e. man as a 
rational or essential being but goes beyond any partisan approach in trying to 
grapple with human reality in all its multifaceted dimensions. The following 
remark captures the existentialist impulse with great cogency: 
"The system of traditional philosophy and modem science 
have reduced man to an abstraction; whatever the system 
may be, within it, man is functionally defined as part of a 
network of concepts draining him of individual identity. 
Thus, he becomes the 'rational animal' of Aristotle, the 
'homoeconomicus' of Adam Smith, a Marxian specimen of 
class-consciousness and so on". (Gill, 1973, p. 14) 
man in its entirety even it it were to involve a consideration of all that may be 
dark and questionable in his existence. 
'Emphasis on human existence' in a way becomes the beginning of a 
description of existentialism, but any description would lack the precision 
required for use in reference to the modem movement; for existentialism's 
concern about man grows out of specifically modem conditions and concludes in 
quite a unique position. Among these conditions are the loss of the individual in 
mass culture and technology, the consequent alienation of the human person 
from himself as well as from his productions, and the loss of meaning in life 
through divisions within the human spirit. The result of these conditions is 
frequently called the 'existential experience'. Recorded by many artists and 
writers as well as philosophers, it is, in sum, an experience of the decomposition 
of our phenomenal world - first of all rational concepts, next of objects, then of 
time and history, until finally all coherence is gone to a point where one faces 
only despair. Sometimes also called an experience of crisis, it has arisen in times 
of social and personal catastrophe in our century. However, existentialism 
should not be understood to be a philosophy of despair, for indicative of the 
existentialist attitude is the existential experience that becomes instmmental in 
the formation of an important philosophical altemative with its focus being 
human existence. Other philosophies also study man; but they view him in terms 
of some concept or essence derived from reason. The existentialists oppose such 
traditional conceptualism and its abstract general concept of existence. They 
believe that what man is can only be determined from how he is. Man's essence 
is to be found only in his concrete existence. The desire to know the meaning of 
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the individual man in a more radical way than other philosophers have sought 
leads the existentialists to hold that the starting point of philosophy is the 
exploration of the concrete situation of man in the world. 
Alisdair Maclntyre in is book Existentialism delineates some central 
recurrent themes in existentialist writings to be those of intentionality, being and 
absurdity, freedom aiid choice, angst and death which are dealt with m one form 
or another in all existentialist writings \yith a^jocus Qg..^^, concrete situations 
that a human being encounters. To remain faithful to their enterprise the 
existentialists often abandon Western philosophy's traditional argumentative 
modes of expression, in favour of a less rigid and a more evocative style. 
Literature and theatre become as important as philosophical treatises for 
exploring the themes considered to be seminal by the existentialists. Linda Patrik 
comments, "Existential literature provides easier access to existentialism than do 
the non-fictional, philosophical works of existentialists, especially for readers 
unfamiliar with the jargon and argument style of twentieth-century European 
philosophy". (Patrik, 2001, p. xi) Most existentialist thinkers wrote systematic 
treatises but the sheer bulk of their literary contribution is noteworthy. The 
existentialists use of literature certainly enhanced the popularity of the 
movement. Patrik says that the existentialists "forged a connection between 
philosophy and literature that has not since been duplicated." (Patrik, 2001, p.xi) 
Existentialism happens to be without any doubt the best publicized of all 
the developments in contemporary thought. It is difficult to understand 
existentialism for it resists any attribution of a precise description or a crisp 
definition. The task becomes even more difficult as it cannot be arranged neatly 
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in the form of a system, school or creed nor does it present a particular set of 
clear cut tenets to be propounded or endorsed. Marcel says: 
"Hardly a day goes by without my being asked what is 
existentialism. It is perhaps hardly surprising that my 
answers tend to be evasive. I should like to say, 'It is too 
difficult', or 'it would take too long to explain' but I realize 
that such answers are disappointing and cannot be given too 
often". (Cited in Gill, 1973, p. 03) 
Oaklander in his book Existentialist Philosophy challenges the 
communicability of the subject matter of existentialism making use of an 
interesting argument. He says it seems impossible to communicate to someone 
else what it is to be a particular, existing individual, because communication 
involves the universal and "since the individual as such cannot be thought, it 
follows that what it is to be an individual cannot be described or directly 
communicated". (Oaklander, 1996, p. 06) Another reason why he considers the 
subject matter of existentialism to be incommunicable is that the human 
individual is in a constant process of becoming for what would be communicated 
one moment would be falsified the very next moment by the constant 
transformation of the human individual subjectivity. 
If Oaklanders argument is to be accepted then it would be futile to study 
existentialism. He observes "what existentialists say about the structure of 
human existence is existentially relevant only if we choose to see it in relation to 
our own life, incorporate it into our life, and become involved in an intensely 
personal act of self-transformation as a consequence of it. Only then can we 
'know' the subject matter of existentialism. Such 'knowledge' or 'self 
awareness' caimot be directly communicated, but must be lived." (Oaklander, 
1996, p. 08) 
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In his much pubhcized lecture of 1946, Existentialism is a Humanism 
Sartre says^ "existeotialism, in our sense of the word, is a doctrine that does 
render human life possible" and in addition, declares that "every truth and every 
action imply....a human subjectivity". (Sartre, 1948, p. 24)Yie also says, "there 
is no other universe except the human universe, the universe of human 
subjectivity". He gives his famous formula "existence precedes essence, or, if 
you prefer... subjectivity must be the starting point." (Sartre, 1948, p. 55) It 
could thus be said that existentialism is the philosophy that considers the human 
as the starting point, an empty one, without any definite essence - a starting 
point that needs to be built up through our free and authentic choices. 
There are several allegations and reproachments that have been laid 
against the term itself. It is often characterized as the vulgar philosophy and cafe 
philosophy. It is made out to be the philosophy which highlights the evil side of 
the human nature. It dwells over "quietism of despair." (Sartre, 1948, p. 23) 
The communists blame that it is yet an another bourgeois philosophy. 
And Christians reproach that it denies the seriousness of human affairs. It is not 
without reason that Sartre begins his famous lecture Existentialism and 
Humanism, by saying that "My purpose here is to offer a defence of 
existentialism against several reproaches that have been laid against it." (Sartre, 
1948, p. 23) And finally concludes these allegations with the following words: 
"Most of those who are making use of this word would be 
highly confused if required to explain its meaning... it is 
intended strictly for technicians and philosophers". (Sartre, 
1948, pp. 25-26) 
The divergencies and radical oppositions among existentialists on the 
number of important questions too make it difficult to define. There is no 
common body or set of doctrines to which all existentialists, subscribe or are 
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comparable. Most of the existentialists even reject the title of being an 
existentialist. Kierkegaard says that "he is a religious man and has no philosophy 
to call philosophy of existence." (Cited in Wahl, 1969, p. 03) Jaspers declares 
that "existentialism is the death of the philosophy of existence." (Cited in Wahl, 
1969, p. 03) And Heidegger clearly says that I am neither an existentialist nor 
phenomenologist but only a philosopher of being. He believes that there is one 
and only problem which should be primarily attended to and that is the problem 
of being. Sartre too, adopted the title only after much initial reluctance, when 
Marcel referred to him as an existentialist. The existentialists disregard for being 
fixed under a label is primarily as Roger L. Shin observes: 
Almost any self-respecting existentialist refuses to call 
himself an existentialist. To say, I am an existentialist, is to 
say, I am one of that classification of people known as 
existentialists; whereas the existentialist wants to say, I am 
myself - and I don't like your effort to fit me into your 
classification." (Shinn, 1968, p. 13) 
Existentialism is generally operative under two opposing areas; theistic 
and atheistic. This ftirther makes the task of defining existentialism even more 
difficult. Sartre states: 
"The questions is only complicated because there are two 
\, kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the 
Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel 
Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the 
existential atheists, among whom we must place Heidegger 
as well as tlte French existentialists and myself" (Sartre, 
1948,p. 26) ) 
On the other hand Paul Tillich who himself is to be considered as a theist 
existentialist affirms that the distinction between theistic and atheistic 
existentialism is arbitrary, unjustified and apparent. "... in reality, there is no 
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atheistic and theistic existentialism... it does not try to give an answer, either in 
theistic or atheistic terms." (TilUch, 1957, p. 28) 
This division fails to take account of the fact that frequently the 
relationship of the existentialist to his theism or his atheism is one which is 
highly paradoxical in nature for there exists a kind of love-hate relationship 
between them in which the elements of belief and disbelief are intertwined. For 
example, Kierkegaard, a theist existentialist with passionate commitment to the 
Christian faith treated conventional Christianity with total disregard. He 
criticized the churchmen for their dispassionate commitment. He said "all 
Christianity is rooted in the paradoxical whether one accepts it as a believer, or 
rejects it precisely because it is paradoxical... A once fiery and spiritual steed 
may come to loose its mettle and pride of carriage when it is held for hire and 
ridden by every bungler." (Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, pp. 96-97) Similarly, this 
love-hate relationship is conspicuous in Nietzsche's atheism too;4lis declaration 
of the 'death of God' was as sincere and passionate as Kierkegaard's striving for 
faith. But despite his sincere and passionate rejection of Christianity, Christianity 
continued to exercise a fascination over him. As Jaspers puts it: 
"... despite Nietzsche's savage attacks on Christianity there 
are strange ambivalences in his attitude. His opposition to 
Christianity as a reality is in separate from his tie to 
Christianity as postulate. And he himself regarded this tie as 
positive - not t^erely as something to be served." (Jaspers, 
1961, p. 06) \ 
The religious and cultural heritages too continue to influence the 
existentialists in the exposition of their thoughts. As John Macquarrie observes 
that "in spite of Kierkegaard's severe criticisms of Luther, his existentialism is 
infact inseparable from his Protestantism. Martin Buber's philosophy too is seen 
to be intertwined with the Hassidic tradition of Judaism. The existentialism of 
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Dostoyevsky and Berdyaev are deeply rooted in the spirit of Russian orthodoxy. 
Unamuno's attachment to Don Quixote and the quixotic generally is as Spanish 
as it is existentialist." (Macquarrie, 1972, p. 20) The rich diversity among these 
existentialists reflect their cultural and religious background as instrumental in 
the formation and execution of their ideas. And this diverse religious and 
cultural heritage makes existentialism immensely complex in its content. 
A radical opposition and diversity manifest in the personal lives of 
existentialists. Heidegger was considered to be a Nazi, Sartre a communist 
whereas Kierkegaard and Nietzsche had no inclination towards politics. Further 
Nietzsche was regarded as naturalist but others were anti-naturalist. 
Kierkegaard finds the meaning of life in God, Nietzsche in art, Sartre and 
Simon de Beauvoir in political commitment and for Heidegger it is philosophy 
itself in which an individual can find the meaning of life. 
Despite radical oppositions and divergencies on a number of important 
issues, what unifies them is the nature of the problems that they set out to 
explore and their style of philosophizing. "The existentialists, for all their 
individual differences clearly constitute a family of minds related by an abiding 
and even obsessive concern with certain philosophic themes and issues that can 
never, they maintain, be comfortably resolved within the framework of a closed 
rational system. The quarrel they have with one another remains a family 
quarrel." (Gill, 1973, p. 06) 
( Existentialism in its wider implications is always understood as a 
philosophy of a concrete man in a concrete situationJ Existentialists do not agree 
with the claim of traditional philosophers that'^an can be understood as a 
manifestation of pre-given cluster of qualities, qualified as 'essences'. It does not 
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inquire into the nature of man as tied down by the logical rules of a system as 
traditional philosophers did. It is most commonly understood as a revolt against 
traditional philosophy which is essentialist in nature. In this sense it is a revolt 
against essentialism. The subject matter of the existentialist philosophers is not 
the 'nature' or 'essence' of a thing, but an inquiry into the crisis-ridden, isolated 
existence of an individual. 
The man who reacted vehemently against the essentializing attitude of 
traditional philosophers was the Danish theologian and philosopher Soren 
Kierkegaard, who emphasized the importance of the uniqueness of individual as 
opposed to universal essences. He took the essentialists attitude to be the mark 
and shame of the nineteenth century, and characterized that period as essentially 
one of 'understanding and reflection without passion'. He described his age as 
one that had forsaken the individual in order to take refuge in the collective idea. 
'There are no longer any human beings' he said. 
Existentialists hold that reason tries to give an idea of man in general 
oblivious to the uniqueness of the individual. Though reactions against 
essentialist tendencies took place it was the existentialist trends in the past that 
opposed it with sustained rigour. 
Essentialism holds the view that in reality 'essence' is prior to 'existence'. 
And "looking for the source of the intellectualist mode... Kierkegaard ultimately 
traces its roots to the very origins of the western theorization in ancient Greece 
and, most crucially to Plato himself" (Gill, 1973, p. 07) Plato is to be considered 
as the prime originator of the essentialist trends in western philosophy. 
Plato's philosophy largely determined the style and the very terminology 
of subsequent conceptualization in classical, medieval and even modem times. 
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The substance of this legacy is the famous doctrine of two worlds, which exalts 
the realm of 'Being' or 'essence' over that of 'becoming' or 'existence'. 
According to Platonic dualism, there are two types of worlds, 'the world of 
ideas' and 'the world of percepts'. He affirms that 'the world of ideas' are the 
real world and 'the world of percepts' are dependent on or are a mere copy of the 
'world of ideas'. It is so because he believes that only ideas are real and the 
world of objects which we perceive, are merely the fading copies or 
approximation of the original 'universal' idea. Thus, an ordinary horse perceived 
on the ordinary level of sense experiences is a changing creature, differing from 
all other horses in numerous, subtle ways and displaying like all other entities 
manifold flaws and limitations. Yet common to him and all other horses, past, 
present and future is the unvarying general nature of the horse itself. And it is 
these general characteristics of horse or the essence of the horseness, according 
to Plato, that stands at a higher level than being. Plato applies the same criteria 
for all phenomenon inclusive of human being. Thus apprehending each 
particular object of the universe through a common universal class and 
considering each particular an example of a universal class. 
The essentialist claim that the singular path of reason leading towards the 
superior domain of absolute truth fiirther discards an alternative approach 
through senses as unreliable and delusive. They believe that the inferior 
mundane sphere available to the senses consists only of transient appearances 
and that the generalizing power of the pure thought is man's cardinal attribute 
and function. Thus making man into a pre-eminently rational animal. 
This essentializing trend manifest from Plato to Hegel is far removed 
from a comprehensive understanding of human existence. Ramakant Sinari in 
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his book Reason in Existentialism comments, "Platonic Being is factually an 
indifferent reality. It is a heaven erected entirely for its own sake, and has 
nothing to do with the world of individual existences." (Sinari, 1966, p. 153) 
In relation to this Bergson with great clarity states that to reduce things to 
ideas, is to resolve becoming into its principle moments, each of these being, 
moreover, by the hypothesis, screened from the laws of time, and, as it were, 
plucked out of eternity. Being as understood by human intellect, ignores the 
particular characteristics of the existing individual whose function consists of the 
fleeting consciousness itself. When Plato speaks of Being as the most universal 
form, or as that which is grasped through conceptual knowledge, he equates the 
whole of it to the general or essential aspect of it. Thus, in the reaction against 
traditional philosophy which propounds that 'essence precedes existence', 
existentialism accelerates its first principle as its exact reverse Existence 
precedes Essence. This is the principle on which almost all the existentialist 
whether theist or atheist unites. As Sartre puts it^'^hat they (theist and atheist) 
have in common is simply the feftt that they believe that existence comes before 
essence." (Sartre, 1948, p. 26) ) 
In the history of philosophy two metaphysical principles, essence and 
existence, have been under distinction. By essence is understood the common 
and essential attribute present in all individual or particular instances of a class. 
Tillich explains essence as the universal or the nature in which a thing 
participates^. The essentialists believe that it is the essence or the nature through 
which each thiiig..9flhe world is defined including the individual. And in this 
sense they advocate 'essence precedes existence'. But on the contrary 
existentialists argue that essence is universal and only a possibility, whereas, 
existence is particular, an individual an actuality belonging to a specific time and 
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space. Essence can be grasped by reason, but existence can be grasped only in 
one's immediate experience. Por the existentialists man exists first and then 
contemplates about his" nature, looks at the world and thinks about it. "His 
contemplations and his actions are possible only because of the priority of his 
existence: existence, thus, is the first principle from which all else follows. It is 
only later, by living, thinking, acting that man defines his nature and forms what 
is called his essence." (Odajnyk, 1965, p. 09) Thus, a man does not have pre-
given 'essence' or 'human nature'. He never comes in this world as finished 
product or as well defined. Rather he defines himself in course of his life in his 
interaction with the world. As Sartre observes: 
"What do we mean by saying that existence precedes 
essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters 
himself, surges up in the world - and defines himself 
afterwards. .. .Man is nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself" (Sartre, 1948, p. 28) 
Different existentialists exhibit a great diversity of form and expression in 
the dealing of issues relating to human existence yet they are 'children of the 
same age', without exception involved in the same predicament, which to them 
is one of crisis. Thus, in spite of their diversity, they are united in attitude and 
situation, protesting in their individual ways against tendencies prevalent in the 
present age. Sympathetic yet critical their protest is the challenge to all 
philosophy. Its function is to bring about a release from the predominance of 
analysis and rationalism, and to stir us to a revaluation of the traditional 
problems of men. Both theistic and atheistic existentialists have been highly 
critical of the philosophical and ethical traditions they inherited. The divergence 
of their views converges in their effort to provide an alternative to the overtly 
rational and what they like to coin as 'inhumane' philosophical approach with a 
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purpose to provide a comprehensive account of vi^ hat it is to be a human being 
living in this world. So seen, existentialism remains an important, though 
perhaps not final expression of issues concerning the existence of man. 
Existentialism in its boldest application is a revolt against rationalism. For 
existentialists there is no acceptance of pure thinking as it concerns itself with 
pure abstractions which, though greatly prized in scientific inquiry, are of 
irrelevance to philosophical enterprise on account of an attitude of detached 
spectatorship which at its best can lend itself to a disinterested thinking. "And 
for this, there is but a short step to the view that reason, when it functions coldly 
and dispassionately, from the stand point of a mere spectator of all time and 
existence, introduces a serious distortion into our understanding of things and 
must therefore, be rejected as an unreliable witness to the truth." (Gill, 1973, 
p. 65) 
The existentialists do not deny the importance of reason but object against 
its sole authority which lacks the pervasiveness to accommodate a 
comprehensive understanding of man. They believe that reason does not have 
self-contained answer to the meaning of a holistic, concrete existence. Reason 
must always function fi-om within existence. As Dostoevsky puts it in 
Underground Man "Reason... is an excellent thing, there is no disputing that but 
reason is only reason, and can only satisfy man's rational faculty... and humafi 
nature acts as a whole, with everything that is in it, consciously or 
unconsciously, and even if it goes wrong, it lives." (Cited in Gill, 1973, p. 17) 
The existentialists do not agree with the rationalists claim that, it is the 
possession of reason alone which distinguishes man from the rest of the species 
but that apart from being rational he is in possession of volition and emotion 
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which perhaps are constitutive of the uniqueness a person possesses. As Pascal 
too suggests that "the nature of man is his whole nature; Omne animaL'" (Cited 
inGill, 1973,p. 17) 
The existentialists do not disregard reason but execrated rationalism's 
idolatory of reason. They do not attack rationalism to undermine the role of 
reason or to deny its importance, but to observe the restrictions within which it 
can meaningfully be operative. They take reason to be a tool and not as a 
tribunal. They argue that the domain of human existence reveals irrational and 
transrational variations. In such contexts the instrumentality of reason has to be 
acknowledged but not the conclusive authority. Regarding the challenge and 
subsequent rejection of the philosophical tradition Alisdair Maclntyre remarks 
that existentialist thinkers should be considered as "disappointed rationalists" as 
a kind of metaphysical rationalism is palpable in the background of almost all 
existentialist philosophies such as in Kiekegaard's rejection of Hegel. He says 
rationalism is disappointing to the existentialists as human existence resists such 
systematization as is unable and insufficient to capture and explain individual 
existence. Maclntyre perceived the nineteenth century as an onset of immense 
opposition to worldviews presenting an ordered system created by a god or a 
rational order. The notion of a contingent or absurd world emerged as a reaction 
to such systematic, rational world views. Reason, according to Maclntyre, is at 
best a limited tool and if used solely to apprehend human existence it would only 
amount to over-stretching the powers of this limited tool. Existentialists make it 
their business to reveal the shortcomings of reason and as Wamock points out, 
"to free people from the shackles of illusion." (Wamock, 1970, p. 03) 
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For Nietzsche man's unquenching endeavour at acquiring a complete 
picture of the worid takes him beyond all scientific inquiry for the optimism 
based on logic collapses in the face of dilemmas that cannot be appropriated 
thus. Jaspers too declares "the knowledge of science fails in the face of all 
ultimate questions." (Cited in Gill, 1973, p. 18) The great German rationalist 
Hegel tries to construct a grand system through which he wants to explain 
everything. Each aspect of the world becomes a component of his grand system 
including man. The existentialist philosophers in general and Kierkegaard in 
particular revolt aggressively against this system building as a philosophical 
endeavour. An understanding of a human being can never be made possible if 
forced through the grid of systematic dictates. The uniqueness that is constitutive 
of a person's individuality cannot be grasped and contained in a system capable 
of containing the collective idea only. Hegel reduces each thing of the world 
including man into a universal 'Idea'. He explicitly rejects the concept of the 
individual in favour of the collective idea. The Hegelian system tries to capture 
individual existence in the logical development of concepts, but existentialists 
argue, that it captures only the concept of the individual and not the individual. 
Kierkegaard says: 
"What confuses the whole doctrine about being in logic is 
that people (i.e. Hegel) do not notice that they are always 
operating with the concept of existence... the difficulty is of 
course whether existence can be reduced to a concept." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p. 173) 
Kierkegaard perceives Hegel's failure as the failure of all of traditional 
rationalistic philosophy. It fails due to the non inclusion of a subjective view 
point i.e. the existence of the individual. Kierkegaard believes that the function 
of philosophy is the recognition of oneself as an instance of the concept of 
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humanity. It is on the strength of such self-knowledge that we erect our most 
fundamental commitments, and it is the understanding of the nature of such 
'commitments' which constitutes the chief concern of Kierkegaard's philosophy. 
For him, philosophy is primarily concerned with the individual and his way of 
life, not with concepts and conceptual knowledge. To exist, for him, is not to be 
a knowing subject but to be a moral agent. Philosophical 'truth' as sought by 
Kierkegaard is the truth of a commitment rather than anything like knowledge. 
As Kierkegaard says, "the real subject is not the cognitive subject... the real 
subject is the ethically existing subject." (Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p. 281) 
Thus the existentialists argue that systematic speculative philosophy 
remains oblivious to the individual being for they are concerned solely with 
humanity at large. In such a system the individual is reduced to nothing. Not 
only Kierkegaard but most existentialist philosophers have directed their 
criticism against rationalism that appropriates the individual in terms of 
essentializing characteristics. Sartre in his novel Nausea writes, 'the world of 
explanation and reason is not the world of existence'. 
The existentialists critique of rationalism should not be taken as a 
manifesto of irrationalism or anti-intellectualism. In their criticism of reason 
they simply attempted to direct philosophy in the direction of the actualities of 
life. As Kierkegaard clarifies this issue thus, "If thought... speaks depreciatingly 
of the imagination, imagination in its turn speaks depreciatingly about thought; 
and likewise with feeling. The task is not to exalt one at the expense of the other, 
but to give them equal status, to unify them in simultaneity; the medium in 
which they are unified is existence." (Cited in Gill, 1973, p. 19) 
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The problem on which all existentialists reach to a common consensus, 
despite their divergencies and radical oppositions is the problem of 'existence'. 
The man who attributes an entirely new meaning to the term 'existence' is Soren 
Kierkegaard^ For him, the meaning of 'existence' is not the same as it was 
previously articulated by traditional philosophers. He reserves the term 
'existence' only for a unique, concrete human being who is involved in the 
actualities of life rather than attributing it to an abstract concept of 'existence^' 
Kierkegaard speaks of 'individual existence' in a very special sense of the term 
which treats man not simply as a biological, psychological or social animal, but 
one who is a human being' an 'existent' which is something far more 
comprehensive and demanding than the 'mere' existence of a particular 
organism/This notion of 'existence' is reserved for those who distinguish 
themselves-as individuals, forging their thoughts and values with the impulse of 
a creative freedom and above all living a life of commitment and responsibility. 
As Soloman points out in his book From Rationalism to Existentialism, "it is the 
" human being who ... is the passionate anti-social or at least asocial individual 
who is master of his own life, the author of his own values." (Soloman, 1970, 
p. 85) 
Protagorous says 'man is the measure of all things'. And Socrates 
pronounces the dictum 'know thyself. Even Aristotle says that 'substance is the 
concrete individual' and the individual cannot be subsumed under genera and 
species. In Modem period Descartes' main concern has been to prove the 
existence of individual self It may be felt that the emphasis on individual 
existence is perhaps not unique to existentialism for philosophers of the past 
have paid much attention to this. 
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The existentialists recognized the need for an enquiry that would place the 
very existence of the analytical at the core rather than departing into abstractions 
and conceptualization about the subject, for in the process of making 'concepts' 
they forget the real 'subject' or existence. Existentialists argue that the concerns 
of the traditional philosophers remain trapped in a surface inquiry confined to a 
conceptualization rather than an interaction with what is concrete in a real being 
who lives, suffers and dies. 
Existentialists protest that existence cannot be reduced to mere 
'concepts'. Because a concept is limited to a mere possibility while existence 
requires an application of that possibility. Further, for existentialists, "existence 
... is the contingent, the particular, that which refuses to fit into some system 
constructed by rational thought." (Macquarrie, 1972, p. 62) 
Thus, the existentialists usage of the word existence refers to that which is 
unique, concrete and individual. They focus on the practical aspect of human 
lives rather than the mere idea of being human. As Jaspers says: 
"Philosophy grew in me through finding myself in the midst 
of life itself Philosophical thought is practical activity... not 
impartial thinking which studies a subject with indifference." 
(CitedinGill, 1973,p. 15) 
Kierkegaard highlights this further by drawing a contrast between the 
lives as lived by Socrates and that of Plato. He writes 
"Socrates... concentrates essentially upon accentuating 
existence, while Plato forgets this, and loses himself in 
speculation. Socrates' infinite merit is to have been an 
existing thinker, not a speculative philosopher who forgets 
what it means to exist." (Cited in Gill, 1973, p. 15) 
Nietzsche too, much in keeping with Kierkegaard's viewpoint makes a 
similar distinction between what he calls as the theoretical man and the tragic 
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mind. According to him, a philosopher should be an instance for the society at 
large and it should be not by mere thoughts but mainly through his actions. He 
declares that "I judge a philosopher by whether he can serve as an example." 
(CitedinGill, 1973,p. 15) 
Sartre, too, believes that a man should be 'engaged'. He thinks that in 
order to become authentic, a man should be actively involved in the actualities of 
life. Simon de Beauvoir mentions in her diary that by February 1940, she and 
Sartre had become aware of an important change within themselves. She writes: 
"Sartre had come to feel that he could no longer remain aloof 
from political involvement. The concept of 'authenticity at 
which he had arrived demanded that he 'assume' his 
'situation' in the world and he could do so only by 
franscending it and engaging in action." (Cited in Kem, 1962, 
p. 12) 
Despite their sharp divergence and radical oppositions from one another, 
all existentialists are definitely in accord about man's freedom. It is the basic 
theme around which the entire existential philosophy revolves! They believe that 
freedom is the sole-criterion of human subjectivity. It is only because of the 
freedom of choice that an individual is defined as 'subjective being'.]Both the 
theistic and atheistic trends give emphasis to the freedom of choice. Even though 
they are radically opposed to each other concerning the ftinction of freedom! For 
theistic existentialism, freedom makes possible the leap of faith through which 
man comes close to God. While for atheistic existentialism, freedom allows man 
the conscious decision through which man defines himself 
In contrast to objectivity, existentialists emphasise human subjectivity. 
Kierkegaard considers the task of philosophy is to rediscover the subjectivity of 
individual because he thinks that we have lost sight of our subjectivity under the 
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illusion of objectivity. And he believes that this illusion of objectivity can be 
eliminated only through free choice. He says that "truth is subjectivity, 
inwardness, eternal becoming and active freedom." (Sinari, 1966, p. 15) Sartre 
too says "subjectivism means ... freedom of the individual subject." (Sartre, 
1948, p. 28) 
For the existentialists freedom means freedom of choice, for them it is the 
free choice that leads to authentic selfhood. They believe that alternative choices 
are always available and one has to choose from within these alternatives. By 
adopting one alternative rather than another, one sets out values over other. As 
Kierkegaard writes in Either/Or. 
"... the choice itself is decisive for the content of the 
personality, through the choice the personality immerses 
itself in the thing chosen." (Cited in Gill, 1973, p. 32) 
/ Freedom of choice is always coupled with the notion of responsibility. 
And responsibility lies in the fact that whenever we choose something it should 
concern all others. We are not choosing only for ourselves but for entire 
humanity. Sartre says: 
"If, however, it is true that existence is prior to essence, man 
is responsible for what he is. Thus, the first effect of 
existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of 
himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his 
existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we 
say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that 
he is responsible only for his own individually, but that he is 
responsible for all men." (Sartre, 1948, p. 29) 
He further says that: 
"What we choose is always the better: and nothing can be 
better for us unless it is better for all... Our responsibility is 
thus much greater than we had supposed, for it concems 
mankind as a whole." (Sartre, 1948, p. 29) \ 
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Choice, at its deepest level, is a commitment. For the theists it is 
commitment to God while for the atheists it is through free commitment that a 
man realizes himself. As Sartre declares: 
"What is at the very heart and center of existentialism, is the 
absolute character of the free commitment, by which every 
man reahzes himself" (Sartre, 1948, p. 47) 
I The existentialists equate freedom with projection. It propels man towards 
the mSire. In exercising freedom man projects himself towards the ftiture and 
V 
decides what he should be)iAs Sinari puts it in Reason in Existentialism: 
"Man is the repository of innumerable possibilities whose 
actualization confirms that he is a 'projection'. Freedom and 
projection are one and the same thing... Freedom is the 
action of my creating myself I decide, I act, and through this 
1 am my sole freedom." (Sinari, 1966, pp. 77-78) 
Similarly Sartre says that "man is nothing else but that which he makes of 
himself.... Man is, indeed a project.... Before that projection of the self nothing 
exists.... Man will only attain existence when he is what he purposes to be. Not, 
however, what he may wish to be." (Sartre, 1948, p. 28) 
/ Existentialists link freedom with transcendence. Without freedom the 
transcendence is not possible. It is only because of freedom that an individual 
can transcends from his given situation or in Sartre's terminology situationality. 
Heidegger uses freedom and transcendence as identical and says "transcendence 
of the world is freedom itself." (Heidegger, 1969, p. 103) Heidegger takes 
freedom as the opening of philosophy. He argues that freedom "evokes in man 
the basic question about the primordial relation between Being and Time. 
Freedom is the condition of possibility for the disclosure of the Being of entities 
- for the understanding of Being. Primordial freedom is fiindamental to 
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philosophy, as it lets man into the extensiveness of Being and into the 
intensiveness of time as the horizon of understanding of Being. Thus, the basic 
question of philosophy, according to Heidegger, is grounded in the question of 
the essence of freedom." (Puthenpurakkal, 1987, p. 102)JAnd for Jaspers it is 
only transcendence which rescues man from 'shipwreck'. 
Thus, the existentialists unanimously suggest the illumination of human 
existence where man can make his choice, his decision as a free and responsible 
individual. They feel that it is by bringing man back to his concrete existence, by 
restoring his freedom, by giving him chance to choose and decide like a 
responsible mdividual that a man's life becomes authentic^ Tillich says that it is 
the aspect of human freedom, his power to contradict himself and his essential 
nature that makes the transition from essence to existence possible. Tillich 
writes, it is human freedom that provides the possibility for the transition from 
essence to existence, j 
Authenticity is of central concern to almost all the leading existentialists. 
As we have seen existentialists concentrate their attention on the problems that 
are directly, related to the concrete human existence rather than on those that are 
abstract or speculative. Such themes as freedom, decision making and 
responsibility become central to the all existentialist philosophies as they 
constitute the core of personal being. It is through free and responsible decisions 
that man becomes authentically himself. Existentialism laid great stress on 
freedom of the individual in forging a life - an authentic existence for one self. It 
rebels strongly against the conformity bom out of the belief that a human is only 
a pre-determined cog in a completely ordered universe. Thus in a very large 
sense authenticity is understood in existential philosophy as living with the 
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recognition that one's own life and choices are one's own responsibihty. And 
'inauthenticity' on the other hand, is the suppression of responsibihty for one's 
own Ufe. 
Though the term authenticity and inauthenticity were introduced for the 
first time, by Heidegger - and later adopted, with some variations in meaning by 
Sartre, but other existentiahsts too have dwelt upon the same fundamental notion 
and their phenomenological descriptions of how the two modes, authentic and 
inauthentic, become manifest in man's day-to-day life. Indeed, whatever 
terminology may be used, the concept of the authentic as opposed to the 
inauthentic life is one of the most original and important contributions of 
existentialism precisely because it negotiates with ethics as genuinely rooted in 
human ontology. All existentialists consider that individuals are radically fi*ee 
and that they have to make conscious authentic choices, as the value of choice is 
tremendous in the shaping of ones existence. They feel that human beings are 
fi-ee and must choose because there are no objective values. Instead of accepting 
a nihilism that may ensue, most existentialists propose that the individual must 
be responsible and undertake it as their most fimdamental task to create values. 
Thus, different existentialists perceive the construction of authenticity 
differently. Theistic existentialists consider a leap in faith as the mark of 
authenticity. Kierkegaard the forerunner of twentieth century existentialism held 
that for him the authentic individual is a person of faith as Abraham was. He 
uses the words like individuality, subjectivity, spirit, inwardness and authenticity 
synonymously. For him commitment and passionate action are the important 
tenets of authenticity. He conceives the job of philosophy as not the detached 
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search for knowledge but as an involved and desperate quest to find out what to 
do. 
Authenticity for Kierkegaard meant rising of the individual above the 
leveling process of crowd. He detested, the glorification of the state, the church, 
the committee or the crowd above the individual considering the process of 
leveling as the greatest danger to authenticity. He says: 
".. .a crowd in its very concept is the untruth, by reason of the 
fact that it renders the individual completely impenitent and 
irresponsible, or at least weakens his sense of responsibility 
by reducing it to a fraction." (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 112) 
Kierkegaard's notion of authenticity stresses the primacy of will over 
intellect. An act of will is the center of harmonious authentic selfhood. His 
Christian choice is an act of will rather than a rational explication. It is to be 
embraced by an act of the will by the leap of faith a moment before God which 
consequently leads to authentic existence. 
Because of the Nietzsche's declaration of the death of God "... men are 
faced with the profound responsibility of deciding for themselves, choosing for 
themselves, acting for themselves, and being themselves; i.e., choosing authentic 
existence rather than 'loosing' themselves in the crowd, becoming a 'non-entity', 
escaping reality." (Natanson, 1973, p. 02) 
Like Kierkegaard, in order to become authentic, Nietzsche too, rejects the 
traditional morality which he characterizes as the slave morality of the crowd. It 
assumes that what is good or bad for one is the same for another. Instead of the 
traditional or slave morality, Nietzsche advocates the morality of the master, the 
over man. In master morality one transcends from the pre-given traditional 
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morality and creates his own values through his free choice. He needs no 
approval by any one. He himself is the source of value. 
Nietzsche pronounces the will to power as the sole criteria for morality. 
He advocates that the greatest expression of power is to overcome oneself and it 
is the will to overcome which lies implicit in every morality. As he puts it in 
Thus Spake Zarathustra: 
"A table of values hangeth over each people. Behold, it is the 
table of its resignation; behold, it is the voice of its will unto 
power." (Nietzsche, 1908, p. 74) 
Thus, Nietzsche advocates that an authentic individual is one who has the 
will to power, who breaks the traditional morality and makes his own value with 
exercising free choice. He speaks about the transvaluation of values. And those 
who transcend from traditional values and have the will to power will be 
authentic individuals or super men. He says: 
"To redeem what is past in man and to transvalue every 'It 
was' until will saith: thus I willed! Thus shall I will." 
(Neitzsche, 1908, p. 272) 
Camus felt that though ultimate meaning in this world is impossible we 
can still restore our own dignity as persons by challenging the absurd through 
faith is one's creativity. A love of life emerges from an encounter with despair. 
Camus denies meaning for his existence from an original denial of the possibility 
of meaning thrust from an external world. 
Sartre believes that man is thrown into an absurd existence, as a result of 
which the individual has the opportunity to discover himself using his own will 
and free choices. Like Nietzsche, Sartre too, surpasses the tenets of traditional 
morality which were based on the underlying assumption that human beings are 
in possession of a given 'essence' which may be called 'human nature'. 
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Differentiating human beings from everything that has a given essence, Sartre 
says "Man is the being who is what he is not and who is not what he is." (Sartre, 
1957, p. xix) It means a constant transformation of our self towards a possibility 
that is not yet crystallized. A human being is a constant 'not yet'. In Being and 
Nothingness, authenticity is a value that cannot be realized, the nature of 
authenticity is ideality and it is a necessary unrealizable ideal, still the individual 
should strive constantly for otherwise the fear of lapsing into bad faith opens up. 
Striving constantly causes us to reflect on our being, never ceasing to accept the 
challenges and responsibility of free choices. 
For Heidegger authentic existence is attained in the decisive Moment-
before- death. The man authentically exists as a being of care and temporality, 
finally abandoned to death anchored to a radical finitude. Being is revealed 
authentically through the temporal horizon of Dasein as it is lived toward its 
final possibility of death. To live authentically is to choose resolutely, to live 
towards ones death, thereby appropriating the experience of ultimate 
nothingness. Inauthenticity by contrast, is the refusal of being towards death. To 
exist inauthentically is to be free from the awareness of freedom, responsibility 
and death, seeking refiige in the security of the anonymous 'they' which tells me 
what to think and what to be. The 'they' defines a person as a fixed actuality 
rather than a free possibility. 
Thus, on the one hand man is portrayed as exercising freedom, will, 
decision, creativity, setting goals and striving for their attaiimient and on the 
other a being of care and temporality, finally abandoned to radical finitude. A 
person is seen in his essential sociality as a being-with-others capable of love but 
on the other hand it is also seen that this being-with-others is usually swallowed 
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up in the inauthentic collectivism of the they and many of the existentialist 
thinkers like Marcel and Buber have thought it a necessity to stress the 
individual's need to extricate himself from the crowd in order to be fiiUy 
himself 
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An Irrational Passion 
... Kierkegaard...desires Christianity in its original purity, for this alone 
can help such a time as ours. Christianity must be resuscitated as the 
martyrdom of the individual, who is to-day aimihilated by the mass-man. 
Kierkegaard will not allow himself to be vitiated by the prosperity of a 
secure position as pastor or professor; will not promulgate an objective 
theology or philosophy; will not become an agitator or a practical 
reformer. He can not show his contemporaries what they ought to do, 
but can make them feel that they are on the wrong road. (Jaspers, 1959, 
p. 20) 
Soren Kierkegaard was a Danish philosopher, theologian as well as a man 
of literature. Kierkegaard's renaissance is one of the strangest phenomena of our 
time. It is rather ironical that this lonely thiiiker of the nineteenth century 
Denmark, who made no significant impact on his own age and died in utter 
misery in a Copenhagen hospital, has been considered as the initiator of the 
existentialist school of thought. For the understanding of his philosophy it 
becomes imperative to begin with his biographical detail which demonstrate the 
successive stages of the realization of his personal existence and eventually 
become the ground for his existential philosophy. He was bom on May 5, 1813, 
in Copenhagen as the youngest of seven children. Under a very strict orthodox 
Lutheran education of somewhat sombre and depressing kind Kierkegaard could 
not really enjoy his childhood. He admits, "I have never had any immediacy, and 
therefore, in the ordinary human sense of the world, I have never lived. I began 
at once with reflection; ... I am reflection from first to last." (Kierkegaard, 1962, 
p. 81) In 1830 he entered the University of Copenhagen where at that time 
Hegelianism prevailed. In 1840 he passed the theological examination, entered 
the pastoral seminary, and delivered his first sermon in a Copenhagen Church in 
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1841. In 1840 he was engaged to Regina Olsen, which he broke off in 1841, an 
event of great consequence for his literary and spiritual life. It marked the 
beginning of a very prolific literary activity. His polemical nature brought him 
into conflict with the official church. He committed himself to the task of 
defending true Christianity against its distortion by the church. He died on 
November!, 1855. 
The meaning of existentialist authenticity in Kierkegaard's life and 
works is a translation of the abstract into the concrete, an ethical and religious 
appropriation of the ideal, and realization rather than any doctrinal knowledge. 
He fights his battle on two major fronts: on the one hand, he fights against the 
liberalist secularization of the Danish Lutheran Church which propagates 
Christianity as a doctrine rather than an active passionate commitment, and on 
the other hand, against the rampant Hegelianism which tyrannized the 
philosophical world of the early nineteenth century. Taking Hegelianism to be 
the expression of the spirit of those times, Kierkegaard's attacks were directed 
towards philosophical as well as social and religious forms. For a comprehensive 
understanding of Kierkegaard's philosophy it would be of consequence to follow 
the dynamics of Kierkegaard's discontent which he express in the form of an 
attack issued in two different directions viz.(l) A religious attack upon 
Christendom, and (2) A philosophical attack upon Hegel. 
Attack upon Christendom: 
Kierkegaard acts as a provocation to thought, calling upon his reader to 
question old established opinion and to rethink his whole position. He achieves 
this by formulating apparently a very simple question. How to become a true 
Christian? But to ask this question seems to be paradoxical, because his 
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contemporaries were Christians. But in Kierkegaard's opinion, in tlie true sense 
they were not Christians. He says "At the present time the difficulty of becoming 
a Christian involves actively transforming an initial being-a-Christian into a 
possibility, in order to become a Christian in reality." (Kierkegaard, 1941, cup, 
p. 326) The defenders of Christianity before him had struggled to show that the 
doctrines of the religion were reasonable and that philosophy, as the embodiment 
of reason, could show these doctrines to be objectively valid. Kierkegaard was 
convinced that such a defence could not be successfully carried out as 
Christianity, far from consisting of a set of reasonable doctrines, was the paragon 
of absurdity. Philosophy or reason and Christianity were absolutely 
irreconcilable. The very essence of Christianity, according to Kierkegaard, is 
paradoxical and irrational. 
Kierkegaard says that there was the vulgar conception of 'being a 
Christian', which accepted a person as a Christian if he had been bom of 
Christian parentage and occasionally succeeded in barely performing prescribed 
rituals. Thus, to be a Christian was to be bom into a Christian family completely 
unified and indistinguishable from each other, in a community before God. This 
was conveniently institutionalized in the concept of the state - church. It was 
established by the state as a kind of etemal principle that every child was 
naturally bom as a Christian. As the state obligated itself to bring etemal bliss 
for all Christians, it also took upon itself the task to produce Christians. The state 
thus delivered, generation after generation an assortment of Christians; each 
bearing the manufacturer's trademark of the state, with perfect accuracy, one 
Christian exactly like all the others with the greatest possible uniformity of a 
factory product. 
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Kierkegaard reacts strongly against the state church with a recurring 
insistence on individuality, which permeates his religious writings and becomes 
the very foundation of being a Christian: 
'"The individual': now that the word has gone so far 
along the road of reflection, Christianity stands and falls 
with that category." (Kierkegaard's Journals 1847, Cited 
inSoloman, 1972, p 74) 
He defines Christianity as 'suffering'. His childhood confrontation with 
the despair and suffering inherent in his father's Christianity leads him to reject, 
with an excessive bitterness, even in his works, any notion of 'being a Christian* 
which provides men with happiness and self-satisfaction. As he says in, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript that 'Christianity is suffering' and to be a 
Christian is to be forever conscious of the unhappy passions of dread and guilt. 
Christianity, because it is defined by suffering and the feelings associated 
with sin is not a set of doctrines to be accepted or rejected for Christianity is not 
a mode or body of knowledge, but it is a way of life. 
A Christian could be only the most spectacular of men. It is not possible 
both, to lead a successftil secular life and be a Christian. In fact, Kierkegaard 
takes as his model of Christianity the asceticism of the monastery. 
"Back to the monastery out of which Luther broke - that is 
the truth that is what must be done...The fault with the 
monastery was not asceticism, celibacy, etc.; no, the fault 
was that Christianity had been moderated by making the 
admission that all this was considered to be extraordinarily 
Christian - and the purely secular nonsense to be considered 
ordinary Christianity." (Kierkegaard, 1944, p. 155) 
Kierkegaard takes it upon himself to change the conception of 
Christianity. He responds that what must be changed is not Christianity but only 
our conception of .Christianity, that is, what it is to be Christian. He says. 
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"My only analogy is Socrates. My task is 
a Socratic task-to revise the conception 
what it means to be a Christian." (Kierkegaard , Attack 
upon Christendom, Cited in Soloman, 1972, p. 74) 
Kierkegaard says that the acceptance of Christianity is not at all 
reasonable, and belief in Christ can never constitute a piece of knowledge. 'The 
problem is not to understand Christianity, but to understand that it can not be 
understood' says Kierkegaard in his Journals in 1948. What this means is that 
although Christianity contains a set of doctrines as its foundations, to be a 
Christian can not be merely the acceptance of these doctrines. The doctrines of 
Christianity are absurd, and the absurd doctrine is not one which one can accept 
as true. Since Christianity is not something that can be known at all, 
'acceptance' is not appropriate to it 'Christianity is not a doctrine.' What is 
required is passion - the passion of faith. 
The central doctrine of Christianity according to Kierkegaard is not to be 
believed in any literal sense at all, but is rather to be used as a foil, as a cause for 
passion and feeling. The acceptance of 'Christianity' is therefore, an acceptance 
of a way of life, a life of suffering, but suffering that has no reason whatsoever. 
At the very basis of this suffering is the doctrine of one's relationship to God, as 
signified by Christ. This doctrine is not something true or known or even 
literally believed. It is a feeling one has of constant guilt and despair, but whose 
object (one's sin before God) must forever remain, not only a 'mystery', but 
simply incomprehensible. To be a Christian, therefore, is to embark upon this 
'irrational' way of life. 
Because Christianity is a way of life, and it lies in feeling, nothing could 
be more inimicable to it than the success of apologetics. If one could accept the 
doctrine of the Trinity as one could accept, for example, the laws of gravitation. 
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one would have a plausible belief, but hardly a way of life. Kierkegaard held that 
any attempt to rationalize Christianity is nothing other than the attempt to make 
being a Christian emotionally empty. The many attempted proofs of the faith are 
nothing other than aids for lacking in emotions and passion. 
"When faith....begins to loose its passion, 
when faith begins to cease to be faith, 
then a proof becomes necessary so as to 
command respect from the side of unbelief" 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p.202) 
Kierkegaard's defence of Christianity firmly rests on his celebration of 
the individual and his absolute rejection of collectivity and the crowd. To be a 
Christian, as to be an 'authentic human being', is to isolate oneself and choose 
one's own mode of life with a passionate commitment, as Kierkegaard himself 
feels that he had done. It is this celebration of the individual and the emphasis on 
commitment and subjectivity that marks the major breach between Kierkegaard 
and Hegel and the whole of traditional western rationalism. 
Attack on Hegelianism: 
Kierkegaard reacts vehemently against western rationalism which tries to 
define human being in terms of reason only. Philosophers construct grand 
speculative systems, so complete in themselves, that every aspect of reality can 
be accounted for. In such systems 'truth' is a matter of finding an appropriate 
place within the system, and trading in the domain of reason there remains no 
place for emotions or the subjective aspects of our human existence. In such a 
grand system there is a place for everything, and everything in its place; every 
aspect of human knowledge is completely accounted for, labelled, systematized, 
criticized, and methodically evaluated. Such was the ideal of reason during the 
nineteenth century and the champion of rationalism was G. F. W. Hegel, who 
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was Kierkegaard's chosen enemy. Kierkegaard attacks on the great speculative 
thinker and says, "If Hegel had written the whole of his Logic and then said... 
that it was merely an experiment in thought, then he could certainly have been 
the greatest thinker who ever lived. As it is, he is merely comic." (kierkegaard's 
Journals,!843, Cited in Soloman, 1972, p. 77) What made Hegel comic for 
Kierkegaard was that he tries to capture all reality in his system of thought, yet 
in the process lost the most important element, namely, existence. For 
Kierkegaard, the term existence was reserved for the individual human being. 
For him existence implies being a certain kind of individual, an individual who 
strives, who considers alternatives, who chooses, who decides, and who, above 
all, commits himself. Virtually none of these acts were implied in Hegel's 
thought. Kierkegaard's entire career might well be considered as a self conscious 
revolt against abstract thought and an attempt on his part to live upto 
Feuerbach's admonition: "Do not wish to be a philosopher in contrast to being a 
man...do not think as a thinker...think as a living, real being...think in 
Existence." (Stumpf,1988, pp. 476-477) 
For Kierkegaard reason deals with what occurs in time only, while 
Christianity is concerned with eternity. He had radical objections against abstract 
metaphysical systems, and especially Hegel who claimed to find an exhaustive 
explanation of everything through his reasoning. Kierkegaard insisted that 
philosophy should not be abstract; rather it must be based upon personal 
experience. He tried to turn the outward looking mind of his contemporaries 
inwards. He says: 
"Truth or value that I hanker after is not merely for 
satisfying the idle intellect but for being 'appropriated' or 
realized in my life. It should, therefore, satisfy me. But 
the conception of objectivity demands, on the contrary, 
that truth should not depend upon my satisfaction, it 
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should satisfy others and I should cultivate a 
detachedness which should drown my personal verdict in 
the verdict of others. This means a spiritual suicide." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p.l 13) 
Thus, Kierkegaard was of the view that "objective truth is easily 
recognized.. .e.g. twice two is four.. .Once I know it . . .But the truth of religion is 
not like that: It is a truth that must penetrate my own personal existence, or it is 
nothing; and I must struggle to renew it in my life everyday... This kind of a 
truth is not a truth of intellect but of the whole man. Subjective truth is not a 
truth that 'I have', but a truth that '1 am'." (Barret, 1972, pp. 152-153) 
Kierkegaard rejects theoretical and systematic goals. Instead Kierkegaard thinks 
that philosophy should be primarily concerned with ethical practice. It should 
speak directly to individuals and awaken them from their passive, slumbering 
lives. Although Hegel is mindful of existential concern, his primary aim is to 
create a complete system that informs all spheres of reality and produces 
existential harmony. Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard is not interested in knowledge 
and system because he thinks that these aspirations distract attention from the 
important task which is to transform people's existence. Hegel believes that both 
aims are important, and his goal is to demonstrate how both theoretical and 
practical goals can be realized in a unified system. But Kierkegaard simply 
dismisses his theoretical goals, as if they are irrelevant to philosophy. He offers 
his conceptual studies and psychological analyses in order to serve his larger 
purpose of facilitating personal authenticity. 
Kierkegaard's objection to the very idea of a systematic philosophy can 
be simply summarized in his words as, 'philosophy, under Hegel, had left no 
room for wisdom, for 'ethics'. One thing has always escaped Hegel, and that is 
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how to live'. Hegel may have achieved the absolute knowledge of reality, but, 
Kierkegaard says: 
"The only reality that exists for an existing individual is 
his own ethical reality. What would be the use of 
discovering so-called objective truth, of working through 
all the systems of philosophy... .to construct a world in 
which I do not live but only hold up for the view of 
others." (Kierkegaard's Journals, 1935, Cited in Soloman, 
1972, p. 78) 
Kierkegaard declared that Hegel gives us a system of 'Absolute 
knowledge' only at the cost of excluding practical wisdom, the 'ethical', as part 
of philosophy. Yet this practical wisdom, knowledge of how to live and what to 
do, is precisely what Kierkegaard demands of philosophy. He says that 'if 
Hegel's philosophy can not give us this wisdom then it is of no use'. He says 
about Hegel: that "he was a 'poor existing individual' who invented the system 
in the vain hope of losing his fmitude by being absorbed into it." (Rorty, 1999, p. 
33) His philosophy can be substituted for ethical or practical wisdom only as a 
distraction from the need to make ethical or practical decisions. The general 
disagreement between Hegel and Kierkegaard is thus Kierkegaard's demand that 
philosophy provides us with just those edifying 'truths' which Hegel explicitly 
denies that it is the business of philosophy to give us. 
Kierkegaard believes that, Hegel's failure, as the failure of all of 
traditional rationalistic philosophy, was its avoidance of the "subjective view 
point", the 'existence of the individual'. This failure comes not from an 
oversight on Hegel's part, or from a conscious attempt to ignore the subject and 
to neglect subjective truth, but comes from a basic impetus in the very 
conception of the systematic philosophy. The medium of the system is concept, 
and, in its development every aspect, every conception, of human existence is 
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given expression. Isolated individual human existence is included as only one of 
the stages in the conceptual development of spirit. However: 
"what confuses the whole doctrine about being in logic is 
that people (i.e.Hegel) do not notice that they are always 
operating with the concept of existence....the difficulty is 
of course whether existence can be reduced to a concept." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p. 173) 
Kierkegaard thinks that Hegel's dialectic assumes that all oppositions can 
be rationally resolved through some higher stand point - In a form of life that 
retains the strengths of the previous forms but resolves their problems. 
Kierkegaard doubts that this is possible. He sees inevitable paradoxes and 
contradictions between different forms of life, and insists that ultimately 
unjustifiable ethical choices must be made between them. This is perhaps their 
most fundamental disagreement. 
Kierkegaard complains that existence can not be so reduced for a concept 
is a mere possibility, but existence requires an instantiation of that possibility. 
Kierkegaard claims that the Hegelian system does not attempt to capture 
individual existence in the logical development of concepts, but it captures only 
the concept of the individual, and not the individual. 'Subjectivity' can never be 
captured in logic for it is forever irreducible to a concept. 
Kierkegaard rebels against Hegel's universal concepts which he 
developed in his systematic philosophy. He believes that such concepts can not 
comprehend specific individuals and particular situations. Even though Hegel 
elucidated the concrete universals that inform particular eras, but Kierkegaard 
insists that each person lives the spirit of the age differently, and the task is to 
explore these diverse responses and their implications for individual lives. In his 
Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel too, examines a variety of styles of life, but 
Kierkegaard insists that Hegel examines only idealized types and raises 
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problems for these types that are Umited to their role in his developmental 
scheme. To really explore those forms of life requires a more detailed 
examination of specific cases, not influenced by the demands of the grand 
system. Kierkegaard's own discussion of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious 
lives uncovers a multitude of intrinsic problems and deals with various efforts to 
avoid them. Hegel, of course, does this too, but Kierkegaard would insist that 
Hegel's efforts remain sketchy and abstract, unconnected with the personal 
dimensions of these forms of life. 
Kierkegaard asserts that the dialectic within Hegel's system is too 
impersonal - attempting to discover a necessity that it can not justify. Hegel 
implies that everyone will follow a certain developmental path based on the 
structure of the abstract types he describes, when infact different people will 
resolve the issues within the various forms of life differently and may not 
emerge from these stages in the way Hegel accepts. Some may continuously 
struggle within a form without ever superseding it. Kierkegaard rejects the claim 
that crises within each form are so determinate that they require specific 
resolutions which lead in inescapable directions. In effect he rejects Hegel's 
concept of determinate negation. Hegel acknowledges that only people who take 
the standard of each form of life seriously will undergo the transitions he 
describes, but he also insists that the dialectical structure he uncovers is real. He 
claims that the tensions within each form of life are resolved in specific 
directions, and he would suggest that this claim can be defended for each form 
of life. An individual may come to the resolution of a stage in different ways, but 
he suggests that there are internal dynamics within forms of life that drive people 
toward specific resolutions. 
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Logic, according to Kierkegaard, exposes those concepts which are 
necessary conditions for 'consciousness in general'. Hegel's logic traces the 
development of the concepts of a literally 'general consciousness' which are 
necessary for spiritual self- consciousness in The Idea. Hegel's concern is only 
for the universal, the a priori, and the analysis of those fundamental concepts or 
categories in logic. Logic, however, can not capture the peculiarities of an 
individual person - his feelings, particular thoughts, emotions, dispositions - in 
short, all of those non-universal aspects of a person to which we refer as his 
personality. The kind of 'understanding' Kierkegaard demands of philosophy is 
just this sort of understanding, of psychological differences rather than logical 
similarities. The task of philosophy is the recognition of oneself as unique and 
peculiar, and not the recognition of oneself as an instance of the concept of 
'humanity'. It is on the basis of such self-knowledge that we base our most 
fundamental commitments, and it is the understanding of the namre of such 
commitments which constitutes the central problem for Kierkegaard's 
philosophy. Thus philosophy for Kierkegaard is primarily concerned with 
individual and his way of life, not with the concepts and conceptual knowledge. 
The objectivist metaphysician may argue that logic and metaphysics must 
precede and determine the ethical decision of rational being. Kierkegaard's 
entire criticism against Hegel is that he seeks to fiimish the explanation of 
individuality through logic. The rationalist believes that logic can explain 
everything about the individual but Kierkegaard hold this as sheer illusion. 
Kierkegaard's objections to the detached and collective nature of Hegel's 
system may be illuminated by contrast with the unsystematic philosophy of 
Socrates, to whom Kierkegaard frequently appeals. Wisdom and not indifferent 
truths are for Socrates the practical guides for living and the goals for his 
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enquiry. Wisdom, however, is not a property of a group or a society, but that of 
an individual, a property which manifests itself in wise reaction to the group. For 
Socrates, like Kierkegaard, to 'know thyself is the end of all enquiry. Hegel, 
quite to the contrary, left no room for the future in his system, and therefore no 
room for the question 'What should I do?' The concept of the individual, for 
him, was an inadequate and outmoded concept - which had been surpassed in the 
dialectic of the system, and preserved only in the abstract notion of the 'spirit', 
which according to Kierkegaard, is the very negation of the concept of the 
'existing individual'. 
Kierkegaard's personal contempt for Hegelianism lay in the system's 
treatment of Christianity. For Hegel, Christianity consisted of a set of doctrines 
to be believed by Christians; to be a Christian was to believe these doctrines. In 
contrast to Hegel, Kierkegaard says that Christianity is not a set of doctrines and 
therefore, nothing that can be proved to be true or made reasonable. The problem 
of Christianity is not the truth of Christianity, but the relation of the individual to 
Christianity, the concern of the 'infinitely interested individual'. 
Becoming a Christian is not a result of the philosophical (scientific) 
enquiry, but a question of deep personal involvement or 'faith': 
"Faith does not result simply from scientific enquiry: it 
does not come directly at all. On the contrary, in this 
objectivity one tends to lose that infinite personal 
interestness which is the condition of faith." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p.30) 
In Hegel, Christianity is not the result of his system: that is, it is the 
absolute knowledge consisting of realization of oneself as spirit. 
The doctrine of Christianity is not important, except as object of faith, and 
not knowledge. Faith, as subjectivity, can not be had by a doctrine, or by a 
religion, or by a church but only by an individual who 'chooses the path of 
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faith'. Hegel's understanding of Christianity as a doctrine of the spirit, that is, 
spirit's conception of itself is fundamentally at odds with Kierkegaard's 
conception of Christianity as a way of life which is chosen not because it is true 
or even plausible, but simply because one personally commits himself without 
appeal to reasons or reason at all. 
Spheres of Life: 
Unlike Hegel, who describes a wide variety of forms of life, Kierkegaard 
concentrates on three main types: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. He 
also examines several variations within the ethical and religious forms. He 
explores the distinctive features and paradoxes of each sphere which in turn 
define the good life in fundamentally different ways. Kierkegaard explores the 
tension in each form of life, and forces his readers to see the personal 
implications of choosing each path. Although some of the flaws he identifies 
might be considered internal flaws, most of them derive from external standard 
imbibed from the form of life he is most inclined towards - the religious type. 
Kierkegaard's analysis of the three stages represents a sharp contrast to 
Hegel's theory of the gradual development of a person's self -consciousness. 
Whereas Hegel expounded the dialectic movement of the mind as it moves from 
one stage of intellectual awareness to another through progress of thinking, 
Kierkegaard described the movement of the self from one level of existence to 
another through an act of will, an act of choice. Hegel's dialectic moves 
gradually toward a knowledge of universal, whereas Kierkegaard's dialectic 
involves the progressive actualization of the individual. Whereas Hegel 
overcomes the anti-thesis by a conceptual act, Kierkegaard overcomes it by the 
act of personal commitment. 
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The contrast between the aesthetic and the ethical comes out most clearly 
in Either/Or and that between the ethical and the religious in Fear and 
Trembling. 
The Aesthetic mode of Existence: 
The aesthetic and ethical standpoints are presented in the book Either/Or, 
in the form of edited sets of papers and letters. It is indicated that the man who 
lives aesthetically is not really in control, either of himself or his situation. The 
aesthetic life is devoted to the immediate: the momentary, the sensual, the 
whimsical, the new, and the challenging. It is an involvement with each moment 
that pursues no larger organizing end and is lacking in any degree of 
consistency. Aesthetes make no effort to judge their actions in moral terms 
remaining completely oblivious to moral standards. Insofar as immoral actions 
offer a new kind of experience, they may taste them, but they do not dwell on 
them. Aesthetes depend heavily on good fortune, both to provide new 
experiences and to achieve success in relation to new challenges. They refuse to 
reflect on their lives as a whole, and they do not question the 'ultimate 
meanings' of their existence. Instead, they remain involved in each passing 
experience - relying on chance to provide something to savor - hoping their own 
evanescent charms and talents will ensure success. 
At this level a person behaves according to his impulses and emotions. He 
is for the most part governed by his senses. For this reason the aesthetic person 
knows nothing of any universal moral standards. He has no specific religious 
belief. His chief motivation is a desire to enjoy the widest variety of pleasure of 
the senses. At this stage an individual can exist inasmuch as he deliberately 
chooses to be an aesthetic man. But even though existence can be achieved at 
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this level, Kierkegaard infuses the element of quality into the matter of 
existence. Later existentialists were to speak of this quality in terms of 
authenticity. That is an individual on the aesthetic level is aware that his life 
consists, or ought to consist, of more than his emotive and sense experiences. 
The aesthete typically tends to live 'for the moment', in whatever the 
passing instant will offer by way of entertainment, excitement, and interest. He 
is committed to nothing stable or definite, and is immersed in sensuous 
'immediacy'. He may do or think one thing at a given time and the exact 
opposite at some other time. His life lacks any semblance of 'continuity', 
stability or focus and changes direction according to the varying moods or 
circumstances and exhibit an absolute whimsicality. 
The aesthetic mode of existence is the life of pure 'immediacy' and its 
ultimate maxim is not a 'reflective' or a 'rational principle', based on obligation 
or self-discipline. The aesthetic life can be at best the life of whim, of immediate 
satisfaction and gratification. It lacks any moral principle, in the form of good or 
evil, it is devoted only to either satisfaction or dissatisfaction, fulfillment or 
frustration, pleasure or pain, happiness or suffering, ecstasy or despair. The 
aesthetic existence is lived by the romantic who is described by Hegel as the 
'Romantic spirit' in the Phenomenology. The aesthetic mode's most 
characteristic example is Don Juan in his unending quest for 'sensual faithless 
love'. Sensual love is purely for the moment, in the same moment everything 
come to an end, and the same thing repeats itself over and over again. The 
question whether the union will be satisfying does not arise for it is a union 
which is not futuristic. Don Juan does not experience the responsibility of 
developing a relationship, for he does not dwell upon it too long. For him every 
woman is simply 'women in the abstract'; at most there is a sensual difference 
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between them, not a personal difference. Don Juan is without principle, or 
faithless, in that there is only a cursory difference between his involvements. He 
seduces women, which mean that each is to be enjoyed for the moment, and, 
there is nothing unique about that moment for it is indistinguishable from all 
other moments. 
The principle of the aesthetic is satisfaction with the immediate, with 
whatever is arbitrarily chosen as an object for immediate pleasur<^s»*^- J^" ^ /VT'-l 0 ^ 
"The whole secret lies in arbitrariness. People uaial^y \ \ 
think it easy to be arbitrary, but it requires much study, i^o ^° 
succeed in being arbitrary so as not to lose oneselrta'-ak 
but so as to derive satisfaction from it." (Kierkeg l^ML ^^-^^^-^-^^ 
1944, E/0, pp.279-296 ) ^^^>>^ Univc^ 
The aesthetic life consists in the enjoyment of the moment regardless of 
what that moment may hold. One can enjoy good health and beauty, in himself 
or others, or riches and honor or talent in the arts in the same way as sensuous 
pleasure is enjoyed. The aesthetic life, although essentially unreflective is not 
necessarily without intelligence for it consists in the enjoyment or even creation 
of music or poetry, or even philosophy, as long as these are enjoyed purely for 
their immediate satisfaction. 
There is, however, a negative component imbedded in the aesthetic stage 
for not only is there pleasure but the constant threat of pain and suffering, not 
only satisfaction but also frustration and what is most destructive is the 
experience of boredom. For the aesthete, nothing is more damaging than being 
bored, or recognizing the repetition of his life of the 'immediate'. The very 
moment the aesthete, recognizes the threat, he becomes obsessed with escaping 
boredom and repetition, and subsequently becomes a slave to the demand for a 
new experience. Don Juan comes to live not for pleasure and gratification, but to 
escape boredom and the staleness of repetition. 
55 
Chapter II Soren A. Kierkegaard: An Irrational Passion 
The aesthetic life is essentially the life of the immediate, and as such, 
rejects any reflection concerning the significance of that moment. One does, 
however, come to reflect on his life and the significance of his actions, and on 
reflection, the immediate loses its value, and the life of absorption in the moment 
is experienced as a mere 'emptiness'. It takes the form of a series of repetitions 
which are ultimately meaningless. One becomes increasingly restless attempting 
to explore ever new experiences in order to suppress the feeling of 
meaninglessness. 
As one reflects on the futility of trying to satisfy the human spirit through 
immediate gratification, he tends to become skeptical about all gratification and 
about all desires. This stage of the aesthetic which has been exemplified by Faust 
one turns away from seeking any new gratification of desires and goes to the 
extent of denying those desires themselves. His existence becomes pure pride, 
coupled with cynicism for the worth of anything. 
Facing the prospect of death and the meaninglessness of life, the aesthete, 
in silent despair, desperately attempts to escape from reflection altogether. The 
natural way of doing so, Kierkegaard suggests, is to stop all self-appraisal and 
self-assertion, and to lose oneself in the crowd and the meaninglessness of 
everyday collective, inauthentic life. For those few who are sufficiently strong 
to maintain their individuality, the choice of the ethical life is in the offing. 
Kierkegaard identifies several problems with the aesthetic way of life. 
First, its dependence on chance implies that it lacks ultimate control over its own 
success thus easily falling into despair if aesthetes suffer serious injury or endure 
highly repetitive experiences. Second, their continuous pursuit of new 
experiences creates a ceaseless restlessness. Experiences can feel similar even if 
they contain some new elements, and this can produce an inevitable boredom. 
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To take Kierkegaard's prime example of Don Juan, even if new victims of the 
seducer present different challenges, the similarity of the process of seduction 
can blind the aesthete to these differences. Then this life can seem like endless 
repetition. Third, if aesthetes ever do reflect on life as a whole, they will 
experience a deep emptiness because their lives have no cumulative meaning, no 
unity, and no centeredness. Here Kierkegaard seems to rely on a standard 
imported from the ethical form of life, rather than explore the paradoxes of the 
aesthete. Kierkegaard's main objection, however, is that the satisfaction 
achieved by the aesthete is short - lived, unreliable, and unstable. 
The Ethical Mode of Existence: 
Unlike the aesthetic life, the ethical life is characterized by reflection and 
self-appraisal, and with reflection one can appraise the meaningfulness of his 
life. Deliberate and principled choice, as opposed to action on whim, is the mark 
of the ethical, and actions have significance not according to immediate 
gratification, but with regard to their accordance with moral principle. This long 
term significance and regard for principle rather than immediate satisfaction, 
allows the ethical life to give a meaning to existence that the aesthete can never 
achieve. 
Unlike the aesthetic man, who has no universal standards but only his 
own taste, the ethical man does recognize and accept rules of conduct that reason 
formulates. Moral rules give the ethical man's life the elements of form and 
consistency. Moreover, the ethical man accepts the limitations upon his life that 
moral responsibility imposes. Kierkegaard illustrates the contrast between the 
aesthetic man and the bthical man in their attitude toward sexual behavior, 
saying that whereas the aesthete yields to his impulses wherever there is an 
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attraction, the ethical man accepts the obligations of marriage as an expression 
of reason, the universal of man. If Don Juan exemplifies the aesthetic man, it is 
Socrates who typified the ethical man or the supermacy of the universal moral 
law. 
The ethical involves in organizing one's life into a coherent whole 
through intense commitment to an ideal that takes account of one's capabilities 
and situations, devotedly discharging the resultant social duties, and regarding 
people as absolute ends rather than as means to one's own ends. His key 
example is someone who enters into marriage — a long term commitment to a 
person - with single-mindedness, sincerity, and the will to make the relationship 
last to the benefit of both parties. Thus people living ethical lives do not 
mindlessly accept socially prescribed duties, but attempt to put their unique 
imprint on each duty they acknowledge. They also define their own long-temi 
ideals in relation to their commitments to other people, rather than simply 
following an ideal intrinsic to their culture. The ethical life is less concerned 
with successful results rather than with good-faith efforts, sincere devotion, and 
long term dedication. The ethical life is devoid of any conception of sin and 
paradox and the satisfaction achieved by actualizing personal commitments 
become the source of stability and self sustainance. 
The ethical life thus is a synthesis of two elements: social norms and 
personal commitment. However it must be distinguished from another form of 
social life that is central to Heidegger: the impersonal or public mode of social 
life that he characterized as the inauthentic mode of existence. In this form of 
life, people conform to public norms — not because of conviction, conscious 
affirmation, or personal self-definition, but because of routine and social 
expectations. They act as everyone acts, unreflectively following whatever the 
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masses embrace. Their behaviour conforms to social rules, but the rules carry no 
personal stamp. This inauthentic existence, Kierkegaard finds to be typical of his 
age, and even those who believe in a Christian God in this other-directed, 
depersonalized fashion are of no worth. 
The basic feature of the ethical would be expected to be the employment 
of universal rational principles that transcend and leave no exception for the 
individual but yet remain secular principles. The ethical life is the societal life, 
the life of man who considers himself part of a community of men and lives 
according to principles which treat every man as an end in himself and subsume 
self-interest to moral duty. The ethical life, with its emphasis on universality, 
rationality, and duty, in short, morality, signifies for Kierkegaard, as for Hegel, 
the ethics of Kant. Although Kierkegaard does not deny the inclusion of a non-
kantian ethics within the ethical sphere, it is clear that the system of values 
which concerns him is that of the Critique of Practical Reason. The ethical 
sphere thus consists of living for the good of men in community and personal 
interests are always to be subsumed under the interests of morality. 
The central feature of the ethical is universality, and a necessary condition 
for a set of principles to be ethical principles is the impartial applicability to 
every person at every time. 
"The ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal 
it applies to everyone, which may be expressed from 
another point of view by saying that it applies every 
instant." (Kierkegaard, 1941, F&T, p. 64) 
Kierkegaard, like Kant, considers morality to be autonomous and rational. 
Every man produces these principles for himself, and must, in so far as he is 
moral, uphold these principles even against the disagreement of society at large. 
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Kierkegaard does not fully adopt Kant's moral philosophy to his 
dialectic, because the thesis from which Kant maintains that every rational 
creature will recognize these principles in himself is identical to his 
characterization of reason. Because Kierkegaard rejects this characterization in 
his denial that reason can give us justification of ultimate moral principles, he 
can not maintain with Kant that the principles of morality can be autonomously 
delivered by every 'rational creature'. 
The model for ethical life, however, is not similar to the formal 
derivations of Kant's ethics, but the historical example of Socrates. In Socrates, 
we find a clear representation of not only the values but the living adherence to 
the values of morality. It is Socrates who not only taught, but lived the principles 
that man is of the highest value, that 'the good is in every man', and that love of 
man is the ultimate good. Socrates like Kant argues that the good which is in 
every man has absolute justification and that subjectivity does not serve as 
justification of these principles. It is the self reflection and a life of principles 
which marks Socrates as the paragon of ethical existence. 
Thus, according to Kierkegaard, the secular reflection of the ethical life is 
adequate to disclose the meaninglessness of the aesthetic life and simultaneously 
a reinforcement of the moral principles which define and give meaning to 
existence. As long as one remains in this secular state of reflection, guilt is a 
result of failure to fulfill ethical demands and can always be overcome by the 
performance of good acts. 
Kierkegaard's objections to the ethical life are based even less on internal 
criteria than his objection to the aesthetic life. First, the ethical life can be lived 
in good conscience, without angst or doubt. Though many might regard this as a 
benefit, Kierkegaard regards it with suspicion because he is convinced of 
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humanity's irredeemable sinfulness. In addition, the degree of passion and 
subjectivity a way of life can achieve is a function of its irrationality, paradoxes, 
and difficulty. Since the ethical life need not be paradoxical or irrational in this 
way, Kierkegaard regards it as less demanding and even less serious than the 
religious life. Finally, ethical persons may be divided by loyalties to conflicting 
values, rendering them incapable of acting as a unified whole. Only singular 
devotion to God can assure such self-integration. 
One of Kierkegaard's criteria for evaluating different styles of life is their 
self-sufficiency or independence from the vagaries of chance. But he rejects one 
ethical attempt to achieve this independence: stoicism. Stoics retreat from the 
world and attempt to remain indifferent to the results of their actions. They seek 
equilibrium and inner calm. This ideal is another way of avoiding 
Kierkegaardian authenticity. He values personal commitment, individuality, 
passionate devotion, and the willingness to risk oneself He believes that the 
inner fortress to which stoics retreat empties them of genuine feeling and care. In 
addition, stoics may falter if forced to endure long-term suffering. Kierkegaard 
believes that only a relationship with a transcendent deity will provide the 
strength to endure such suffering. This personal and passionate relationship to 
God is the core element of the religious way of life. 
Thus for the most part, the ethical man considers moral evil as being a 
product either of ignorance or of weakness of will. But after some time when the 
dialectics progress in the consciousness of the ethical man he begins to realize 
that he is involved in something more profound than an inadequate knowledge of 
the moral law or in sufficient strength of will. The ethical man ultimately comes 
to realize that he is in fact incapable of fulfilling the moral law, that he 
deliberately violates that law and therefore he becomes conscious of his guilt. 
61 
Chapter II Soren A. Kierkegaard: An Irrational Passion 
This guilt or the sense of sin becomes the dialectic element, the anti-thesis, 
which places before man a new either/or. Now he must either, remain at the 
ethical level and try to fulfill the moral law, or he must respond to his new 
awareness, the awareness of his own fmitude and estrangement from God to 
whom he belongs and from whom he must derive his strength. Again man's 
movement from the ethical to the religious stage can not be achieved by thinking 
alone but by an act of commitment, by a leap of faith. 
Religious way of life — Becoming a Christian: 
The difference between faith and reason is particularly striking for 
Kierkegaard when man arrives at the third level that is the religious stage. Man's 
movement from the aesthetic to the ethical level required an act of choice and 
commitment. For Kierkegaard truth is the subjective matter and a consequence 
of commitment. Without risk there is no faith. And with faith, Kierkegaard says, 
the existing individual realises his true authentic self 
The religious stage is that sphere of life defined by the conception of the 
individual in relationship to God. Kierkegaard personally considered this stage 
as his chosen mode of existence and that the central purpose of his writing, as he 
admits in his Point of View of My Work as an Author, is to arouse the religious 
view of life in his readers. 'Religious' for Kierkegaard is to be taken in a very 
restricted sense— to be religious is to be a Christian, but a Christian in 
Kierkegaard's very special sense. The sense of religious here is so restricted that 
it is questionable whether anyone who has not had a background in 
Kierkegaard's pathological guilt-ridden Lutheran upbringing could qualify as the 
religious Knight of Faith. Membership in the Christian church is the very anti-
thesis of being a Christian. In fact. 
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"It is easier to become a Christian when I am not a 
Christian than to become Christian when I am one." 
(Kierkegaard, 1941, CUP, p.327) 
Kierkegaard's conception of Christianity is diametrically opposed to the 
rationalist conception of Christianity as in Hegel and Kant. For Kant, 
Christianity was rationally justified by its necessity for practical reason, and God 
is postulated in support of morality. Christ enters into Christianity as a corollary 
of belief in God, for belief in Christ can be rationally justified only so far as this 
belief is necessary for morality. For Hegel also, belief in God is rational, but the 
Hegelian God is of a radically different sort. For Hegel, God is not transcendent 
as for Kant, but immanent. God for Hegel is that subject which is common to all 
men, and Christ is the symbol of that 'incarnation', that is, the fact that God or 
spirit is man, and man is God. 
Kierkegaard rejects not only the reinterpretation of the Christian 
conceptions of God, Christ, and the incarnation by Hegel, but the entire 
rationalist approach to Christianity. God can not be an object of knowledge, but 
simply an object of faith. And for the question of his existence, once one is 
within the religious viewpoint he can not be intelligibly raised. 
Christianity is not a set of doctrines, but a way of life, a set of values. The 
absurd doctrine of incarnation, the Trinity, and so on are not important in 
themselves; it is the attitude of the religious toward these that is of importance. 
The appropriate attitudes for Kierkegaard are fear, dread and even terror, before 
an almighty yet unknowable God, despair and suffering at one's personal 
weakness, and over powering guilt in the face of sin before God because of these 
shortcomings. 
The religious life includes a feeling of sinfulness, an extreme sense of 
paradox, and a knowledge that ordinary social laws may have to be suspended in 
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order to follow God's will. For Kierkegaard, the more irrational the faith in God, 
the more personal and authentic the religious faith because it lacks the support of 
objective reasons. Kierkegaard insists that the belief in the Christian God is 
paradoxical because it asserts that an eternal transcendent God becomes 
incarnate and temporal. This paradox can not be fathomed rationally: it can only 
be accepted through faith. 
Crucial to Kierkegaard's notion of the religious life is feeling the 
continuous presence of God. Instead of foundering in uncertainty or skepticism, 
religious person welcomes this continuous living presence and respond with 
constant devotion and awe. This living presence personalizes the devotee's 
relationship with God; everyday life becomes an expressive witness to that 
presence. Religious person willingly disobey the requirements of social morality 
when God commands it - e.g., when God called upon Abraham to sacrifice his 
son Isaac. 
Christianity is the love of this God, confidence in his goodness and 
justice, as well as the fear and despair of him. The life of a Christian is to be 
totally and passionately before God, and to be the Christian 'knight of faith' is to 
drop every vestige of skepticism and rationality with regard to religious 
questions and simply exist in the presence of God. 
"The believer defers from the ethicist in being infinitely 
interested in the reality of another." (Kierkegaard, 1941, 
CUP, p.288) 
One can be rational only to the extent of recognizing the absurdity of the 
doctrines of Christianity and discovering the utter irrationality of accepting the 
Christian way of life. Reason thus having completed its fiinctions, what is left is 
the choice, the unquestionable acceptance, the leap of Christianity. 
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Knowledge of God is past the limit of reason Christianity is irrational in 
the sense that it is absurd, and that it must be accepted though it can not be 
understood. In this sense, Kierkegaard is a strict anti-rationalist, in that he 
attacks any possibility of rationalizing Christianity. Contrary to Hegel, 
Christianity can not be grasped by the development of reason, for Christianity is 
not a set of doctrines to be understood, but only to be accepted and lived by. In 
the religious stage, no comparable understanding and no comparable 
employment of reason is possible. Kierkegaard does speak of the ethical sphere 
as rational but the religious sphere is not. The ethical life is the life of reason; the 
religious life is the unreasonable life of faith. 
The teaching of Christianity, therefore, can not be based on reason but 
must be based on authority. Kant and Hegel's insistence on natural religion is, 
according to Kierkegaard, to reject what is fundamental to the religious way of 
life. 'Positive' religion is the only possible religion. 
Because religion rests on authority, the teacher, namely Jesus, is not 
simply an 'occasion' for learning, but Himself constitutes the truth that 'God 
exist in and with his own existence.' It is not a matter of indifference that Christ 
is the teacher of religion, for He Himself is the 'truth' which He is teaching. To 
'learn' Christianity, one must feel himself confronted with God, and this 
confrontation is not the sort of 'learning' which could be prompted by an 
'occasional' teacher. 
It is the conception of the eternal which differentiates the religious sphere 
from the other two. In the aesthetic sphere, "time" refers only to the immediate; 
in the ethical, 'time' refers to the more than immediate, but only to secular 
(worldly) existence. In the religious sphere, however, there is no concept of 
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time; our recognition of God places us 'beyond the this - worldly and the 
temporal.' 
The central teaching of God, therefore, is that man is in sin; acceptance of 
God is the acceptance that one is sinful. Facing this sin, which does not involves 
any specific transgression, feeling guilty about it, despairing at the impossibility 
of erasing it, and earnestly repenting is the Christian way of life. 
"Christianity begins with the doctrine of sin, and 
therefore with the individual." (Kierkegaard, 1941, SUD, 
p.197) 
It is the presence of sin that distinguishes the religious from the ethical, 
for sin is irrational. In ethics a man feels guilty because he believes he has 
transgressed some specific moral principle. In religion the believer feels guilty 
for a transgression against no principle in particular. By his very being he has 
sinned against God where no amount of reasoning could disclose how such a sin 
is possible. In ethics one is responsible for his own error, but this is not true of 
the doctrine of original sin. Moral transgression, even if not remediable, can be 
absolved by God Himself, Who, because He is not concerned with the temporal 
but with salvation, makes it a point not to provide such absolution during a 
man's worldly existence. Rather, this existence must be one of continuous guilt 
and suffering-the permeating recognition that one is basically incomplete and as 
such constitutes a virtual insult to God. Therefore, sin is not one of the corollary 
doctrines of Christianity, but is the inevitable consequence of recognizing 
oneself in God's presence. 
The breach between the religious and the ethical is best illustrated in the 
story of Abraham and Isaac. In his choice between obeying the command of 
God and saving his son, Abraham was faced with the inevitable choice between 
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the central precepts of the religious and the ethical for to fail to obey a direct 
imperative of God would be inconceivable for a religious person and yet the 
murder of ones own son would be perhaps the greatest of all crimes. The choice 
itself shows beyond any doubt that secular morality and religious duty may be in 
absolute conflict in that there is no criterion for making this difficult choice; one 
must simply choose between God and morality. Kierkegaard encourages a 
broader conception of morality in which one's first duty is to God, the 
teleological suspension of the Ethical. The religious way of life consists 
basically in the adoption of religious attitudes of inwardness and suffering, guilt 
and the like. Abraham provides an extreme case just because he confi-onts the 
toughest test with unflinching faith in God. In these commandments, the ethical 
can be considered God's expression of His commands to all men, and it is belief 
in God that gives sanction and ultimate meaning to morality. 
Kierkegaard contrasts two theories of access to divine commands. 
Socrates believes his access to his inner voice as reliable because he could 
remember a prior contact with an eternal reality to which his actions conformed. 
He was able to challenge the laws and customs of Athens because of his access 
to this reality. His task was to teach people how to recollect their relationship to 
this eternal realm. Kierkegaard's objection to Socrates' understanding of the 
religious life is that it is purely theoretical. In contrast, Christians' access to 
God's commands will forever be clouded because of their sinfiilness. They can 
not expect to achieve unity with God on their own through recollection. A 
Christian's relationship with God depends on his grace and forgiveness. There 
can never be final assurance or security. Christians thus experience constant 
uncertainty, despair, and crisis. Kierkegaard's preferred version of the religious 
life involve a continual struggle and a leap of faith is required, and this 
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distinguishes the rehgious life from the ethical and the aesthetic way of life. The 
more irrational the faith, the greater the authenticity required to affirm God. 
In the movement from one life style to another, there is a shift in the way 
one looks at the world. The movement the decision to commit ourselves to a new 
lifestyle is not a logical one, nor does it always happen smoothly. This shift in 
life orientation is fimdamental and radical. It means a change in our value 
system. The transition involves a commitment. When we are engaged in a living 
orientation we give that value system and its orientation the frill weight of 
reality. 
All of us make changes in our lives. And what we do during this process 
is commit ourselves to different values, projects and programs of action. This 
transition does not happen just rationally or logically. Our entire emotional 
orientation as well as our mind set changes. It involves an emotional factor, and 
not merely a mental or intellectual demand. This transition calls for a free 
choice, a free decision on the part of the individual. The changes are so 
fundamental and the distance between the spheres is so radical that Kierkegaard 
calls it a leap of faith. Thus leap of faith, according to Kierkegaard, is 
'unconditional' and irrational. It requires passion not knowledge. And this 
unconditional, irrational, passionate commitment is the mark of authenticity 
which can be seen only in the religious stage where an individual surrenders 
himself before the will of God unconditionally. 
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Meeting Through Dialogue 
Only when every means has collapsed does the meeting 
come about....No deception penetrates here; here is the 
cradle of the Real Life. (JBuber, 1937, p. 12) 
The development of twentieth century philosophy emerged as a 
consequence of a revolt or a departure from idealism and distinguished itself 
through an extraordinary renovation in religious thinking. Some nineteenth 
century materialists believe that the following century would witness religion 
perishing from the earth, but on the contrary a new prophetic fervor directed 
towards preserving and defending the traditional religions become visible. The 
ancient pieties were once again proclaimed, and the banners of faith spread out. 
New and original efforts to understand the basic phenomena of religion came 
into being. Theology once again become intellectually exciting and for certain 
theologians even fashionable. Theologians and religious philosophers were led 
to examine the varieties of experience that underlie the towering superstructure 
of theological concepts. The religious thinkers in seeking to renew the old, re-
created the experiences that lay at its very origin. 
Thus, the twentieth century philosophy experienced an extraordinary 
rebirth of traditional religious thought. The movements in question have been 
contemporary, i.e. they have been acutely aware of themselves as different from 
the attitudes of the period immediately preceding. They are both, new in the 
sense that they in some sense belong to the contemporary - and also traditional, 
in their attempt to keep some aspects alive, retained more or less in the same 
form in which it once had lived. Hence, it is rightly termed as neo-orihodoxy. 
Chapter III Martin Buber: Meeting Through Dialogue 
Here, we are including two philosophers Paul Tillich and Martin Buber, 
who represent the two dominant religious traditions of western civilization; 
Protestant, Christianity and Judaism. Both these thinkers have made extensive 
use of previously existing resources of their respective traditions; yet with each 
the attempt to renew the tradition is far from being a mere repetition of the past, 
as both of them have made the more rigidly orthodox extremely uneasy. Buber's 
religion strikes orthodox Jews as much too Hassidic and mystical, and Tillich's 
theology is for a good many protestant theologians altogether too secular and 
Psychological. Thus given their style of speculation these two philosophers can 
well be understood as the bridge between neo and orthodox ideas. 
Martin Buber was a German philosopher, whose faith rested on the 
religious tradition of Judaism, but he emphasizes on an aspect of religious 
experience that is faithful to both the Jewish as well as the Christian tradition. 
Buber was of the conviction that it would be impossible to enter into a 
relationship with God unless a human being developed the capacity to relate 
meaningfully with human beings. The interpersonal aspect of religion has been 
held as sacrosanct by Buber and is the very foundation in the formation of his 
thoughts. For this reason he has often been pronounced as an existentialist 
theologian who held 'personal encounter' as the very core of his philosophical 
pronouncements. 
For existentialists, the point of departure is the question of what it means 
to be an 'existing human being'. A question that can be meaningfully answered 
only if the dimension in which a human being enters into a relationship with 
another human being is sufficiently explored. Buber deviates considerably from 
other existentialists in the usage of a vocabulary and the presentation of the 
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dynamics of interrelatedness which is unique to him. An exploration of this 
dynamics would be in place for a clearer understanding of this issue. 
He suggests that there are two basic word-pairs: I-Thou and /-//. These 
two basic or primary word-pairs according to him, represents the two modes of 
existence. These two word-pairs emphasize the two ways of becoming a self or 
an T , for there are two primary ways of relating. Buber believes that an 
individual becomes human only in a relationship, and these paired terms 
describe two possible ways of relating. The 'I-Thou' relationship is one of 
intimacy, mutuality, sharing and trust. While on the contrary, the 'I-It' 
relationship is one of having, using, and exploiting. To put it differently, the 'I-
It' relationship is unidirectional moving only from the subject to the object, from 
I to the thing. But the T-Thou' relationship is a form of relating in which the T 
gives and receives from the 'Thou'. When we relate to another person as a 
'Thou', we do not treat that person as a thing or an object. This is what Buber 
means when he says, 'when I confront a human being as my Thou and speak the 
basic word I-Thou to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consist 
of things'. Will Herberg points very cogently in summarizing Buber's distinction 
between I-Thou and I-It as follows: 
"The primary word I-Thou points to a relation of person 
to person, of subject to subject, a relation of reciprocity 
involving 'meeting' or 'encounter', while the primary 
word /-// points to a relation of person to thing, of subject 
to object, involving some form of utilization, domination, 
or control even if it is only so-called objective knowing." 
(Herberg, 1972, p. 14) 
Martin Buber's notion of authenticity lies in his formation of the 'I-Thou' 
and 'I-It' relationship .The problem that Buber faces is: how can man achieve 
'reality' without returning to die naive, pre-Kantian 'objective' view of the 
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universe. Buber finds this reality through 'perceiving' that in addition to man's 
'orienting' function he also posses a 'realizing' function which brings him into 
real contact with God, with other men, and with nature. In his most celebrated 
work / and Thou, he speaks about the relations of man to man and to things as 
well as God. This relationship cuts across the lines of our ordinary distinctions to 
focus attention not upon individual objects and their causal connections but upon 
the relations between things. Buber says: 
"Here I and Thou freely confront one another in mutual 
effect that is neither connected with nor coloured by any 
causality." (Buber, 1958, p.51) 
In the development of his philosophy of I and Thou the thoughts of his 
teacher, William Dilthey, provide a secure foundation. He was much influenced 
by Dilthey's thought that a man can not take a detached scientific observer's 
position about the realities of life, but that he must participate with the things of 
the world because only in participation a man discovers the typical and unique 
aspects of his life. Another important influence on Buber's philosophy were the 
thoughts of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. The influence of these two philosophers 
may account in part for the 'dynamism' of Buber's philosophy. Both of them 
emphasize on the concrete and actual as opposed to the ideal and abstract. They 
also emphasize on the value of life impulses and wholeness of being as opposed 
to detached intellectuality. In one of his early writings Buber speaks about 
Nietzsche as the path finder of a new culture, the awakener and creator of new 
life-values and a new world-feeling. 
In addition to Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, the most important 
influences on the development of Buber's 'I-Thou' philosophy were Ludwig 
Feuerbach and George Simmel. Buber states in W/zo/ Is Man? that Feuerbach 
imparted a decisive impetus in his youth. Unlike Kant, writes Buber, Feuerbach 
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postulates the whole man and not cognition as the beginning of philosophizing 
and by man he does not mean an isolated individual, but man with man - the 
connection of I and Thou. Like Feuerbach, Simmel too, is concerned with 
relation - the relation between man and God, between man and man and 
between man and nature. He draws an analogy between the relations of man and 
God and those of man and man which come quite close to Buber's own 'I-Thou' 
relation. To believe in God, according to Simmel, means not just a rational belief 
in his existence but a definite inner relationship to Him. This involves a 
surrender to the Will of God with complete trust that paves the path of life. In 
the same way to 'believe' in a man means to share a relationship of mutual trust. 
He begins his philosophy of man in / and Thou with the following description: 
"To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold 
attitude. The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the 
twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks. 
The primary words are not isolated words but combined words. 
The one primary word is the combination I-Thou. 
The other primary word is the combination /-//; 
wherein, without a change in the primary word, 
one of the words He and She can replace it. 
Hence the I of man is also twofold. For the / of the primary 
world I-Thou is a different / from that of the primary word /-//." 
(Buber, 1937, p.03) 
Buber characterizes these two primary words I-Thou and I-It as man's 
two primary attitudes and relations. But he does not use both the I's in the same 
way. He says: 
"The primary word T-Thou' can only be spoken with the 
whole being. The primary word T-It' can never be 
spoken with the whole being." (Buber, 1937, p.03) 
Buber contrasts the reality of man with nature. His distinction rests on the 
two fold principle of human life that consists of two basic movements. He 
describes the first movement as 'the primal setting at a distance', and the second 
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as 'entering into relation'. The first movement presupposes the second, as one 
can only enter into relation with another being that has been set at some distance 
from us and thereby has an independent existence. The first movement exhibits 
the possibility of human existence and the second how human existence gains 
realization. Only man can perform the setting a distance as only he has a 'world' 
which is an unbroken continuum holding not only knowledge and experience of 
his own self and the other he relates to but all that is knowable in the present and 
in the future. Buber elaborates this by contrasting man to, that of an animal 
which has 'environment' or 'realm' and not a world. An animal selects from his 
realm those things which he needs, but he does not see it as a separate whole and 
is incapable of distinguishing between what is perceived from what can be 
perceived. He says 
"Only man as man, gives distance to things which he 
comes upon in his realm; he sets them in their 
independents of things which from now on continue to 
exist ready for a function and which he can make wait for 
him so that on each occasion he may master them again, 
and bring them into action."(Buber, 1965, p. 65) 
Thus, Buber believes that only man has a 'world' impregnated with 
meaning while animals have only an 'environment' or a 'realm'. Animals utilize 
it governed by their needs, but do not see it as a separate whole with which a 
persisting relationship can be established. Contrary to animals man possesses an 
impulse and a distinct awareness of an unaccomplished task before him - that of 
discovering the world, through personal participation. Buber says that the 
distance becomes instrumental in the creation of a situation and the procedure 
through which a man relates to that situation is his becoming. This act of 
entering into relation with the world as a whole, for Buber, is a 'synthesizing 
apperception'. He says: 
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"... by synthesizing apperception I mean the 
apperception of a being as a whole and as a unity... The 
conception of wholeness and unity is in its origin 
identical with the conception of the worid to which man 
in turned." (Buber, 1965, pp.62-63) 
Buber states that wholeness and unity can be achieved only by looking at 
the world as a complete whole and not just a tool or an instrument to be grappled 
with. And this grasping is performed not simply through 'setting at a distance' 
but through 'entering into relation' with it. He says: 
"only the view of what is over against me in the world in 
its full presence, with which I have set myself, present in 
my whole person, in relation - only this view gives me 
the world truly as whole and one." (Buber, Cited in 
Friedman, 1955, p.80) 
Further, it is in men's relation to one another that the twofold principle of 
human life can be seen still more clearly. Man sets himself apart and at a 
distance from others and thus makes himself independent. He is therefore able to 
enter into relation with other retaining his unique individuality. 
"The basis of man's life with man is twofold... the wish 
of every man to be confirmed as what he is,... and the 
innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow men in this 
way... actual humanity exists only where this capacity 
unfolds." (Buber, Cited in Friedman, 1955, p.81) 
Genuine conversation, like every genuine fulfillment of relation between 
men, means acceptance of otherness. This means that although one may desire to 
influence the other and to lead him to share in one's relation to truth, one accepts 
and confirms him in his being that a particular man made in his particular way. 
Thus, mutual confirmation of men is fully realized in what Buber calls 
'making present', an event which happens partially wherever men come together 
but in its essential structure only rarely. Making the other present means to 
'imagine' the real, to 'imagine' quite concretely what another man is wishing 
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feeling, perceiving and thinking. Something of the character of what is imagined 
is joined to the act of imagining. One to some extent wills what he willing, 
thinks what he thinking, feels what he feeling. The particular pain which I inflict 
on another surges up in myself and paradoxically we are engulfed in a common 
situation. It is through this making present that we grasp another as a self, that is 
as a being whose distance from me carmot be separated from my distance from 
him. This event is not ontologically complete until he knows himself made 
present by me and until this knowledge includes the process of his inmost self 
becoming. 
The starting point of / and Thou is neither metaphysics nor theology but 
philosophical anthropology - the study of the problem of man. Philosophical 
anthropology is an important development in Buber's thought because he defines 
philosophical anthropology as the study of 'the wholeness of man', which is an 
essential existentialist dimension. He develops this notion of philosophical 
anthropology in his book Between Man and Man. It is an extension and 
development of his philosophy of dialogue. 
In What Is Man? Buber defines 'philosophical anthropology' as the study 
of 'the wholeness of man' and lists the following as among the problems which 
are implicitly set up at the same time by this question: 
"... man's special place in the cosmos, his connexion 
with destiny, his relation to the world of things, his 
understanding of his fellow men, his existence as a being 
that knows it must die, his attitude in the ordinary and 
extraordinary encounters with the mystery with which his 
life is shot through..." (Buber, 1947, p.l20) 
Buber proceeds to set up philosophical anthropology as a systematic 
method which deals with the concrete, existential characteristics of man's life in 
order to arrive at the essence of man: 
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"Even as it must again and again distinguish within the 
human race in order to arrive at a solid comprehension, 
so it must put man in all seriousness into nature, it must 
compare him with other things, other living creatures, 
other bearers of consciousness, in order to define his 
special place reliably for him. Only by this double way of 
distinction and comparison does it reach the whole, real 
man." (Buber, 1947,p.l21) 
The concern with the wholeness of man rules out the attempt to answer 
the question in terms of particular philosophical disciplines. BubeMi^?^ - *<" 
"Philosophy succeeds in rendering me... help mlliysf^'y': 
individual disciplines precisely through each of tliesd MV. N^ 
disciplines not reflecting, and not being able to reflec^on v^  ) 
the wholeness of man... in everyone of these discipli: 
the possibility of its achieving anything in thought rests 
precisely on its objectification, on what may be termed its 
'de-humanization'." (Buber, 1965, p.l4) 
Buber does not agree with Heidegger in his belief that philosophical 
anthropology can provide a foundation for metaphysics or for the individual 
philosophical sciences. He claims that in doing so it would become so general 
that it would reach a false unity instead of the genuine wholeness of the subject 
based on 'the contemplation of all its manifold nature'. Buber says: 
"A legitimate philosophical anthropology must know that 
there is not merely a human species but also peoples, not 
merely a himian soul but also types and characters, not 
merely a human life but also stages in life; only fi-om 
the... recognition of the dynamic that exerts power within 
every particular reality and between them, and from the 
constantly new proof of the one in the many, can it come 
to see the wholeness of man." (Buber, 1965, p. 14) 
In defining philosophical anthropology as the problem of finding the 
human in the constant flux of individuals and cultures, Buber develops an 
approach through which we can avoid the abyss of abstract unity, on the one 
hand, and that of meaningless relativity, on the other. Buber states that "man's 
existence is constituted by his participation, at the same time and in the same 
77 
Chapter III Martin Buber: Meeting Through Dialogue 
actions, in finitude and infinity; man's uniqueness is determined by the particular 
existential characteristics of his relation to 'mystery', cosmos, destiny, death, 
things, and man, related to the definition of man as the creature who participates 
in both finitude and infinity." (Buber, 1965, p. 15) Buber defines man in Between 
Man and Man "...as the only creature who has potenfiality." (Buber, 1965, p.l5) 
Further Buber writes "Man is the 'crystallized potentiality of existence'. Even 
though this wealth of possibility is confined within narrow limits. These limits 
are only factual and not essential. Man's action is unforeseeable in its nature and 
extent." (Buber, 1965, p. 15) It is because of this potenfiality that Buber is able to 
speak in terms of the freedom of man and the reality of evil. 
In What is Man? Buber defines man as the creature who is capable of 
entering into living relation with the world and things, with men both as 
individuals and as the many, and with 'the mystery of being - which is dimly 
apparent through all this but infinitely transcends it.' In a living relation with 
things, man not only regards them technically and purposively, but also turns to 
them as having an essence. In relation with man one life opens to another such 
that one experiences the mystery that is one's own. The two participate in one 
another's lives not psychically but onfically. Here Buber contrasts this essential 
relation with Heidegger's category of solicitude for other men. He affirms that 
solicitude does not set a man's life in direct relation with the life of another, for 
in it one offers one's assistance but not oneself to the other person. An essential 
relation to God, finally, cannot be reached, as Kierkegaard thinks, 'by 
renunciation of the relafion to the whole being', but must include all of one's 
encounters with the world and men. (Buber, 1955, p.l60) 
Buber concludes what is Manl with the statement that the uniqueness of 
man is to be found not in the individual, nor in the collective, but in the meeting 
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of 'I and Thou.' He says that "individualism understands only a part of man, 
collectivism understands man only as a part; neither advances to the wholeness 
of man, to man as a whole. Individualism sees man only in relation to himself, 
but collectivism does not see man at all; it sees only society." (Buber, 1947, 
p.200) 
The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such 
nor the aggregate as such. Each considered by itself is an abstraction. The 
individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation with 
other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of 
living units of relation. That essence of man which is unique to him can be 
directly known only in a living relation. Preeti Sayeed in her book Facing the 
Other, intersubjectivity in existentialism describes Buber's philosophical 
position thus, 
"In his philosophical anthropology....Buber presents a 
vision of man who is not a lifeless mosaic pieced together 
from fragmentary abstractions but an organic whole 
whose ambience is community and who finds an 
expression of his freedom and creative becoming in his 
capacity to positively interact with other beings." 
(Sayeed, 1998, p. 115) 
Buber's elucidation of authenticity largely is a process through which life 
is to be lived, in spirit a life that is face to face with the 'Thou'. He holds that the 
spirit is a response of man to his Thou. Our culture has abdicated before the 
world of It, and this abdication makes a life in the spirit impossible. He considers 
T-It' as evil because it allows to appropriate and thus shutout all relations. 
Neither universal causality nor destiny prevent a man from being free if he is 
able to ahemate between I-It and I-Thou. But without the ability to enter into 
relation and together with the arbitrary self-will and belief in fate that 
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particularly mark modem man, the individual and the community become sick, 
and the I of the true person is replaced by the empty I of individual. 
He believes that spirit is not in the / but between / and Thou. To respond 
to the Thou man must enter into a relation with his entire being, as the stronger 
the response the more strongly does it bind with the Thou and banishes 
objecthood. 
The man who comes to terms with it divides his life into two separate 
provinces: one of institutions - It and one of feelings - 1 . 
"Institutions are 'outside' where all sorts of aims are 
pursued, where a man works, negotiates, bears influence, 
undertakes, concurs, organizes, conducts business, 
officiates, preaches... Feelings are 'within', where life is 
lived and man recovers from institutions. Here the 
spectrum of the emotions dances before the interested 
glance." (Buber, 1937, p.43) 
Buber suggests that a true community arises through people taking their 
stand in living a mutual relation with a living center and only then through being 
in a living mutual relation with each other. He believes that community cannot 
be set up as a goal and directly attained but can only result from a group of 
people being united around a common goal in their relation to the Eternal Thou. 
The communal life is not I-It but its mastery and predominance to which 
Buber refers to as evil. Communal life cannot dispense with the world of It any 
more than man himself He says: 
"Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their 
natural and proper effect so long as they are linked with, 
and upheld by, his will to enter into relation. There is no 
evil impulse till the impulse has been separated from the 
being; the impulse which is bound up with, and defined 
by, the being is the living stuff of commimal life, that 
which is detached is its disintegration. Economics, the 
abode of the will to profit, and state, the abode of the will 
to be powerful, share in life as long as they share in the 
spirit." (Buber, 1937, p.48) 
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To use the evil impulse to serve the good is to redeem evil and to bring it 
into the sanctuary of the good. It is this which is done by the man whose life 
swings between Thou and It, and it is this which reveals to him the meaning and 
character of life. 
Man's very freedom to do evil enables him to redeem evil. It enables him 
to serve the good not as a cog in the machine but as a free and creative being. 
Man's creativity is the energy which is given to him to form and to direct, and 
the real product of this creativity is not a work of art, but a life lived in relation, a 
life which is increasingly interpenetrated by Thou. 
Buber holds that a denial of causality makes freedom real to us. The free 
man is he who wills without arbitrary self-will. He knows he must go out to meet 
his destiny with his whole being, and he sacrifices his puny, unfree will, that is 
controlled by objects and instincts, to his grand will. Buber says: 
"Then he intervenes no more, but at the same time he 
does not let things merely happen. He listens to what is 
emerging from himself, to the course of being in the 
world; not in order to be supported by it, but in order to 
bring it to reality as it desires, in its need of him, to be 
brought... The free man has no purpose here and means 
there, which he fetches for his purpose: he has only the 
one thing, his repeated decision to approach his destiny." 
(Buber, 1937, p.59) 
In contrast to the free man stands the self-willed man who, according to 
Buber, neither believes nor meets. He does not know connection but only the 
outside world and his desire to use it. He has no destiny, for he is defined by 
things and instincts which he fulfills with arbitrary self will. Incapable of 
sacrifice, he continually intervenes to 'let things happen'. His world is 'a 
mediated world cluttered with purposes'. His life never attains a meaning, for it 
is composed of means which are without significance in themselves. Buber 
elucidates here that only T-Thou' gives meaning to the world of 'It', for 'I-thou' 
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is an end which is not reached in time but is there from the start, originating and 
carrying-through. The free man's will and the attainment of his goal need not be 
united by a means, for in 'I-Thou' the means and the end are one. 
'Individuality', the I of 1-lt, becomes conscious of itself as the subject of 
experiencing and using. It makes its appearance through being differentiated 
from other individualities and is conscious of itself as a particular kind of being. 
It is concerned with its my - my kind, my race, my creation, my genius. It has no 
reality because it has no sharing, and because it appropriates unto itself. 
'Person', on the other hand, the I of I-Thou, makes it appearance by entering into 
relation with other persons. Through relation the person shares in a reality, 
which neither belongs to him nor merely lies outside him, a reality which cannot 
be appropriated but only shared. The more direct his contact with the Thou, the 
fuller his sharing; the fuller his sharing the more real his I. 
Thus, according to Buber, the act of relation is not the emotion or 
feeling, which remains within the I. But the pure relation is the love between I 
and the Thou. To the man who loves people are set free from their qualities as 
good or evil, wise or foolish and confront him in their singleness as Thou. Hence 
love is not the enjoyment of a wonderful emotion, not even the ecstasy but the 
'responsibility of an I for a Thou.' 
Thou to a man means to affirm his being. "Yet the man who straight 
forwardly hates is nearer to relation than the man without hate and love." 
(Buber, 1937, p. 16) For in this situation what a man really has in mind is the 
person who he hates as distinct from the man whose hatred and love does not 
have any meaning and is void of any real intention. But Buber believes that 
hatred sees only a part of being. If a man sees a whole being and still hates, he is 
no longer in relation but in 'I-It'. He further says that a full 'I-Thou' relationship 
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can only mean love, it is better to hate men than to treat them entirely as objects 
to be known or made use of it. 
In the silent or spoken dialogue between I and the Thou both personality 
and knowledge come into being. Unlike the subject object knowledge of the 'I-
It' relation, the knowing of the 'I-Thou' relation takes place neither in the 
'subjective' nor in the 'objective', the 'emotional' nor the 'rational', but in the 
'between' - the reciprocal relationship of whole and active beings. Similarly, 
personality is neither simply an individual matter nor simply a social product, 
but a function of relationship. Though we are bom 'individuals', in the sense of 
being different from others, we are not bom persons. Our personalities are called 
into being by those who enter into relation with us. Thus a person is not merely a 
cell in a social organism. To become a person means to become someone who 
responds to what happens from a center of inwardness. 
To be fully real the I-Thou relation must be mutual. This mutuality does 
not mean simply unity or identity, nor is it any form of empathy. Though I-Thou 
is the word of relation and togethemess, each of the members of the relation 
really remains himself, and that means really different from the other. Though 
the Thou is not an It, it is also not 'another' I'. He who treats a person as another 
T does not really see that person but only a projection of himself Such a 
relation, despite the warmest 'personal' feeling, is really 'I-It'. 
Thus, Buber believes that the authenticity can be gained only in the 
genuine dialogue between two individuals - a dialogue in which the experiencing 
senses and the real fantasy which supplements them work together to make the 
other present as whole and one. For this, dialogue to be real, one must not only 
focus on the other, but also involve oneself, and that means to truly express what 
one really thinks about the matter in question. Genuine dialogue can thus be 
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either spoken or silent. Its essence lies in the fact that 'each of the participants 
really has in mind the other or the others in their present and particular being' 
and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relationship 
between himself and them.' The essential element of genuine dialogue, 
therefore, is 'seeing the other' or experiencing the other side'. 'Experiencing the 
other side' means to feel an event from the side of the person one meets as well 
as from one's own side. It is an inclusiveness which realizes the other person in 
the actuality of his being. 
Man's wholeness does not exist apart from real relationship to other 
beings. In / and Thou Buber defines spirit in its human manifestation as a 
'response of man to his Thou.' These two elements of wholeness and relation are 
invariably linked together in Buber's thought. The true person may again and 
again be required to detach and shut himself off from others, but this attitude is 
alien to his innermost being: for such a man wants openness to the world, he 
wants the company of others. Through relation the whole man shares an absolute 
meaning which he cannot know in a life by himself. 
Thus, truth in the realm between man and man means that one imparts 
oneself to the other as what one is. This is not a question of saying to the other 
everything that occurs to one, but of allowing the person with whom one 
communicates to partake of one's being. It is a question of the 'authenticity' of 
what is between men, without which there can be no true human existence. Thus, 
it is the interaction between man and man which makes possible authentic 
human existence. It follows that the precondition of such authentic existence is 
that each overcomes the tendency toward appearance, that each meets the other 
in his personal existence and makes him present as such, and that neither 
attempts to impose his own truth or view on the other. The dynamic glory of the 
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being of man is first bodily present in the relation between two men, each of 
whom in meeting the other also means the highest to which this person is called 
and serves the fulfillment of this created destiny without wishing to impose 
anything of his own realization on the other. 
Thus, the 'sphere of the between', mutual confirmation, making the other 
present, overcoming appearance, genuine dialogue, experiencing the other side, 
personal wholeness which lead to the attainment of an authentic human 
existence, an existence which is not inherited but earned through the dynamics 
of dialogue. 
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Inspirations of Ultimate Concern 
The anxiety of meaninglessness is anxiety about the loss of 
an uhimate concern, of a meaning which gives meaning to 
all meanings. (Tillich, 1952, p. 47) 
Paul Tillich was an eminent twentieth century religious philosopher and 
theologian who illuminated and brought together the realms of culture and 
religion into close proximity. He was held in great esteem by the intellectuals 
contemporary to him both in his motherland Germany and later in his adopted 
homeland, the United States of America. The philosophy of Tillich made an 
irrepressible impact on a period that marks the gradual surrender of an overall 
traditional Christian conviction about God, morality and the significance of 
human existence. 
During this transition the contribution of Paul Tillich has been of 
immense importance. On the one hand, he has been considered as the last major 
spokesman for a vanishing christian culture, being the last systematic thinker 
who sought to demonstrate the reasonableness of the christian faith to modem 
man and to explore the meaning of this faith in relation to the questions posed by 
the philosophical analysis of human existence. This became possible due to the 
coinciding of certain factors. First, he was deeply influenced by the recovery of 
neglected insights in the Bible. Secondly he was deeply affected by the crisis of 
the western culture wrought by the calamities of the first world war and most 
importantly his discovery of existentialism through the writings of Kierkegaard. 
On the other hand, his writings have been regarded as immensely crucial to the 
current atheistic trend. His discussions of the meaning of God and faith served to 
undermine traditional Christian belief, as a consequence of which he has been 
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regarded as an advocate of agnosticism and atheism. His use of the philosophical 
terminology in discussing God and faith, and his rejection of the Personal God of 
popular Christianity further fortified his atheistic/agnostic identity. 
Thus, he has been considered as the boundary man as he positioned 
himself between the old and new, between a heritage imbued with a sense of 
sacred and a secular orientation defining the new age. He declared that his 
vocation was to mediate between the concerns voiced by faith and the 
imperatives of a questioning rationality. 
His boundary location was on account of the parental influences 
impressed upon him during his childhood. Both his parents were strong 
personalities of contrasting types. Both of them represent two different 
Germanic traditions and attitudes concerning life. His family was very 
conservative. With his mother holding moral indictments rigidly close to her 
heart due to which it became very difficult for young Tillich to escape from this 
extreme attitude of his mother. On the other hand it was equally difficult to 
disregard his father's authoritarianism. In an effort to draw a balance between 
those opposing forces Tillich found himself situated on the boundary. He writes: 
"Most difficult to overcome was the impact of the 
authoritarian system on my personal life, especially on its 
religious and intellectual side. Both my father and mother 
were strong personalities."(Tillich, 1967, p.31) 
In his ardent struggle against the strict authoritarianism of his father 
Tillich made use of the strength of philosophical argumentation which 
eventually led him into developing an independent philosophical position closely 
connected to the domain of existence. He writes: 
"From an independent philosophical position to a state of 
independence spread out into all directions, theoretically 
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first, practically later. It is this difficult and painful break-
through to autonomy which has made me immune against 
any system of thought or life which demands the 
surrender of autonomy."(Tillich, 1967, p.32) 
Paul Tillich became an outstanding figure in contemporary theological 
and existential thought, being one of the best thinkers who highlighted the 
centrality of existentialism as a true approach to religion and philosophy. As a 
student in Germany he had become acquainted with Kierkegaard, and his early 
studies of Schelling revealed to him the existential point of view 
comprehensively. From 1941 to 1944 he wrote a number of essays on 
'existentialism' which are included in Theology and Culture. And in 1951 he 
delivered the Terry lectures at Yale, entitled The Courage to Be. These lectures 
were decisive landmarks in his intellectual development. Although an 
existentialist interpretation of religion and philosophy has been made by Tillich 
he remained a theologian all his life. As he himself says "As a theologian I tried 
to remain a philosopher, and when a philosopher to remain a 
theologian."(Tillich, 1936, p.40) He further says that: 
"... I was and am a theologian, because the existential 
question of our ultimate concern and the existential 
answer of the Christian message are and always have 
been predominant in my spiritual life."(Tillich, 1961, 
p.lO) 
Being an existentialist theologian he insists that 'personal involvement' is 
essential for any valid religious insight. He advocates that to understand 
Christianity an individual must see it through the eyes of Christian faith. As he 
puts it in 'Interpretation of History' that: 
"In religious truth the sake is one's very existence. 
Religious truth is existential truth, and to that extent it 
cannot be separated from practice. Religious truth is 
acted." (Tillich, 1936, p. 18) 
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Tillich sees the cultural predicament of his time as tragic and hopeless 
with modem life in utter confusion and despair. He suggests that an individual 
can escape from this impasse only through a radical reorientation of human life 
turning to God with whom a man encounters in his moments of ultimate 
concern. Ultimate concern is the central phrase and central concept in his entire 
thought and its around this central notion that Tillich builds his idea of religion 
and the discovery of meaning in human life. Such an approach is obviously 
existential in its nature. 
The problem with which Tillich is concerned is the way religion is related 
to other aspects of culture. He observes that while religions exhibit a genius for 
preserving traditional practices, they also try to meet the demands of a changing 
climate of thought. Tillich faces the secular culture of the contemporary world 
with the orientation of a theistic world view. He tries to show that the conditions 
for a culture in which religious life is directed toward a theistic God, emerges 
from the same source as, and is firmly tied up with the so called secular life. The 
growing lack of rapport between those who are God - centered and those who 
are man - centered has been responsible in creating one of the chief difficuhies 
for thinkers who want to achieve a rapprochement between theistic and 
humanistic values. Tillich tries to provide a base for a common thought by 
relegating religion as man's 'ultimate concern'. Even the atheist has 'ultimate 
concern', even though he does not believe in the existence of God. 
Tillich expounds faith as the "state of being ultimately 
concemed."(TiIlich, 1958, p.08) According to him, our ultimate concern is that 
which determines our being or non-being — not in the sense of our physical 
existence but in the sense of"... the reality, the structure, the meaning, and the 
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aim of existence'X Tillich, 1951, p. 14). For Tillich, religious faith grows out of 
those experiences which we invest with ultimate value and to which we give our 
ultimate allegiance. He describes ultimate concern in Systematic theology as the 
abstract translation of a great commandment: 
"The Lord, our God, the Lord is one; and you shall love 
the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength. 
The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other 
concerns from ultimate significance; it makes them 
preliminary. The ultimate concern is unconditional, 
independent of any conditions of character, desire, or 
circumstance. The unconditional concern is total: no part 
of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it; there is 
no "place" to flee from it. The total concem is infinite: no 
moment of relaxation and rest is possible in the face of a 
religious concem which is ultimate, unconditional, total, 
and infinite." (Tillich, 1951, pp.11-12) 
Behind this assertion that relegates religious faith as ultimate concem, 
Tillich makes two assumptions. First, that ultimate concem is common to all 
religions. No matter what their differences, a 'religious' experience is precisely 
that which makes an ultimate claim on our loyalties. And second, that no one is 
without some kind of'faith' in the sense of an ultimate concem. 
Tillich explains ultimate concem as something that concems a person to 
the extent that it looms large over that person's life. He says that it "unites man's 
mental life and gives it a dominating center." (Tillich, 1958, p. 107)) Tillich calls it 
a matter of infinite passion." (TilHch, 1958, p. 106) This simply means that any 
other concem or group of concems will always be subordinated - sacrificed if 
necessary - to that which is called 'ultimate.' 
In his writings especially in Dynamics of Faith, Tillich supplies numerous 
examples of what constitutes an ultimate concem. These examples involve both 
religious and secular interests. The religious ultimate concems, generally 
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speaking, are various deities or their manifestations. "Faith, for the men of the 
old Testament, is the state of being ultimately and unconditionally concerned 
about Jahweh (Yahweh) and about what he represents in demand, threat and 
promise." (Tillich, 1958, p.03) For Islam, the revelation given by Mohammed is 
of ultimate concern. And among the non theistic religions, the ultimate concern 
is "a sacred object or an all-pervading power or a highest principle such as the 
Brahma or the One." (Tillich, 1963, p.05) 
On the secular front, Tillich gives a long list of uhimate concerns for 
example, the nation "If the nation is someone's ultimate concern, the name of 
the nation becomes a sacred name and the nation receives divine qualities which 
far surpass the reality of the being and functioning of the nation." (Tillich, 1958, 
p.44) Other people are ultimately concerned with success and with social 
standing and economic power. In a similar vein, some individuals embrace 
pleasure as their ultimate concern. Russia's Bolsheviks were concerned 'about 
the transformation of reality,' and present day communists are concerned about 
the realization of final stage of society. Scientists may be ultimately concerned 
about science and they may be ready to sacrifice everything, including their 
lives, towards that ultimate. Among existentialist philosophers, the human 
predicament is of ultimate concern. And for the humanists "... the ultimate 
concern of man is man."(Tillich, 1958, p.63) 
Tillich's definition of faith as ultimate concern stresses the removal of the 
subject-object dichotomy. The ultimate of the act of faith and the ultimate that is 
meant in the act of faith are one and the same. This means the "... disappearance 
of the ordinary subject-object scheme in the experience of the ultimate, the 
unconditional."(Tillich, 1958, p. 11) His definition of faith points towards -
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humanity's continuity or even identity with God as the ground of being. But it 
can also be seen as pointing in the opposite direction, toward so extreme a 
sundering of God and man that faith can operate as an autonomous function of 
the mind whether God be a reality or not. He says: 
"'God'... is the name for that which concerns man 
ultimately. This does not mean that first. There is a being 
called God and then the demand that man should be 
ultimately concerned about him. It means that whatever 
concerns a man ultimately becomes God for him, and, 
conversely, it means that a man can be concerned 
ultimately only about that which is God for him."(Tillich, 
1951, p.21) 
Tillich sometimes makes a distinction between true and false uliimacy. 
That which demands our ultimate concern must indeed be ultimate if it is worthy 
of our commitment. If the object of faith is not itself ultimate, then such a faith is 
idolatrous and can give rise to the demonic. Tillich, frequently uses the word 
demonic, to describe an ultimate commitment as that which is not ultimate, as 
when an individual submits to the demand of a totalitarian state for total 
allegiance. Fascism and communism are the examples of demonic or idolatrous 
for these two concerns appear to be ultimate and unconditional, but in reality 
"neither is a matter of unconditional concern. For one may die for something 
which is conditional in being and meaning - as the Germans did who, for 
national reason, fought under Hitler for Germany while hating national socialism 
and secretly waiting for its defeat."(Tillich, 1963, p. 06) Tillich disregards 
national and social concerns as truly ultimate. They are only transitory and as 
such ambiguous. Thus, Tillich affirms that "In true faith the ultimate concern is a 
concern about the truly uhimate. While in idolatrous faith preliminary, finite 
realities are elevated to the rank of ultimacy." (Tillich, 1958, p. 12) He further 
says that "Idolatry is the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy. 
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Something essentially conditioned is taken as unconditional, something 
essentially partial is boosted to universality, and something essentially finite is 
given infinite significance." (Tillich, 1951, p. 13) 
Tillich states that the truly ultimate can transcend the subject-object 
dichotomy, but contrary to it false ultimacy can not for in idolatrous concerns in 
the finite it claims infinity which it does not possess. Hence the cleavage of 
subject and object can not be overcome in it, as is conspicuous in the case of 
national and social concerns. The object of idolatrous concern remains an object 
which the individual looks at as a subject. The subject can approach such finite 
object with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling, where 
subject-object cleavage is not transcended. Further, Tillich talks of degrees in the 
realm of false ultimates. For examples nation is nearer to true ultimacy than 
success is. For national ecstasy can produce a state in which the subject is almost 
subsumed within the object at least for sometime. This is not possible in the case 
of success. But it should be borne in mind that a nation can never become a true 
ultimate. It only appears to be so, because after a period subject emerges again 
totally disappointed and looking at nation in a skeptical way. 
Tillich says that idolatrous ultimacy inevitably leads to an existential 
disappointment a disappointment which deeply penetrates the very existence of 
man. "The inescapable consequence of idolatrous faith is existential 
disappointment..." (Tillich, 1951, p.l3) Even the ecstatic character of idolatrous 
faith can conceal this consequence for a certain time only and finally it breaks 
down. What was considered to be ultimate proves to be preliminary and 
transitory and under those circumstances one's life collapses leading to 
disappointment. For example, one may be drawn into communist movement. 
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thinking it to be his ultimate concern, with a belief that it would bring salvation 
to all human beings. But after experiencing the internal terror and conflict he 
may stop believing in the movement and as a result may be plunged into an 
existential disappointment once again. Under such situations Tillich suggests 
that only courage comes to our rescue. Courage restores confidence in ourselves 
to face the situation boldly and sets us free from the whirlpool of existential 
disappointment. For, "courage... is the daring self-affirmation of one's being in 
spite of the powers of "non-being" which are heritage of everything 
finite."(Tillich, 1958,p.l7) 
The three characteristics that impart meaning to Tillich's idea of ultimate 
concern have been its integrative action, its uncondiiionality and its deeply 
religious inclination. 
The first characteristic that Tillich refers to as the integrating center of 
personal life builds and integrates our lives around the ultimate concern which is 
the focus of all preliminary concerns. One way or the other, we evaluate our 
concerns either consciously or unconsciously. That is, we may not be conscious 
about that which concerns us most and why, but we do display our priorities by 
the way we act. Hence every preliminary concern is directed toward ultimate 
concern. For example, one studies because he requires a degree which in turn is 
a prerequisite to a good job and good job brings luxury and pleasure. The final 
concern in this entire journey is pleasure and any further questioning as regards 
pleasure is met with silence - that being the end. For the hedonists pleasure is the 
highest good; the ultimate end. A hedonist would thus build and integrate his life 
around pleasure. A recognition of finality comes over when ultimacy is reached 
and with it the series comes to an end, with no further reasons to be acquired. All 
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preliminary concerns converge on ultimate concerns with nothing else in view. It 
is around ultimate concerns that life is integrated and built. Tillich says that the 
ultimate concern is total: no part of ourselves or of our world is excluded from it; 
there is no 'place' to flee from it. 
Further Tillich describes ultimate concern as unconditional. There can be 
no precondition attached to ultimate concern, A hedonist, for whom pleasure is 
the ultimate concern, would therefore desire pleasure under any condition. But a 
man for whom knowledge is the ultimate concern would qualify his concern for 
pleasure by desiring pleasure, only under the condition that it does not interfere 
with his purpose of learning. Thus, Tillich says that the ultimate concern is 
unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or 
circumstances. 
The unconditional character has been linked to ultimate concern, what 
Tillich regards as the religious attitude. The term 'ultimate concern' is the 
abstract translation of the commandment: you shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and with all your soul and with all your mind. Tillich links 
'ultimate concern' with this Biblical commandment. He observes that this is 
what ultimate concern means and from these words the term ultimate concern is 
derived. The individual religiously structures his life around ultimate concern 
and he is prepared to die for it. 
Thus, in the conviction that faith is the state of being ultimately concemed 
and the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man's ultimate concern. Tillich 
explains that besides material conditions involving basic needs, man also has 
aesthetic, social, political and moral concerns. Some of these concerns may be 
urgent and may claim ultimacy in which case, it requires complete surrender. For 
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example, if one makes the life and growth of the country one's ultimate concern, 
it demands that all other claims - economic well-being, health, family - be 
sacrificed. As Tillich says: 
"If it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of 
him who accepts this claim, and it promises total 
fulfillment even if all other claims have to be subjected or 
rejected in its name. If a national group makes the life 
and growth of the nation its ultimate concern, it demands 
that all other concerns, economic well-being, health and 
life, family, aesthetic and cognitive truth, justice and 
humanity, be scarified." (Tillich, 1963, ST, III, pp.481-
82) 
There is an expectation that one will receive total fulfillment through 
one's encounter with the object of faith. Tillich says that it is not only 
unconditional demand made by that which is one's ultimate concern, but "it is 
also the promise of ultimate fulfillment which is accepted in the act of faith." 
Thus unconditionality is the promise of fulfillment. 
Tillich further declares that faith as ultimate concern is an act of the total 
personality including all elements of the personality. It is the most centered act 
of the human mind thus uniting the entire functions of a man's total being in the 
act of faith. 
"It is not a movement of a special section or a special 
fiinction of man's total being. They all are united in the 
act of faith. But faith is not the sum total of their impacts. 
It transcends every special impact as well as the totality 
of them and it has itself a decisive impact on each of 
them." (Stewart, 1980, p. 15) 
Tillich further explains by saying that "faith is the most centered act of 
the human mind. It is not a movement of a special section or a special function 
of man's total being. They are all united in the act of faith."(TiUich, 1963 ST, III, 
p. 483) In his book Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Tillich 
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classifies this phenomenon by saying that "Faith... is an act of whole 
personality. Will, knowledge, and emotion participate in it. But faith is not only 
the sum total of their impacts. Rather it transcends every special impact as well 
as the totality of them."(Tillich, 1955, p.53) 
Tillich equates this centered act of faith with freedom, "for faith is a 
matter of freedom. Freedom is nothing more than the possibility of centered 
personal acts. The frequent discussion in which faith and freedom are contrasted 
could be helped by the insight that faith is a free, namely, centered act of the 
personality. In this respect freedom and faith are identical..." (Stewart, 1980, 
p.l5) 
Tillich advocates that faith as a centered act of total personality is related 
to the rational aspect of man's personality. He distinguishes between two kinds 
of reason: technical and ontological. Technical reason, according to Tillich, is 
the capacity to analyse, to calculate, and to argue. It provides only means and not 
ends. Thus, it is taken as in the sense of scientific method, logical strictness and 
technical calculation. On the other hand the ontological reason is concerned with 
the complete structure of mind, with mind as a whole, and not merely with the 
cognitive aspect. It is according to Tillich, effective in the cognitive, aesthetic, 
practical and technical functions of the human mind. In this second sense, reason 
is identical with the humanity of man in contrast to all other beings. It is 
involved in the search of knowledge, the experience of art, the actualization of 
moral commands. It makes a centered personal life and a participation in 
community possible. Tillich observes that if reason is considered to be opposed 
to faith, then it tends to dehumanize man. But it does not do so. Reason, 
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therefore, is an element of faith. If faith destroys reason, it destroys itself and the 
humanity of man. As Tillich observes: 
"For only a being who has the structure of reason is able 
to be ultimately concerned, to distinguish between 
ultimate and preliminary concerns, to understand the 
unconditional command of the ethical imperative, and to 
be aware of the presence of holy."(Tillich, 1958, p.76) 
Thus, Tillich concludes that reason is an element of faith. If faith is the 
state of being ultimately concerned, no conflict between them need exist. As a 
matter of fact reason is the precondition to faith. 
Tillich says religious faith, which is the state of being 'ultimately 
concerned' about the ultimate, can be expressed only in a symbolic language. He 
claims that whatever we say about that which concerns us ultimately, whether or 
not we call it God, has a symbolic meaning. It points beyond itself while 
participating in that to which it points. In no other way can faith express itself 
adequately. The language of faith says Tillich is the language of symbols. Tillich 
believes that the fundamental symbol to which we are ultimately concerned is 
God. He says: 
"There can be no doubt that any concrete assertion about 
God must be symbolic, for a concrete assertion is one 
which uses a segment of finite experience in order to say 
something about him. It transcends the content of this 
segment, although it also includes it. The segment of 
finite reality, which becomes the vehicle of a concrete 
assertion about God is affirmed and negated at the same 
time. It becomes a symbol, for a symbolic expression is 
one whose proper meaning is negated by that to which it 
points. And yet it also is affirmed by it, and this 
affirmation gives the symbolic expression an adequate 
basis for pointing beyond itself "(Tillich, 1951, p.239) 
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Tillich further says that though God is the basic symbol of faith. He is not 
the only one. According to him, "all the qualities we attribute to him, power, 
love, justice, are taken from finite experiences and applied symbolically to that 
which is beyond fmitude and infinity. If faith calls God 'almighty', it uses the 
human experience of power in order to symbolize the content of its infinite 
concern, but it does not describe a highest being who can do as he 
pleases."(Tillich, 1958, p.45) 
Tillich finds it impossible to develop an interpretation of religion which 
was not intimately associated with the vital concerns of human life. He observes 
that there is a deep schism between the cultural revolution and the religious 
traditions. The Churches whether Lutheran or Roman or even the Greek, reject 
the cultural and political revolutions. And the revolutionary movements, on the 
other hand, disown the Churches as the expression of a transcendent 
heteronomy. Tillich believes that both the Churches and the cultural movements 
reject something from which they themselves derive life. Tillich calls this 
something as theonomy. He defines it in the following words: 
"A theonomous culture expresses in its creations an 
ultimate concern and a transcending meaning not as 
something strange but as its own spiritual ground. 
Religion is the substance of culture and culture the form 
of religion." (Tillich, Cited in Hammer, 1966, p.l22) 
This idea of theonomous culture, for Tillich, became the principle of 
philosophies of religion and of culture which proposes to fill the gap from both 
sides. Tillich finds this gap intolerable and disastrous and advocates that it ought 
to be filled. This gap, according to Tillich, can be filled partly by creating 
movements, like religious socialism and, partly by a fresh interpretation of the 
mutual immanence of religion and culture within each other. Tillich attempts to 
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analyze the mutual immanence of religion and culture in his Berlin lecture, 
immediately after the end of the war, entitled The Idea of a Theology of Culture. 
In this lecture he holds the opinion that in spite of a total breakdown and ensuing 
misery, a new beginning, a period of radical transformation, or in the language 
of New Testament, a Kairos had come upon us. And the breakdown of bourgeois 
civilization paves the way for a reunion of religion and secular culture. 
A theonomous analysis of culture shows that in the depth of every 
autonomous culture an ultimate concern, something unconditional and holy, is 
implied. It is the task of deciphering the style of an autonomous culture in all its 
characteristic expressions and of finding their hidden religious significance. 
"Autonomous culture", Tillich says, "is secularized in the degree to which it has 
lost its ultimate reference, its center of meaning, its spiritual substance... The 
later nineteenth century, with its subjection to the technical pattern of thought 
and action, shows the character of an extremely emptied and secularized 
autonomy in an advanced stage of disintegration... But the religious substance, a 
remnant of something ultimate, was noticeable and made the transitory existence 
of such a culture possible. However, more than in the disintegrating bourgeois 
autonomy, the religious reference was effective in the movements which 
protested against this situation. Theonomous analysis was able to decipher 
puzzling experiences, such as visionary destruction of bourgeois idealism and 
naturalism in art and literature by expressionism and surrealism... it was able to 
interpret the quasi - religious, fanatical, and absolutistic character of the 
reactions of the twentieth century as against the nineteenth. ... In all of them 
there is an ultimate, unconditional, and all-determining concern, something 
absolutely serious and therefore, holy, even if expressed in secular 
terms."(Hammer, 1966p.l22) 
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Tillich's deepest conviction as a theologian rests in the fact that 
philosophy has an indispensable role to play in making of 'systematic theology'. 
He clearly rejects both the traditional theologies of revelation as well as the 
traditional natural theologies and goes on to develop his unique system of 
philosophical theology which provides an alternative to both the previous 
theologies. 
The method Tillich advocates and professes to adopt in his work as a 
systematic theologian is the method of correlation. The systematic theologian is 
charged, according to Tillich, with a double responsibility: first, he must be 
faithful to the content of the revelation which is to be interpreted; secondly, he 
must try to interpret it in such a way which makes it intelligible even to those 
who do not share his religious commitment. The first of these requirements 
reflects Tillich's conviction that statements about God can be made only on the 
basis of revelation; the second underlines the apologetic character of the 
systematic theologian's task. The systematic theologian who employs the 
method of correlation tries to satisfy both requirements by seeking to connect 
questions which are asked by human beings quite independently of revelation 
with statements which can be made only on the basis of revelation. A systematic 
theology which employs the method of correlation will be able to satisfy 
simultaneously both the demand that the theologian be faithful to the content of 
the revelation for to interpret, and the demand that this interpretation assume a 
form which renders the message grounded in this revelation intelligible to those 
without any religious commitment. 
Tillich's rejection of natural theology is not hostile towards philosophical 
theology. On the contrary, it is Tillich's view that the systematic theologian who 
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uses the method of correlation is himself a philosophical theologian of a special 
kind. This is because he believes that philosophy has an indispensable 
contribution to make to systematic theology. Although it is supposed to be no 
part of the philosopher's job to make his contribution in the form of a doctrine of 
God, it is, according to Tillich, one of his tasks to ensure the adequate 
formulation of those 'existential questions' to which statements about God are 
capable of providing possible answers. 
The central affirmations about human beings made in the 'question-
developing' parts of Tillich's systematic theology are (a) that human beings are 
finite, and (b) that human beings are estranged. Tillich holds the view that the 
philosopher attends critically to certain 'universally human' experiences -
experiences which human beings undergo within all sorts of social and cultural 
conditions. As he puts it in the introduction to the second volume of systematic 
theology that: 
"The philosopher must participate in the human 
predicament not only actually - as he always does 
- but in conscious identification. He must 
participate in man's finitude, which is also his 
own, and in its anxiety as though he had never 
received the revelatory answer of 'etemity'. He 
must participate in man's estrangement, which is 
also his own, and show the anxiety of guilt as 
though he had never received the revelatory 
answer of 'forgiveness.'"(Tillich, 1957, pp. 16-
17) 
In order to be in a position to formulate 'existential questions' effectively, 
it is sufficient that the philosopher scrutinize certain experiences with which he 
is necessarily familiar in virtue of the fact that he is a human being - in 
particular, the experience of the anxiety of death and the experience of the 
anxiety of guilt. The contention that human beings are 'finite' represents an 
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attempt on Tillich's part to identify the feature of the human situation which 
gives rise to the universal experience of antic anxiety ('the anxiety of death'). 
The contention that human beings are estranged represents his attempt to 
identify that feature of the human situation which gives rise to the universal 
experience of the 'anxiety of guih'. Tillich's central doctrines of human fmitude 
and estrangement are thus the products of a special kind of analysis of the 
experiences which human beings are subject to. 
The main objective of Tillich's magnum opus, Systematic Theology, is to 
explain and justify the role of ontology in his theological system. We find two 
different conceptions of the philosophical enterprise in this book. At times, the 
'search for ultimate reality' is represented as the search for an answer to a 
question about 'ultimate reality', the 'question of being' as he prefers to call it. 
And at other times, it is thought of as a search undertaken by human beings (all 
human beings; human beings as such) in an endeavour to come to terms with 
that anxiety which consists in their awareness of their finitude - their awareness 
of the fact that they are 'a mixture of being and nonbeing' and that they stand 
between being and nonbeing'. Interpreting in the first of these two ways, the 
'search for uUimate reality' is an intellectual enterprise in which only some 
human beings, philosophers or ontologists - engage; but interpreting in the 
second sense, the 'search for ultimate reality' is the religious quest, in which he 
says, all human beings are inescapably involved. 
The elucidation and support of Tillich's insistence on the closeness of the 
relation between religious quest and ontological question needs to explain these 
two questions, (a) Why Tillich thinks that it is illuminating to describe the 
religious quest as a quest for being or in the language of Biblical Religion and 
103 
Chapter IV Paul Tillich: Inspirations of Ultimate Concern 
the Search for Ultimate Reality, as a 'search for ultimate reality', (b) Why this 
description of the religious quest makes it easy for him at times to obliterate the 
distinction between religious quest and the ontological question. 
Tillich's view that all human being engage in the religious quest is tied up 
with his belief that there are certain anxieties that all human beings are prone to. 
These anxieties generate the religious quest and a man's religion can 
consequently be seen as his way of coping with anxiety. 
In The Courage To Be Tillich identifies three anxieties to which human 
beings as such are prone to be subject to: the anxiety of death, the anxiety of 
guilt, and the anxiety of meaninglessness. The anxiety of death is occasioned by 
man's awareness of the fact that he is a mortal, destined to die some day. The 
anxiety of guilt is generated by man's awareness of the gap between what he is 
and what he ought to be. The anxiety of meaninglessness springs from man's 
sense of the ultimate purposelessness of the various activities which go into the 
making of his life. These anxieties do not exist divorced from each other but as 
Tillich points out. 
"... are interwoven in such a way that one of them 
gives the predominant color but all of them 
participate in the coloring of the state of anxiety. 
All of them and their underlying unity are 
existential, i.e. they are implied in the existence of 
man as man, his fmitude and 
estrangement."(Tillich, 1952, p.54) 
Tillich holds the view that the religious quest generated by the experience 
of 'existential anxiety' can be described as a quest for being because he thinks 
that this universal human anxiety has its source in 'the threat of non being'. And 
it is 'being' which according to Tillich, has the 'power to resist nonbeing'. 
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The question arises as to how can Tillich suppose that the various 
anxieties he distinguishes in The Courage To Be all have their source in the 
threat of nonbeing. Part of the answer lies in the distinction he tries to draw 
between 'anxiety' and 'fear'. His main reason for distinguishing sharply between 
fear and anxiety is that he wants to be able to admit that fears come and go - and 
that specific fears can be eliminated by appropriate action - without being forced 
to abandon his conviction that anxiety forms the permanent and inescapable 
background to human life. Since he holds that fears are prodilced by and directed 
towards specific 'objects', the attempt to differentiate anxiety from fear takes the 
dramatic form of the claim that anxiety is occasioned by 'the negation of every 
object - and 'the negation of every object' is, according to Tillich, 'nonbeing'. 
"Fear, as opposed to anxiety, has a definite object (as 
most authors agree), which can be faced, analysed, 
attacked, endured... But this is not so with anxiety 
because anxiety has no object, or rather, in a paradoxical 
phrase, its object is the negation of every object... The 
only object is the threat itself, but not the threat, because 
the source of the threat is "nothingness". (Tillich, 1952, 
pp.36-37) 
In systematic theology too he clarifies it further by stating that: 
"Anxiety is independent of any special object which 
might produce it; it is dependent only on the threat of 
nonbeing... In this sense it has been said rightly that the 
object of anxiety is "nothingness" - and nothingness is 
not an "object". Objects are feared. A danger, a pain, an 
enemy, may be feared, but fear can be conquered by 
action. Anxiety cannot..." (Tillich, 1951, p.212) 
Tillich insists that anxiety is a natural expression of the fact that human 
beings are 'a mixture of being and nonbeing'. 
"We philosophise because we are finite and because we 
know that we are finite. We are a mixture of being and 
nonbeing, and we are aware of it."(Tillich, 1955, p. 13) 
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In elucidating what is meant by the assertion that man is a 'mixture of 
being and nonbeing'. Tillich relates it to his contention that estrangement is a 
fundamental feature of human existence. The 'nonbeing' which is an ingredient 
of man's being consists not in his being destined some day not to be, nor in his 
not being (identical with) other finite beings, but in his not being what he 
'potentially' or 'essentially' is - that is, in his not being what he ought to be. 
Tillich elucidates the general doctrine that it is 'the threat of nonbeing' 
which generates 'existential anxiety'. He relates the anxiety of death to the threat 
of antic nonbeing, the anxiety of guilt to the threat of moral nonbeing, and the 
anxiety of meaninglessness to the threat of spiritual nonbeing. By insisting in 
this way on the many meanings of the term 'nonbeing', Tillich puts within his 
reach a way out of the charge that secures acceptance of his doctrine that 
existential anxiety occasions the threat of nonbeing. Despite all these distinctions 
drawn between different types of anxiety, it is the single quest, the quest for 
being, which is generated by the experience of anxiety. Thus, the fundamental 
human quest generated by the universal experience of anxiety is, according to 
Tillich a quest for being. 
Tillich, normally recognizes that the religious quest and ontological 
questions are different but he finds a close connection between them. There are 
two main ways in which Tillich tries to link the fact that human beings as such 
engage in religious quest with the fact that some human beings ask the 
ontological questions. First, because the ontological question is represented as a 
question about what is sought by human beings in the religious quest. Since the 
religious quest is fi-equently characterized, as a 'quest for being' or as a 'search 
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for ultimate reality' in Tillich's philosophy the ontological question is 
represented as a question about the 'being' or 'ultimate reality' which is the 
object of the religious quest. This is the view of the ontological question which 
predominates in Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. And 
secondly Tillich represents the ontological question as the one concerning the 
features of the human situation which shed light on the fact that the religious 
quest is one in which human beings necessarily engage. On this view the 
ontologist is required to contribute the sort of doctrine of man which will render 
intelligible the fact that there is a certain quest-viz. the quest for being - which 
human beings as such undertake. 
Tillich holds the view that philosophers are interested in the elucidation of 
the structure of being {or reality), they trace this interest to the fact that it is the 
structure of being which makes experience possible rather than to a desire to 
identify the features of the human situation which give rise to the religious quest 
or to a desire to give some account of the meaning of the verb 'to be' or to a 
desire to illumine the 'mystery of being' by explaining why there is a world at 
all. 
Tillich's claim that the philosopher investigates the structure of being 
with a view to throwing light on the conditions of the possibility of experience is 
construed by him in two quite different ways. 
On the one hand, the conditions of the possibility of experience are 
identified with certain features of the objects of experience - features they must 
have in order to be possible only because reality has a certain structure, the sort 
of structure which makes it possible for the mind to 'grasp' it. And it is this 
structure which it is the job of the ontologist to articulate. 
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On the other hand, it concerns, not the features of the things we 
experience which alone enable them to be experienced by us, but the nature of 
the distinction between the experiencing subject and what he experiences: for 
experience to be possible at all, the distinction between experiencing subject and 
experienced object must, it is held, be grounded in an ontological distinction 
between the 'self and its 'world'. 
Tillich maintains the view that the 'basic ontological' structure is the self-
world structure. His primary contention is that the distinction between the 
experiencing subject and experiencing object is grounded in a fundamental 
ontological distinction, that between the 'self and its 'world'. The subject-object 
structure, Tillich writes, 'presupposes the self-world structure as the basic 
articulation of being. By advancing this claim, Tillich hopes to render plausible 
the contention that the question about what makes experience possible is an 
ontological question. 
There are two main ways in which Tillich attempts to substantiate this 
claim that what makes experience possible is an ontological question. These two 
ways: (a) by argument (b) by appeal to 'immediate experience'. 
(a) In a preliminary reference to his doctrine of the basic ontological 
structure Tillich says of it that it is 'the implicit condition of the 
ontological condition'. He proceeds to elucidate this claim as follows: 
'The ontological question presupposes an asking subject and an object 
about which the question is asked; it presupposes the subject-object 
structure of being, which in turn presupposes the self-world structure as 
the basic articulation of being. 
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(b) Of the two claims which embody Tillich's argument in support of the 
thesis that it is the 'self-world structure' which makes experience 
possible, the first that it is a condition of the legitimacy of the ontological 
question that it be possible to distinguish between the questioner of the 
ontological question and that about which he questions be assumed to be 
the 'self- world structure.' 
Tillich holds that the very experience of scrutiny that yields the 
philosophical doctrine of human fmitude is also the experience in virtue of 
which human beings can understand what the notion of God means. He says 
only those who have experienced the shock of transitions, the anxiety in which 
they are aware of their own fmitude, the threat of non-being, can understand 
what the notion of God means. If the receptivity of human beings to revelation is 
a function of the fact that they are creatures subject to existential anxiety, then it 
is natural that the systematic theologian whose task is to 'correlate' statements 
made on the basis of revelation with questions asked by human beings, 
independently of revelation should seek to articulate these questions in the light 
of an analysis of man's experience of this anxiety. 
Tillich maintains that estrangement is a quality of the structure of 
existence and that man's estrangement from his essential being is the universal 
character of existence. Estrangement can at best be represented as a quality of 
the structure of human existence, not of existence as such. It is, however, the 
larger claim that estrangement is a quality of the structure of existence that 
Tillich considers it essential to maintain on the basis of his analysis of the human 
situation. 
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Tillich's conception of the philosopher's task in relation to systematic 
theology which makes it possible for him to deny that it is a 'doctrine of man' 
which is contributed by the philosopher to the system. He says: 
"Whoever has penetrated into the nature of his own 
finitude can find traces of finitude in everything that 
exists. And he can ask the question implied in his finitude 
as the question implied in finitude universally. In doing 
so, he does not formulate a doctrine of man; he expresses 
a doctrine of existence as experienced in him as 
man."(Tillich, 1951,p.70) 
In gaining clarity about what it means to be a human being i.e. that is, in 
analyzing the human situation Tillich says that the philosopher simultaneously 
gains clarity about what it means for anything to exist. To ascertain the structure 
of human existence is at the same time to ascertain the structure of existence as 
such. 
In the third volume of his Systematic Theology Tillich develops the 
dynamics of philosophy of life. The thesis of the life dialectic is religion or 
being. As he sees that man is threatened by three forms of anxieties i.e. about 
death, about a meaning of life, and about right and wrong. Religion attempts to 
overcome this three-fold anxiety by turning to the supernatural for support. 
According to him, there are two extremes; participation and individualization, 
which is represented by mysticism and theism respectively. In mysticism, Tillich 
says, man tries to participate in - become a part of - the higher reality. In 
mysticism man tries to strive to participate in the divine power by actually 
identifying himself with that power. This identifying experience convinces man 
that the world of time and space and material reality is ultimately unreal; hence 
he sees death only as the negation of the negative. Thus, by denying the 
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significance of ordinary life, the mystic dissolves the very question of its 
meaning. 
Theism, on the other hand, treats man and the deity as separate 
individuals and seeks to establish a person to person relationship. In theism, man 
treats the ground of his being as a person, who in the divine-human encounter, 
removes the cause of anxiety. God promises security against the threat of death 
for those who observe the requirements of prayer, service, and devotion. He 
provides life with a divine purpose. And, through his law, he provides the 
answers to what is right and what is wrong. 
Tillich does not recognize any of the two judgments. He says, mysticism 
tries to assume away anxiety and meaninglessness rather than solve the problem. 
"It plunges directly into the ground of being and meaning, and leaves the 
concrete, the world of finite values and meanings, behind" (Tillich, 1952, p. 
186). Mystical courage, moreover, is a transitory phenomenon lasting only for 
the duration of the encounter with the divine. And theism, on the other hand is 
equally wrong for him because, it makes God, "a being besides others and as 
such a part of the whole of reality." (Tillich, 1952, p. 184) The God of theism is 
an all knowing, all powerful tyrant who dictates man's actions and pries into his 
personal life. Tillich says that "this is the God Nietzsche said had to be killed 
because nobody can tolerate being made into a mere object of absolute 
knowledge and absolute control." (Tillich, 1952, p. 185) 
When man awakens from the dreaming innocence of religion, whether it 
is mystical or theistic, he is faced with the threat of non-being. Here, is a 
courage, which can "resist the power of nonbeing in its most radical form." 
(Tillich, 1952, p. 175) And, this is the courage to be. The courage to be, is 
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produced by a dialectical synthesis of being and non-being. Tillich says: "the 
self-affirmation of being is an affirmation that overcomes negation.... We could 
not even think 'being' without a double negation: being must be thought as the 
negation of the being." (Tillich, 1952, p. 179) In the dialectical synthesis, "being 
'embraces' itself and non-being" (Tillich, 1952, p. 34) that is, being in both the 
sense of reality and the sense of the true God includes the nonbeing of the 
supernatural God, supernatural salvation, supernatural meaning, and supernatural 
law. Tillich says that, in the moment of self-realization man discovers this: he 
discovers that God is man, hence that there is an essential unity between being 
(God) and nonbeing (the unreality of a supernatural God). He writes: "Being has 
nonbeing 'within' itself as that which is eternally present and eternally overcome 
in the process of the divine life." (Tillich, 1952, p. 34) This 'divine life' is a 
parable depicting the evolution of personal wisdom as a three-stage process. The 
authentic human life moves from theism to atheism to humanism, that is from 
God to no God to a supernatural God. In other words, this progression can be 
described as a movement from revelation to reason to humanism. 
Tillich's most eloquent, mature, and clearest point of view regarding 
authentic individual is found in his lecture named The Courage To Be. In this 
short lecture Tillich says that when an individual franscends from both the 
mysticism, and theism i.e. the courage to be as a part and the courage to be as 
oneself then he foimd the ultimate source of the courage to be i.e. God above 
God. This experience of the God above God of theism unites and transcends the 
courage to be as part and the courage to be as oneself. It avoids both the loss of 
oneself by participation and the loss of one's world by individualization. The 
acceptance of the God above the God of theism makes us a part of that which is 
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not also a part but is the ground of the whole. Therefore, our self is not lost in the 
larger whole, which submerges it in the life of a limited group. If the self 
participates in the power of being-itself it receives itself back. For the power of 
being acts through the power of the individual selves. It does not swallow them 
as every limited whole, every collectivism, and every conformism does. This is 
why the church, which stands for the power of being itself or for the God who 
transcends the God of the religions, claims to be the mediator of the courage to 
be. 
Thus, the absolute faith, or the state of being grasped by the God above 
God, is not a state which appears beside other states of the mind. It never is 
something separated and definite, an event which could be isolated and 
described. It is always a movement, in, with and under other states of the mind. 
It is the situation on the boundary of man's possibilities. Therefore, it is both the 
courage of despair and the courage in and above every courage. It is not a place 
where one can live, it is without the safety of words and concepts, it is without a 
name, a church, a cult, a theology. But it is moving in the depth of all of them. It 
is the power of being, in which they participate and of which they are 
fragmentary expressions. Thus, "the courage to be is rooted in the God who 





Olluminatiofi of Bxistenz 
KARL JASPERS 
Illumination of Existenz 
When everything that is said to be valuable and true collapses 
before my eyes, those with whom I communicate or might 
commimicate remain, and with them remains what to me is 
authentic. (Jaspers, 1970, p.ll7) 
Jasper's existentialist inclinations acquire immense value as a critique of 
modem mass society. He criticizes modem mass society with an unprecedented 
intellectual conviction and flexibility together with a committed moral 
consciousness. Jasper's notion of history reveals his anxieties of the present and 
of the ftiture to come but his philosophy is a portrayal of a hope of renewal. It is 
infact, the tension between the past, present, and future that build up the stmggle 
for a reach towards authenticity. Jaspers believes that philosophy is not a body of 
doctrines but essentially an activity; an activity intended to awaken in oneself 
and other human beings the possibilities for a genuinely meaningful existence. 
Jaspers advocates that the ultimate end of human existence is the 
achievement of an authentic existence gained through a deeper and wider self-
consciousness and he believes that philosophy as an activity contributes to this 
task of illuminating existence. But for him this expansion of consciousness is not 
the Hegelian circle of knowledge which is forever expanding in its effort to 
engulf the absolute. He feels that the raising of human consciousness to gain 
authenticity is a far more complex matter than the simple expansion of a circle. 
The shipwreck of a sweeping intellectual system - according to Jaspers is often 
an awakening into a self-consciousness which further leads towards the 
recognition of the finitude of his own mental powers and therefore of his own 
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being. As a consequence of this realization man turns away from the tyranny of 
those ideas. Man is always more than any of his ideas or even the sum of his 
ideas, and if man forgets this, he becomes the fanatical partisan of an ideology. It 
is out of this kind of encounter with the self that is more than the sum of all our 
ideas, the encounter of reason with non-reason, that authentic existence springs 
faith. And this authentic existence, according to Jaspers, continues only as the 
perpetual tension between reason and non-reason. 
Jaspers sees human history as pivoting around the drama of self-
consciousness. He sees the Axial Age in human history as an age in which 
humanity properly speaking begins. It is the period between 800-200 B.C., in 
which the great philosophers, prophets, and sages emerge the world over 
reflecting upon human existence in all its diversity. It is the period in which in 
China Lao-tse and Confucius, in India the Upanishadics and Buddha, in West 
Asia the Prophets, among the Persians, Zoroaster, and in Greece Socrates and 
other great philosophers came to be. What unites all these philosophies for 
Jaspers is not an identity of metaphysical and cosmological speculation. Such 
speculation is only a byproduct of a deeper historical revolution that influenced 
human consciousness during that period. The essential thing was that in their 
different ways and in their different cultures men for the first time questioned 
themselves on the meaning of their own existence. And despite the diverse 
answers, there is implicit in all their thoughts the realization that meaning enters 
into human existence only through the struggle for the realization of a lucid 
consciousness coupled with the moral courage required for that struggle. At the 
moment when man asks what is the meaning of my existence, there appears the 
possibility of breaking free from the trammels of fate. For, whatever may be the 
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answer, in the very act of asking this question it becomes clear that only man can 
establish the meaning of his existence. In this act, humanity, as strictly human 
with no recourse to anything beyond or apart from being human emerges from 
the depths of the primeval. Thus the goal of history is to raise and enrich the 
self-consciousness of man. History begins, says Jaspers, when man takes the first 
step toward authentic human existence; it continues as a struggle, with all its 
tensions and setbacks, toward ever greater authenticity. Jaspers in his book Man 
in the Modern Age states, 
"... man as individual refuses to allow himself to be 
absorbed into a life-order which would only leave him in 
being as a function for the maintenance of the whole. True, 
he can live in the apparatus with the aid of a thousand 
relationships on which he is dependent and in which he 
collaborates; but since he has become a mere replaceable cog 
in a wheelwork regardless of his individuality, he rebels if 
there is no other way in which he can manifest his selfhood." 
(Jaspers, 1959, p. 45) 
For Jaspers, philosophy begins not with an enquiry into the problem of 
being but with an enquiry into the specific situation in which the philosopher 
finds himself in the world. The reason behind this shift lies in Jasper's belief that 
the problem of being cannot be resolved by way of a rational analysis. He states 
that it is impossible to conceive of a doctrine of being which, in virtue of its 
rational convincing force could command universal assent. Everything that I 
experience as essentially real owes its reality to the fact that I myself exist as an 
individual. Therefore, Jaspers says, that the primary philosophic task is the 
illumination of the personality of the one who asks the philosophic questions. 
There is one more reason why Jaspers does not begin with the metaphysical 
question, i.e. enquiry into the problem of being. He believes that an individual 
always finds himself in a historically determined situation. This situation 
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contains some known and knowable as well as some unknown and unknowable 
elements: it is rooted in an unfathomable past and tends toward an impenetrable 
future. It has neither a readily definable origin nor a definitely recognizable end. 
The philosopher finds himself in the midst of things, inmiersed in a movement 
that is apparently undetermined and undeterminable. Jaspers says: 
"The significance of entering into the world constitutes the 
value of philosophy. True, philosophy is not an instrument, 
and still less is it a talisman; but it is awareness in the 
process of realization. Philosophy is the thought with which 
or as which I am active as my own self It is not to be 
regarded as the objective validity of any sort of knowledge, 
but as the consciousness of being in the world." (Jaspers, 
1959, p. 179) 
Thus, for Jaspers, philosophy begins with the philosopher's own 
existence, with what he is, and not with what he knows. He achieves and 
communicates not knowledge but himself. He is concerned with his own 
existence because in that lies the source of his own life. Here he finds not 
objectivity but freedom, not knowledge but choice. He stands before himself not 
as a reflective intelligence but as an embodied being who must take a position 
and become something willed in relation to a definite situation. 
Thus, Jaspers advocates that the proper starting point of philosophy is my 
personal existence, such as it is given to me in the immediate experience of my 
concrete situation. He says: 
"The situation is the beginning... and only form of 
reality.... My thinking starts from it and returns to it." 
(Jaspers, 1971, p. 03) 
Jaspers' philosophy unfolds as neither metaphysical in the traditional 
sense nor anti-metaphysical in the contemporary sense. He philosophises about 
being. According to him, being can be appropriated only through indirect 
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communication. It discloses itself in neither the subject nor the object of human 
existence, but in the indefinable sphere which encompasses both. 
In the Psychology of World View, published in 1919, Jaspers denied the 
absolute validity of any doctrine and replaced the term ontology with another 
term named periechontology, which is concerned not with being as a 
determinate object, but as illuminating the sphere in which being becomes 
present to us. Being understood in this manner is called by Jaspers as 
encompassing. He introduces the idea of 'encompassing' as the form of our 
awareness of being which underlies all our scientific and common sense 
knowledge and which is given expression in the myths and rituals of religion. 
'Encompassing', according to him, is not a horizon within which every 
determinate mode of being and truths emerge for us. It is rather that within 
which every particular horizon is enclosed as in something which is absolutely 
comprehensive, but not visible as a horizon at all. He says that 'encompassing' 
is not the horizon of our knowledge at any particular moment. Rather, it is the 
source from which all new horizons emerge. Thus, Jaspers states that "the 
encompassing has no objective content. It never appears as an object of 
knowledge. The 'encompassing' appears as the inexhaustible depth that 
transcends both subject and object." (Eugene, 2000, p. 307) 
Jaspers admits that there is no escape from the 'encompassing'. It is 
impossible for any individual to withdraw from it. We can only enlarge the 
extent of our knowledge. But this extension of our knowledge is fragmentary, 
and it is indefinitely extendable. There is no limit of its extention. So, we are 
always within a horizon. He says: 
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"We always live, as it were, within a horizon of our 
knowledge. We strive to get beyond every horizon which 
still surrounds us and obstructs our view. But we never attain 
a standpoint where the limiting horizon disappears and from 
where we could survey the whole." (Jaspers, 1972, p. 17) 
Jaspers defines 'encompassing' as what is beyond the relativity of all our 
perspectives, horizons and conceptual schemes. But it has no fixed, knowable 
coimotation. It is an index or sign to denote the ultimate Being which is the 
foundation for our concepts, but which can never be exhaustively grasped by 
them. Such a term has a clear use; but it has no clear, distinct, objective content. 
Thus, 'encompassing' is the term that does not refer to any particular 
thing. It does not have any object content. But it can be expressed as a felt 
quality of all our experience and thought. As Jaspers puts it: 
"The encompassing always merely announces itself in 
present objects and within the horizon - but it never becomes 
an object. Never appearing to us itself, it is that wherein 
everything else appears. It is also that due to which all things 
not merely are what they immediately seem to be, but remain 
transparent." (Jaspers, 1972, p. 18) 
Jaspers believes that because of the intentional nature of our 
consciousness we always find ourselves trapped in the subject-object 
relationship. Every act of our consciousness is analyzable according to a model 
in which a subject is related to an object. "The general relation of a subject to 
object", according to Jaspers, "therefore, is the horizon or 'encompassing' 
backbone of all awareness.... The analysis of encompassing is thus an 
elucidation of the main ways a subject is related to an object. Because this 
subject-object relationship is the basic model." (Jaspers, 1972, p. xvi) 
Jaspers explains that 'encompassing' can be discussed only n terms of its 
'modes'. There are two main modes of the 'encompassing'. These are (i) the 
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'encompassing' that we are (the subject) and (ii) the 'encompassing' that being-
itself is (the object). Jaspers suggests these two modes as the two possible 
approaches to encompassing. By approaching being through the encompassing 
that-we-are, Jaspers intends to work through the various modes of the subject-
object dichotomy in which we are immersed, coming across in each mode upon 
the horizon that forces us to acknowledge the limits that prevent us from 
grasping the totality of being. Apart from these two modes there are three 
immanent modes of the subject-object relationship namely; Dasein^ 
consciousness-in-general, and spirit. In each of these modes Dasein (existence), 
consciousness-in-general, and spirit, Jaspers says that, we are capable of 
breaking through the objectivity of the subject-object dichotomy, and touching 
upon the non-objective presence of being. 
Existence which is the first amongst the three immanent modes of 
subjectivity, primarily, man is considered as an organic being who is there, who 
exists in a practical life-world in space and time. He has instincts, needs, and 
drives; he acts so as to satisfy them. At this level the objects which are related to 
him, are of his practical concern constitutive of the world of ordinary 
experience. This mode is called by Jaspers as simply being-there; 'Dasein'. But 
Jaspers does not use the term 'Dasein' in the same meaning as it is used by 
Heidegger in Being and Time. In Being and Time, Heidegger uses 'Dasein' as a 
technical term; as the name for human existence especially, and defines it by its 
existential categories such as freedom, historicity, resoluteness, fallenness, 
death, care and so forth. But Jaspers uses the term 'Dasein' in the sense of 
ordinary existence. 
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The essence of Dasein is to live like a being, and die. My Dasein is what I 
am in the world. Though, in a sense, the being of Dasein is said to be infinite, 
like a circle in which something finite turns round endlessly, it is all the same 
nothing more than a 'seeming substance'. As a Dasein, I am 'there' for any 
objective analysis, and can eventually be studied by such sciences as biology, 
physiology and psychology. There can be no privacy or individuality in me, as 
long as I endure like a phenomenon and offer myself as something to be 
observed and experimented upon. Being tied to some situation or other, the 
Dasein would scarcely be able to act as a self-determining being. Manhood or 
womanhood, youth or old age, being someone as opposed to not having some 
other identity, are constraints under which it has to live; and, while living, it 
cannot escape from being conditioned by the non-Dasein. As Jaspers puts it; 
"The essence of man is lost in the blind reliance upon nature, 
where his existence seems identical with nature, and nature 
identical with knowledge regularities." (Jaspers, 1957, p. 87) 
The second immanent mode of subjectivity is consciousness-iii-general, 
or abstract rational and conceptual understanding. At this level the world known 
by man is not the world of ordinary experience but it is the world as represented 
in the sciences. This abstract level, according to Jaspers, is common to all men, 
and it is not unique to anyone. Because the concepts and method employed by 
consciousness-in-general are public and verifiable. So, its knowledge is 
universal and objective. Hence at this level, according to Jaspers, men are point-
consciousness and interchangeable units. 
Jaspers holds that what appears to our consciousness is experienceable as 
an object has being for us. And the experienceable being becomes present to us 
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through temporal act of consciousness. There are two meanings of 
consciousness; first, the consciousness of living beings and second, the 
consciousness as such. Jaspers says that as the consciousness of living beings we 
are divided into the confinement of the individual. But as consciousness-in-
general we participate in an actuality, the universally valid truth and we are an 
infinite consciousness. We participate in the encompassing through the 
possibility of knowledge, and through the possibility of common knowledge of 
Being in every form in which it appears as consciousness. We participate not 
only in the validity of knowledge, but also in a universally recognized formal 
lawfulness in the activities of willing, acting and feeling. In such a way truth is 
timeless and our temporal actuality is somewhat complete actualization of this 
timeless permanence. The actual existence of this timeless meaning may be 
temporal, and it is something produced, but it moves and grasps itself in a new 
sense of the 'encompassing' that is spirit. 
The third immanent level is spirit. The term spirit is borrowed by Jaspers 
from the German idealist Hegel. According to Jaspers the term spirit is the 
synthesis of existence and abstract consciousness in general. It is concrete and 
historical like existence and it is universal like consciousness in general. The 
spirit then is concrete universal, which Jaspers calls an idea. As men participate 
in this concrete universal, they are found together into historic unities. And these 
historic unities are the nation, a church or religion, a cultural tradition, 
professional organizations etc. Each of these historic unities is formed by an 
idea. When it is viewed under the idea of spirit, men are not considered as 
individuals. But they are considered as the members of totalities. One can get a 
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sense of the objective pole of this level by reflecting on the worlds of politics, 
art, or science. 
Jaspers fiirther says that man's life in the ephemeral world is nothing but 
the mortal situation of Dasein - a shipwreck. Human existence in the world is 
destined to suffer 'shipwreck'. But Jaspers advocates that man is capable of 
giving a meaning to 'shipwreck' which is an existential despair. This despair 
forges an access to Being and Transcendence. Ultimate shipwreck thus becomes 
the supreme 'cipher' which imparts value to all the others. In 'shipwreck' 
Transcendence becomes translucent. Therefore, Jaspers says that, in the face of 
menacing forces which bear down upon my existence, it is my duty not only to 
continue the struggle but to intensify its vigour. In shipwreck, consciously 
experienced, affirmed, and surmounted by my forward thrust toward Being, my 
existential freedom reaches its vital sphere. The bonds which tied it to Dasein 
are cut, and with its newly released energy it takes hold of Transcendence. 
Jaspers writes: 
"The non-being of all being that is accessible to us, that non-
being which reveals itself in shipwreck, is the Being of 
Transcendence." (Jaspers, 1971, p. 234) 
According to Jaspers existence is transcendence. Without transcendence 
existence is not possible. It is the representation of being itself beyond all 
objectivity. He says that "transcendence expresses the dual feature that within 
any level of the world one never fully articulates all possibilities, and that 
beyond objective determination is a background or horizon of being itself to 
which existing is related. Because transcendence is being-itself, Jaspers says that 
existing is aware of itself as given to itself by transcendence. If there were no 
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transcendence, if the world were all there were to being, existing would not be 
possible. Man would be a mundane being, describable in the concepts of the 
various immanent modes of the encompassing." (Jaspers, 1972, p. xxi) 
Jaspers points out that the philosophies of existence do not constitute the 
absolutization of existence. Materialism is the absolutization of matter because it 
reduces everything to matter. Idealism is the absolutization of mind because it 
reduces everything to mind. But the philosophies of existence do not reduce 
everything to existence, for existence must always be defined with regard to 
something other than itself, with regard to transcendence. 
Jaspers was of the view that some measure of responsibility cannot be 
evaded for the manner in which we shape our lives and take charge of our 
existence. Man is the being who esteems, who values, and who sets goals and 
ideals for himself which he seeks to realize in his living and by which he hopes 
to guide his behaviour. A man aspires, he hopes, so long as he lives. He is a 
process, a coming-to-be, and is never finished or complete. The demands of the 
world and his own aspirations and interests continually call him to active 
engagement in practical life. 
The nature of man's existence remains in some respects an open issue for 
him, even if, in other respects, it is closed, finished, unalterable. Something, 
some goal, experience, quality of living, forever remains outstanding in the form 
of some value unrealized, some aspirations unachieved and, as such, a man is 
never complete. This consciousness of one's existence as incomplete generates 
an alternative to the static importance to man. A man is a valuing, aspiring 
creature, who strives to be other than he is in some eeneral or particular respect. 
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And as a result of such striving, he finds his existence continually taking on new 
forms. As goal-seeker and goal-setter, he shows himself to be capable of self-
transcendence. 
For Kierkegaard, subjectivity is sharpened and intensified when brought 
into contact with something other than itself No doubt the subjective thinker 
concentrates upon his own thought; but by this very concentration he seeks to 
reach the wholly other. Subjectivity at its highest pitch points the way to 
objectivity. When I have reached the limits of an intense existence I come upon 
Being, and my relation with Being makes my existence still more intense. 
Transcendence does not have the same meaning in Kierkegaard as in the 
various aspects of Heidegger's philosophy. And in Jaspers the meaning of the 
word is sometimes akin to Kierkegaard's meaning and sometimes to 
Heidegger's. 
Husserl believes that thought is always turned towards something other 
than itself And Heidegger contends that this idea of intentionality as it is found 
in the Husserl is rooted in an idea which is deeper than the idea of intentionality 
and which is the idea of transcendence. 
In his book on Kant, Heidegger advances the view that what Kant calls 
the transcendental is not really comprehensible unless it is seen as a step towards 
the ontological, and that Kant, appearances notwithstanding, is not a theoretician 
of knowledge, but a theoretician of Being. 
In order to understand Jaspers idea of transcendence two uses of the word 
must be distinguished. First, there is transcendence as the domain of Being - and 
here we have something analogous to Kierkegaard's wholly other; secondly, 
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there is the movement of transcendence that we accomplish - and here the 
meaning that Heidegger gives it at times and Sartre almost always is applicable. 
Beyond the scientific domain and the domain of existence there is what 
Jaspers calls transcendence. That transcendence should lie beyond the scientific 
domain as Jaspers defines some calls for some explanations. The domain of 
existence is the domain of possibility - not intellectual possibility, but 
possibility as it is lived, as it manifests itself by our will to act in a certain way. 
Jaspers always speaks of possible existence. In science we are concerned with 
the domain of what is, in existence, with the domain of what is about to be, but 
is not as yet. In effect of this the ideas of fiiturity, of projects, of possibility, are 
essential to the idea of existence. We are what we shall make of ourselves, what 
we are about to be, or again, what we have to be. 
Hence, all existence is free existence. The ideas of existence and freedom 
are interrelated for Jaspers, as for Kierkegaard, and this is one of the reasons 
why they are against positivism, on the one hand, and absolute idealism on the 
other. 
But the existent individual, in what Jaspers calls boundary situations - in 
the face of suffering, in the face of death, in the face of his own inner 
contradictions, in the face of the problem of truth and of faith - feels that there is 
something other than himself, other than humanity in general, and that 
something is transcendence. 
This is particularly evident in the problems of truth and faith. The 
existent, says Jaspers, only exists in so far as he devotes himself entirely to a 
truth that he considers unique - the unique truth to which he must dedicate his 
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life. But at the same time the existent knows quite well that other existents 
devote themselves to truths other than his, which they regard as unique, and that 
by virtue of their devotion, they, too, come to exist. Therefore, concludes 
Jaspers, above each man and his truth there must be something which we cannot 
reach, and which somehow reconciles in itself all the unique individuals and 
their unique truths, and all their projects and their differences. That something is 
transcendence. 
The domain of transcendence, for Jaspers, is a domain that lies over and 
above possibility, choice, freedom. Choice, freedom, possibility expire in this 
domain, of which we can only say that it is nothing more - save perhaps, says 
Jaspers, by resorting to tautologies, to vicious circles, to antitheses, to all manner 
of round about speech. 
Thus, beyond our own selves, we discover something which is the very 
basis of our existence, but about which we can say nothing without discending 
into absurdity. This, for example, is what Shakespeare wants to convey when he 
says: 'The rest is silence'. The rest is that which is utterly impervious to the 
mind. 
Here, in Jaspers we find the equivalent of Kierkegaard's wholly other, 
with the difference that Jasperian transcendence is no longer the God of revealed 
religion, but something unnameable, the ineffable background against which all 
things must be seen. 
The word 'transcendence' has two meanings in Jaspers, It also designates 
the movement we accomplish in transcending ourselves, in soaring above 
ourselves. Jaspers says the existent must accomplish a continual movement of 
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self-transcendence. Here in lies is the twofold meaning of transcendence in 
Jaspers. 
Jaspers agrees with Kierkegaard rather than with Heidegger that 
philosophizing is a movement of transcending from the world of empirical and 
rational realities. And man transcends from the empirical and rational realities, 
according to Jaspers, not by any theoretical and dogmatic commitments but by a 
kind of revelation that is 'the illumination of existenz'. As he puts that "In 
philosophizing we ... turn toward existenz." (Jaspers, 1970, p. 10) 
Like Kierkegaard, who uses the word 'existence' in a different sense, 
Jaspers too uses the word 'existing' differently. For him 'existing' is a technical 
term and it acquires its meaning from the ways he uses it and the things he says 
about it. It is not used as the ordinary English word 'existence'. But for him it is 
a quality which attributes to all men. It can only be pointed to or appealed to. "It 
is the being which in the phenomenality of existence is not but can be, ought to 
be." (Jaspers, 1970, p. 03) 
Jaspers affirms that existing' neither refers to any universal concept 
extracted from individual existing beings, nor does it denote man's being in the 
world as biological and physiological entity. But it is that which I myself am, for 
to exist means to be an individual and it is left only to man to be an individual. It 
is absolutely unique each individual is a particular, concrete historical being in 
so far as he is authentic. 
An individual, according to Jaspers, exists, so far as he does not present 
himself before himself as an object. The existing individual chooses and realizes 
himself as himself. He writes; 
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"1 am existing if 1 do not become an object for myself. In 
Existing I know, without being able to see it, that what I call 
my "self is independent. The possibility of existing is what I 
live by; it is only in its realization that I am myself" 
(Jaspers, 1970, p. 03) 
For Jaspers 'Existing' is a movement which directs us towards a reality 
whose genuine apprehension is not intellectual or objective. It should also not be 
confused with the Dasein who is spatial and temporal by nature. The word 
Existing represents itself as an experience which can hardly be characterized 
exhaustively. Dasein denotes nothing which would refer to the free and 
authentic existence of man. 
Jaspers acknowledges a primacy of faith which alone reaches towards 
authentic existence. He affirms that an individual can discover his authenticity 
when the subject object dichotomy dissolves. And according to him, this subject 
- object dichotomy collapses in the understanding and practice of philosophical 
faith. 
Since the publication of Philosophie in 1932, Jaspers has advocated 
'philosophical faith' as the meaning of philosophical doctrine, and through it he 
has sought to communicate with those who no longer find ecclesiastical faith 
illuminating. He says: 
"Today philosophy is the only refugee for those who, in full 
awareness, are not sheltered by religion. No longer is it the 
affair of a restricted circle, of an elite; for, at any rate as the 
individual's urgent question how he can best live, it has 
become the affair of countless numbers of persons. The 
philosophy of the schools was justified insofar as it rendered 
a philosophical life possible." (Jaspers, 1959, p. 142) 
Jaspers was much influenced by Kant but he did not imderstand 
philosophy to be a science in the way that some neo-Kantians conceived it. On 
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his account philosophy seeks to remind, to appeal, and thus to provide the 
occasion for the other persons grasping the meaning of philosophical doctrine 
and awakening to authentic existence. 
Jaspers neither acknowledges the transcendent God of theism nor 
Spinoza's immanent God of pantheism. He believes that both the ideas of God 
are equally at fault because they are ontological in nature. Both imply that 
metaphysical truth is firmly and objectively established. And they are valid for 
all times and for all. Jaspers says that "after Kant all ontology stands 
condemned." (Jaspers, 1972, p. 17) "We can neither conceive transcendence as 
an individual God, separated from the world, nor can we say that 'all' is 
transcendent or that God is the being which contains all." (Jaspers, 1969, p. 52) 
Existentialism finds it equally impossible to endorse faith in the God of 
'revealed religion', because it is founded upon the claim that God has 
manifested Himself once and for all in human history, and supporting this claim 
by the promulgation of fixed dogmas, while existential freedom, says Jaspers, is 
strictly personal and its truth is always incomplete. Existentialism therefore, 
excludes and rejects any truth established once and for all and of supposedly 
timeless and universal validity. On the other hand, Jaspers does not accept 
atheism either. Because he believes that atheism sustains a 'negative ontology' 
of its own, and it is as dogmatic and intolerant as any revealed religion. Thus, 
the existential philosophy neither endorses the religious nor the atheistic 
position. And instead of religious and atheistic positions it acknowledges 
'philosophic faith' as seminal. As Jaspers says: 
"Philosophy has become the foundation of man's true being. 
Today it is assuming its characteristic form. Man, torn from 
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the sheltering substantiality of stable conditions and cast into 
the apparatus of mass life, deprived of his faith by the loss of 
his religion, is devoting more decisive thought to the nature 
of his own being. Thus, it is that there have arisen the typical 
philosophical ideas adequate to our own epoch. No longer 
does the revealed Deity upon whom all is dependent come 
first and no longer the world that exists around us; what 
comes first is man, who, however, cannot make terms with 
himself as being, but strives to transcend himself" (Jaspers, 
1959, p. 143) 
Unlike Christian faith which absolutizes and institutionalizes its contents, 
philosophical faith can neither be absolutized nor institutionalized. It is and 
remains alive only in the vast realm of individual minds and in their continued 
discourse through the ages. While the religious faith is dogmatic, 'philosophic 
faith' is free of any dogma. Philosophical faith' treats the entire philosophy as 
preparation or recollection, only as inspiration and confirmation, thus believing 
that no meaningful philosophy can be a self-contained conceptual system. The 
conceptual structure is only one half at best and it attains truth only if, in 
addition to being conceived, it is embodied in the thinker's own historical 
existence. Hence, the philosopher freely contorts his own thoughts. 
Philosophical faith caimot become a creed; its thought does not become dogma. 
It does not rest in a body of doctrine in turn remaining to be a venture of radical 
opeimess. Philosophical faith venerates traditional philosophy but does not 
maintain an attitude of obedience to it. It does not look on history as an 
authority, but as one continuous spiritual struggle. 
It involves both the subjective and the objective side of faith in its 
entirety. If only the subjective side is taken into account there remains only a 
believing state of mind, a faith without object, devoid of any inner content. On 
the other hand if only the objective side is considered, there remains a content of 
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faith, as object, as proposition, as dogma, as an inventory, as a dead something. 
But when we philosophize it is the comprehensive that is taken into account 
disregarding the split between the subject and object. 
In his later works Jaspers preferred to speak of his philosophy in terms of 
reason rather than existence. He says that "reason seeks the limits of knowledge 
and opens the way for faith to transcend the empirical and historical isolation of 
human existence." (Eugene, 2000, p. 309) Philosophical faith is allied with 
knowledge. It wants to know what is knowable and to be conscious of its own 
premises. Faith cannot become universally valid knowledge, but it may become 
clearly present to me by self-conviction. It becomes unceasingly clear and more 
conscious, and by becoming conscious unfolds more and more of its inner 
meaning. Jaspers says that reason is not an enemy of philosophical faith. 
Philosophical faith affirms the way of reason and acts within it in such a way 
that human beings may overcome their empirical and historical isolation and 
acknowledge that the course of their being comes from beyond themselves. This 
is an act which must be continually undertaken in our coming to authentic 
existence in the moment. 
The realization of authenticity actualizes through the channels of 
communication according to Jaspers. He holds that man cannot really become 
himself in isolation rather he can attain his genuine existence in 
'communication' and 'collaboration' with others. He enters into 
'communication' and 'collaboration' with other existences, Jaspers says, in the 
act of freedom. In communication not only the authentic existence of my own 
self is revealed but becomes equally applicable to the other as well. The other 
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too, attains self-realization and self-possession in the loving strife of 
communication. Self-realization in communication is, according to Jaspers, like 
a creatio ex nihilo. He says "a new richness of being is acquired and revealed. 
And, conversely, the absence or the refusal of the communication leads to a 
corresponding absence or loss of being." (Jaspers, 1970, p. 58) 
G.J. Shepard in his book. Building a Discipline of Communication, 
maintains that each discipline promotes a unique ontological view of existence 
and its artifacts. He says that we in communication have failed to offer a 
communication-based view of existence or Being, and that for over 300 years 
this has kept us in academic illegitimacy, because a field achieves disciplinary 
status by promoting a unique foundational ontology. We have forwarded no 'eye 
on existence', we have not shown that communication is materially essential to 
Being. 
Although Jasper's philosophy of communication will not lead us to any 
specific 'view of Being' that we can claim as our own, Jaspers would have us 
see that existential communication is the manner by which we construe more of 
Being. He offers no direct or final visions, but existential commimication in 
particular can bring us to the level where we are less trapped in the subject-
object dichotomy and permittmg partners in existential. Jaspers gives substance 
to Shepard's curiosity, suggesting that Being comes into greater being through 
significant existential acts of humans commimicating. Jaspers takes 
communication as the 'foundational transformational process'. Much as 
respiration in the human body could be said to be 'foundational'. Similarly, 
within the social body it is human communication that is foundational. 
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Communication is 'transformational' in that it acts out the core creationai act of 
giving birth to formlessness into symbolic and material forms. In this way 
communication not only participates in Being, it exemplifies the transformation 
of non-being into Being. In this sense communication could be said to be 
synchronous with the creative force of Being. 
Hannah Arendt identifies Jaspers as the first philosopher she knows who 
'protested against solitude', who dared to question all thoughts under this one 
standard: 'what do they signify for communication? Are they such that they may 
help or such that they will prevent communication? Do they reduce to solitude 
or arouse to communication?" (Arendt, 1957, p. 543) 
There are several 'defective' modes of human communication, including 
"affection, insincerity, deceit and lying, and 'pseudo-communication' arising 
from shyness, fear, suspicion, prejudice, self-centeredness, presumed 
superiority, callousness, combativeness, bad will, and continually idle talk" 
(Kaufmann, 1957, pp. 214-216) while on the other hand authentic existential 
communication requires equality, mutual recognition, affirmation and 
clarification. 
Jaspers uses the concept of 'losing struggle' throughout his writings to 
signify a wrestling with the other to press other and self further than either has 
been able to go alone: a loving contest in which each person surrenders their 
weapons to the other. "The certainty of authentic existence resides only in 
unreserved communication between persons who live together and vie with one 
another in a free community, who regard their association with one another as 
but a preliminary stage, who take nothing for granted and question everything. 
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Only in communication is all the other truth fulfilled, only in communication 
and I myself not merely living but fulfilling life." (Jaspers, 1973, pp. 25-26) 
Jaspers follows the line of argument of the Hegelian dialectic in 
explaining the need of communication in the process of self-realization. He says, 
I am an ego, only by setting myself off from a nonego, by asserting myself in the 
face of 'the other', by opposing myself to 'the other'. This kind of self-assertion, 
however, leads one to the edge of 'the abyss of absolute estrangement' in regard 
to 'the other'. And the desire for the unity of the being urges one to bridge the 
abyss in the union of being-with-other. Thus communication originates and is 
consummated. 
Jaspers sees human beings as relational beings whose existence, identity, 
and humanity derive from interpersonal communicating. He says that "Every 
new human being begins in communication." (Jaspers, 1957, p. 79) In the 
second volume of his magnum opus Philosophies Jaspers repeatedly stresses the 
primacy of human communication to human becoming. He says that "It is only 
in communication that I come to myself" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 53) He further says 
"Myself-being is always decided in communication, by its tie to 
communication." (Jaspers, 1970, p. 52) 
Jaspers stresses the need for communication as crucial to philosophy and 
to philosophical truth. For him, 'truth' is founded upon relationality. He says: 
"I should not suffer so deeply from lack of communication 
or find such unique pleasure in authentic communication if I 
for myself, in absolute solitude, could be certain of the truth. 
But I am only in conjunction with the other, alone I am 
nothing." (Jaspers, 1973, p. 80) 
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Existential communication differs from all objectively verifiable 
relationships among human beings. It surpasses ordinary friendship, affection, 
and love as well as reciprocal esteem, mutual psychological understanding, and 
a mere unanimity of thoughts, convictions, and aspirations. All these have their 
proper place in Dasein, not in 'existence'. They are all insufficient to link 
existences in the profiindity of their unconditional freedom. 
Philosophical truth in particular arises through human dialogue; it grows 
from authentic communication between selves struggling toward understanding 
of self and other, life and meaning, and is not simply passed from one to other. 
As Jaspers points out that: 
"It would be a truth which would arise for the first time in 
communication, which would become actual only in and 
through it; it would be a truth which is neither already here 
to be transmitted to another, nor which presents us with a 
methodically attainable end in which it could be valid 
without communication." (Jaspers, 1957, pp. 96-97) 
Jaspers says that in true communication one want to reach the other in the 
original and irreducible ground and substance of his freedom. In other words 
one's freedom is in search of the freedom of the other and one's own self 
requires other selves with whom to enter into a dual relationship of opposition 
and unification. Jaspers says: 
"I cannot become myself, if the other does not wish to 
become his self; I cannot be free if the other is not free." 
(Jaspers, 1970, p. 57) 
Jaspers values independent self-reflection, but asserts that 'the truth 
begins with two'. He says: 
"What I gain for myself alone in reflection would if it were 
all be as nothing gained. What is not realized m 
communication is not yet, what is not ultimately grounded in 
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it is without adequate foundation. The truth begins with 
two." (Jaspers, 1973, p. 124) 
In genuine communication those who enter into the existential 
relationship 'open themselves' and 'reveal themselves' to each other without 
reservation in the original depth of their being, ready to see and to be seen, to 
penetrate and to be penetrated, to mold and to be molded in a reciprocal give-
and-take. In order to gain existence I am willing to forsake all my attachments to 
empirical goods and values, so that I may become free to experience 
sympathetically the profound existential truth of the other. 
Jaspers affirms that the serious communicator "strives to become capable 
of playing his part in the dialogue of ever-deepening communication, which is 
the prerequisite for truth and without which there is no truth." (Jaspers, 1973, p. 
166) He says that truth reveals itself through communication, 'thinking' is a 
practice that transpires between persons rather than transpiring only as 
solitudious performance within a single person, and truth can be "recovered 
from its dispersion by communication." (Jaspers, 1957, p. 104) 
Thus, in existential communication there is no fusion of the existences. 
Because the fusion would entail the submersion of the individual in the 
collective. On the contrary, true communication preserves the distinctions 
between individual and individual and between their existential truths. 
Existential truth, therefore, is as multiform as are the individuals in whom it is 
incarnate. And these various existential truths are not only equally legitimate but 
they mutually necessitate and supplement each other. Thus, like existence, 
existential communication is also undefinable and ineffable. It is objectively 
inconceivable and unknowable. What can be objectively known, seen, and 
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appreciated is the material effects of it. Its existential 'consequences' are beyond 
the reach of any objective criteria. Jaspers says that: 
"The consciousness of possible existence alone is capable of 
perceiving their truth in the bond of communication." 
(Jaspers, 1970, p. 423) 
Much like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger, Jaspers too is aware of 
the dangers which threaten human existence when it surrenders its inalienable 
personal prerogative to the impersonal, soulless anonymity of the masses. The 
existing individual, even in communication, must always preserve the integrity 
of his self. His being-with-others must be in the nature of a voluntary, personal 
engagement. Jaspers writes: 
"He who only loves 'mankind', loves nothing but an empty 
abstraction; he only loves truly who loves this particular 
human being... I destroy communication if I seek it in a 
communion with the greatest possible number." (Jaspers, 







Encounter in Creative Fidelity 
I am for God inasmuch as I am unique. (Marcel, 1952, p. 263) 
Gabriel Marcel was the most prominent French advocate of Christian 
existentialism. A philosopher, dramatist as well as musician. Marcel set the task 
of philosophy to be the 'Socratic' task which was to illuminate the human 
situation. He felt that modem man had distanced himself from the grounds of 
creativity, of freedom, and meaning in life. In modem times a highly 
mechanistic and scientific civilization exists that ignores the deepest spiritual 
needs of human beings. The individual tends to appear to himself and to others 
as merely an agglomeration of functions rendering existence as empty and 
meaningless. Marcel was of the view that modem man inhabiting a highly 
scientific world was rapidly sinking into feebleness and dissatisfaction bom out 
of the technical achievements that had trapped him into an insignificant 
objectivity. As a resuh of his centrality in the cosmos was compromised. Science 
had began to treat him not as an 'existing' individual but merely as a bundle of 
intricate functions. The magnitude and the significance of his functions had 
come to determine his worth. Even the phenomenon of death was looked upon as 
one of the worldly happenings, 'a fall into uselessness'. Instead of sheltering 
himself in his inner being, the modem man, having already equipped himself 
with the technical knows how, searches for a solution of his crisis. The 
characteristic feature of our age, Marcel writes, is "the man in whom the sense of 
the ontological... the sense of Being ... is lacking, or, to speak more correctly... 
he is the man who has lost the awareness of this sense." (Marcel, 1961, p. 01) 
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Marcel's criticism of the so-called technological mentality is intended to 
convince us of the fact that the basic problem of man in the modem world is, 
how to guard himself, as an integral spiritual being, against the incalculable 
temptations of growing sciences. Like Jaspers, he too, finds it alarming that there 
should be a lack of understanding of this fact among the thinkers of the past. To 
regard myself and the other individuals as essences is to destroy the abiding 
selfhood in us all. 
In his book The Philosophy of Existence, Marcel writes, "Travelling on 
the underground, I often wonder with a kind of dread what can be the inner 
reality of the life of this or that man employed on the railway,,. the man who 
opens the doors, for instance, or the one who punches the tickets. Surely 
everything both within him and without him conspires to identify this man with 
his functions... meaning not only with his functions as a worker, as a trade union 
member or as a voter, but with his vital fiinctions as well." (Marcel, 1949, p. 02) 
He further says, "I need hardly insist on the stifling impression of sadness 
produced by this functional world. It is sufficient to recall the dreary image of 
the pensioner official, or of those urban Sundays when the passers-by look like 
people who have retired from life. In such a world there is something mocking 
and sinister even in the tolerance awarded to the man who has retired form his 
work." (Marcel, 1949, p.03) It seems that everything is wrong everywhere. Life 
has lost its seriousness and the purely mechanical way in which it goes on 
laboriously without interest, originality, and creativity exhibits a sad submission 
to hopelessness. 
In the face of such a prospect of bleakness Marcel professes di primacy of 
faith which alone holds the promise of a meaningful life. He holds that the 
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individual can discover his authenticity only under the condition that the subject 
- object dichotomy be dissolved. Marcel believes that the subject - object 
dichotomy which is chiefly responsible for creating an unbridgeable gap 
alienating human beings from each other, can be overcome through the act of 
faith. 
Before working out the details of Marcel's insights perhaps it would be 
worthwhile to learn about his early life, for the events and circumstances that 
shaped his existence had an immense impact on the orientation and development 
of his entire thought. 
Marcel was bom in Paris, in 1889. His mother died when he was only 
four years of age. He writes, "not only my entire childhood but my entire life 
was dominated by the event of the sudden death of my mother.... In a mysterious 
way she has always remained present to me." (Cited in Reinhardt, 1952, p. 204) 
In the lonely years of his childhood he made his loneliness creative by 
communicating with the creature of his imagination. Thus writing his first two 
plays at the early age of eight years and later involving himself in the creation of 
musical compositions. 
Soon after his mother's death he came under the care and guidance of his 
aunt, who also made a great impact on his life. He writes "she was a Jewess, but 
her family had renounced any religious beliefs. She herself had embraced 
Protestantism ... she imposed upon me an extremely strict moral discipline ... she 
shared my father's agnosticism, with the difference that his had a moral and 
her's an aesthetic tinge; the result was that I grew up in an atmosphere of 
instability and aridity." (Cited in Reinhardt, 1952, p. 204) 
He traveled extensively with his father, in particular visiting the well-
141 
Chapter VI Gabriel Marcel: Encounter in Creative Fidelity 
known cultural and artistic citadels of Europe and acquainting himself with the 
great German and Anglo-Saxon writers of his time as well as the past. He 
submitted his thesis at the early age of eighteen on The Metaphysical Ideas of 
Coleridge and Their Relationship to the Philosophy ofSchelling in 1908. This 
qualification enabled him to secure a position in teaching philosophy and more 
importantly familiarized him to the germinal insights of existentialism. 
During World War I, he served with the Red Cross and was assigned the 
duty of tracing missing persons, a task that brought him face to face with the 
drama and tragedy of human existence. He was particularly repelled by the 
callousness with which people were treated as no more than mere data on a filing 
card, to be moved back and forth as other information was secured. The shock of 
World War I infused a sense of urgency to his philosophical endeavours for it 
made him realize the contingencies and firagility of those material and cultural 
pillars of life that had seemed so firm and secure. 
The philosophical career of Gabriel Marcel revolved around a central 
thematic concern. He stressed the meaning and bearing of his inquiries in that 
"we are concerned existentially with determining the metaphysical conditions of 
personal existence." (Marcel, 1952, p. 225) The axial place of mankind and of 
the metaphysics of the human condition was fully and clearly recognized by 
Marcel in his later and most mature effort, the Gifford lectures. On the occasion 
of the Gifford lectures he stressed the need for a metaphysics that concerns itself 
with who, or what am I ? that to seek the metaphysical condition of mankind it 
becomes important. Marcel has insistently urged it becomes important to inquire 
into what it is to be a human being, a self which requires a philosophical 
articulation of what it is to be 'a' self In these lectures he advocates the need to 
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find meaning in life where speculative reason fails to find a satisfying answer. 
Marcel proclaims that it is the act of faith that rescues the individual from the 
anxiety and perplexity of modem day life. In the act of faith, man not only 
accept and fiilfills the desfiny prescribed for him by his particular human 
situation, but in his union with the transcendent source of Being, all the 
previously meaningless facts are understood 'existentially', that is, as 
meaningful aspects of a significant human existence. The whole self is involved 
in the act of commitment that establishes the reality of the person. Here an 
element of transcendence is found that takes man beyond the limitation of his 
own human situation. In the act of faith man is restored to that unity of being of 
which he was deprived by his adherence to scientific rationalism. 
Marcel too, like other existentialists begins his enquiry with the problem 
of being. But his approach to this problem is somewhat different. He highlights 
the distinction between problem and mystery. He believes that 'being' cannot be 
approached as problem but it is though an involvement with mystery that the self 
is revealed. The distinction between problem and mystery, for Marcel, is a 
fundamental one. According to him, a problem is an objective difficulty. It does 
not imply or elicit personal involvement, and remains open to solution through 
the employment of appropriate techniques. Thus, for example, what the scientist 
meets with during the course of his researches and instrumentally tries to solve 
are problems, even if definite solutions are not readily forthcoming. A mystery, 
on the other hand, is not an insoluble problem, but something radically different. 
Mystery is not unknowable, but the inherently unfathomable, though it may 
allow exploration of its bottomless depths and infinite nuances. Moreover, it is 
never a purely objective matter, but something that envelops us in its issues and 
143 
Chapter VI Gabriel Marcel: Encounter in Creative Fidelity 
implications. From this point of view, evil, death, love, fidelity - mistakenly 
described as problems - are really mysteries. Above all, there is the 'mystery of 
Being'. Marcel holds that the mysterious and the ontological are identical. 
In his search for a new and concrete approach to the problem of 'being'. 
Marcel speaks, of two different kinds of reflections, i.e. primary and secondary 
reflections. The primary reflection has its place in scientific research while on 
the other hand, the secondary reflection happens to be strictly philosophical. 
Primary reflection is characterized as abstract, analytical, objective, universal 
and verifiable. In primary reflection the thinking subject is not the individual 
human being but the Cartesian cogito. It deals with the realm of the problematic. 
Primary reflection is exemplified in scientific and technical thought. It allows the 
individual to posses and manipulate his world more completely. Hence, it is 
indispensable to human culture. Primary reflection proceeds from human 
experiences that are confined to the categories of seeing and having. And in the 
categories of seeing and having the real subject disappears. "In the process of the 
'objectification' of the thinking ego and of the empirical contents of 
consciousness both subject and object are totally detached fi-om existence. Thus, 
the 'thinking substance' the Descartes and the 'transcendental ego' of Kant 
happen to be no longer 'real subjects'." (Reinhardt, 1952, p. 213) In the sphere 
of 'seeing' and 'having' that is, a purely scientific and technical knowledge, the 
frame of reference is not the existing individual but thought in general; the 
impersonal thinking of Dasman. 
Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is concrete, individual and open. 
It is not concerned with only seeing and having but with presences. It transcends 
all objective knowledge and all objectivity. Secondary reflection is aware of the 
fact that the existing individual is deeply rooted in the reality. It oannot be dealt 
144 
Chapter VI Gabriel Marcel: Encounter in Creative Fidelity 
as an object of scientific investigation. But it remains open to its object as a lover 
does to his beloved - not as a specimen of a class but as a unique being. 
Secondary reflection is not concerned with the 'problems' but involved in 
'mysteries'. As Marcel says: 
"A problem is something which one hits upon, something 
which blocks one's way. It is wholly 'in front of me'. A 
mystery on the contrary, is something in which I find myself 
engaged, whose essence it is consequently not to be wholly 
'infront of me'. It seems that in this realm (of the mystery) 
the distinction between the 'within myself and the 'in front 
of myself loses all significance." (Marcel, 1952, p. 214) 
Thus, according to Marcel, a mystery initially appears to be merely a 
problem that is difficult to solve. But reflection manifests that in dealing with a 
genuine mystery the distinction between subject and object, what is in me and 
what is before me, breaks down. He says: 
"Where primary (or first) reflection tends to dissolve the 
unity of experience which is at first put before it, the 
ftmction of secondary reflection is essentially recuperative; it 
reconquers unity." (Marcel, 1960,1, p. 85) 
The transcendence of all objectivity and all objective knowledge, in the 
secondary ret lection, for Marcel, carries a meaning absolutely different fi"om 
both the negation of Hegelian dialectic and the nihilation of Sartre. In the 
dialectics of Hegel and Sartre, both of them do not discover any new reality but 
they establish only new logical terms. On the contrary, Marcel's negation and 
transension of objectivity are essentially the endeavor of human thought to 
escape its limitations by reaching beyond itself into the realm of 'being'. 
According to Marcel, every problem of knowledge becomes eventually involved 
in an endless regress: that which is sought in the end is always presupposed at 
the outset. 
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Marcel was of the view that the essence of man is to be in a situation. 
Man always finds himself in a concrete situation in the world. He is always 
involved in the phenomena of the world. The awareness of his existence in the 
world is not first of all a separation of his self as a knowing subject from the 
body as a known object, because it is the existence of his body in the world that 
constitutes him as an object open to a subject. But in the primordial participation 
of the existence in the world, the existing self becomes confused and considers 
himself a universal existence. And then loses his individuality in the general 
thought. It is the task of philosophy, Marcel says, to get rid of the false problems 
which arise due to objective knowledge and to institute a philosophical outlook 
in the individual which re-instates and re-lives essential experiences. 
The first of these is the experience of incarnation - in a body which exists 
in continuity with all other objects in the world. The primary and basic aspect of 
the condition of man is, his 'being incarnate'. He is, 'a being who finds himself 
united to a body'. When it is said 'I exist' the reference is made not to the 
Cartesian 'cogito' but to the 'incarnate body', that is, to this body of mine, of 
which I can neither say that it is myself, nor that it is an object for myself Thus 
there exists between myself and my body neither separation, nor a complete 
fusion, nor strictly speaking a relation, but 2i participation. And my linkage with 
the 'world', with the 'others', and with 'God' has the same mysterious character 
as my being incarnate in my body. In neither case can this mysterious bond be 
made the subject of scientific investigation or the object of scientific knowledge. 
Marcel says: 
"Incamation is the etemal 'given' of metaphysics. 
Incamation is the situation of a being vdio appears to himself 
to be, as it were, bound to a body. This 'given' is opaque to 
itself.. of this body I can neither say that it is I, nor that it is 
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not I, nor that it is for me (an object). The opposition of 
subject and object is found to be transcended from the start." 
(Marcel, 1965, pp. 11-12) 
The idea of participation is a fundamental key to the philosophy of 
Marcel. To feel, to be incarnate, to believe, to use secondary reflection, to have 
faith, to love, to exist, and so on, are all to participate in being. Being is 
experienced as mysterious precisely because we participate in it rather than hold 
ourselves off from it. At a deeper level, we can never simply detach ourselves 
from the other within our experience without grossly distorting the reality of our 
situation. Marcel holds that the more we are able to recognize the individual 
being as such, the more we will be oriented and directed toward grasping being 
as being. Thus Marcel says that access to being is gained only through intimate 
inter subjective participation. He says: 
"A complete and concrete knowledge of oneself cannot be 
self-centered; however paradoxical it may seem, I should 
prefer to say that it must be centered in others. We can 
understand or from others, and only by starting from them.... 
Fundamentally, I have no reason to set any particular store by 
myself, except in so far as I know that I am loved by other 
beings who are loved by me." (Marcel, 1960, II, p. 08) 
Participation accoimts for the difference between being a spectator of 
something and contemplating it. A mere spectator confronted with a mere 
spectacle is comparable to a recording machine. For him a war, at a safe 
distance, is merely something stimulating to observe for he is not involved in or 
deeply affected by what confronts him. With contemplation, however, the 
situation is quite different. It requires an emotional involvement in the situation 
so that it becomes more than a mere spectacle for those who contemplate it. 
Rather than being something entirely external, the spectacle takes on internal 
meaning. At the same time, it is not limited to the emotional or illusory; again 
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the distinction between the internal and external, the subjective and objective 
breaks down. Marcel says that "In as much as I contemplate the landscape, for 
example, a certain coesse is realized between the landscape and me." (Marcel, 
1960,1, p. 158) 
Then, participation in the mystery of being is the opposite of all objective 
relations, of objective knowing (subject - object knowing), and of objective 
doing or technique. It is a way of being with in contrast to having. 
The supreme degree of participation is that relation in which all 
objectification is strictly impossible: the relation between the believer and God. 
In Marcel's view, participation in God is known in the first instance through 
ontological exigence, the fundamental awareness of ultimacy in being. This 
participation becomes more complete as we invoke God in such interpersonal 
experiences as fidelity, hope, and love, whereby the detached self is transcended 
for communion with others and ultimately with God. In this way, Marcel affirms 
that we come to discover that our true being is not something we possess 
naturally but something we must both choose and create. Our life, in other 
words, is not simply a datum given to us, but neither is it within our power to 
create on our own; it is offered to us as a gift which to be real has to be received. 
Therefore, our authentic being is not simply ours but God's being, or God's way 
of being, as well. As we become more truly creative, that is, more truly 
participant in being, God becomes more manifest to us; we participate in Him 
and He is in us. 
Like Kierkegaard and Jaspers, Marcel too, establishes a theistic 
relationship between man and transcendence or Being. He says that the world of 
problematical is the world of fear and desire, of 'the functional' and the 
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'functionalizable' "... even those whose faith in techniques is strongest are 
bound to admit that there exist enormous reahns which are outside man's 
control." (Marcel, 1949, p. 19) It is the exploration of these realms that a genuine 
religious life aims at. My inner reality cannot forever be sheltered against the 
sense of the 'fall' in bom in itself To be transcendental, for Marcel, is to be 
willed by God, to be in relation with the personal Absolute, to reveal oneself as a 
'subject'. I am for God inasmuch as I am unique. 
By responding to God in creative fidelity, we approach our true being; yet 
we can never fully coincide with it. Marcel says that "one might be tempted to 
say that between me and my being there is a gulf which I can partially close, but 
which, in this life at least, I cannot hope to completely fill." (Marcel, 1960,1, p. 
35) The only place where this gulf apparently fills, according to Marcel, is in the 
life of saint, for whom there is no grace at all or for whom all is grace. But even 
for the saint God remains the transcendent, neither fully transcendent nor wholly 
immanent but mysteriously both; beyond and deeply within this being. 
Marcel stresses the primacy of being over knowledge. He believes that 
there is a mastery within all cognition and faith because they presuppose a 
participation in being in which the dualism of subject and object is overcome. 
Our existence is not primarily a matter of thought or consciousness but 
something participated. Thus, Marcel emphasizes that to exist means to 
participate in the mystery of being. The more fully we can grasp our existence in 
all its reality, the closer we come to realizing our authentic existence. 
In the second part of the Mystery of Being, Marcel takes up the relation of 
existence and being. Here he placed existence between bemg a thing and 
authentic being. He says: 
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"The idea of existence (if it is an idea) is itself deeply charged 
with ambiguity .... We are spontaneously led to treat existence as 
the fact that a thing is somewhere but could also be somewhere 
else or even nowhere at all, as though it were subject to every 
vicissitude, every displacement, every kind of destruction. But if 
I concentrate my attention on this simple fact: I exist - or again: 
someone that I love exists, the perspective changes; to exist can 
no longer simply mean to be there or to be elsewhere - it can 
probably mean essentially to transcend the opposition of the here 
and the elsewhere .... Existence will appear at one limit as 
indistinguishable from authentic being." (Marcel, 1960, II, p. 31) 
Marcel says that to realize ontological need is at once to plunge into the 
realm of mystery. He says that if I ask, 'what is being?' I must ask, 'who am I 
who questions being? Can I be certain that I am?' At this level the cogito cannot 
help me, for I am concemed with my being as a whole, with the living, feeling, 
willing, loving, praying, hoping, and so on, as well as thinking person. 
Recognition of the mystery of being is bound up with personal 
involvement in being. T and 'am' are not two distinct things that can be 
analyzed separately. I affirm being only as a living participant in being and only 
in an affirmation 'that I am rather than I utter', an affirmation where. 'I am, in a 
sense, passive, and of which I am the seat rather than the subject'. The dualism 
of the self that affirms its own being and the being that affirms and underlies the 
affirmation is transcended. 
It is by exploring the reality of concrete experience. Marcel believes, that 
we can solve the problem of being. The realm of objective thought, the realm of 
the problematic, is the realm of abstraction. It is only by abstracting from 
concrete, personal existence that thought becomes objectively valid. Conversely, 
according to Marcel, the concrete is mysterious. It is 'metaproblematic' in the 
sense that it is prior to or more basic than the abstractions that create problems. 
Here, Marcel introduces the term ontological exigence which is the thirst 
150 
Chapter VI Gabriel Marcel: Encounter in Creative Fidelity 
for being. It is the existential need for self-realization, or the demand to 
transcend the world of abstract objectivity. This exigence for being is not always 
experienced as such but may find expression in a variety of ways. Sometimes it 
is simply a deeply felt dissatisfaction with our present condition in the world: 
sometimes it is experienced as a need for spiritual adventure, as a need for 
artistic creativity and expression, or as the search for a vocation. Ontological 
exigence is never a desire for some object. It is an inner need or urge that cannot 
be distinguished fi-om an appeal; it is a demand arising within us that our lives 
find ftilfillment. 
Thus, for Marcel, the human condition is disclosed as a fundamental 
ontological exigence concretely manifested as a quest: we are beings who, in our 
very being are in quest of our own authentic existence. As seekers, our condition 
is that of not-knowing; hence, in Marcel's terminology, each of us is a 'being-
on-the-way', a 'voyager', whose quest, however much it may be and frequently 
is masked, is his most basic condition. Realizing this, I am brought up 
abruptly against myself: I who ask, 'who am I?' am that very quest for 
assuredness about myself In order to utter the question, I must be, and thus I am 
this assuredness, this emphasis I give myself in the affirmation 'I exist?' Marcel 
states that "In every case, I produce myself, in the etymological sense of the 
word, that is to say I put myself forward." (Marcel, 1962, p. 15) In my seeking, I 
manifest myself, in what Marcel later calls an "exclamatory consciousness of 
self., of existing." (Marcel, 1960,1, p. 91) 
Marcel's main objective is to explore the mineness of my own animate 
organism. Marcel says that my 'body-qua-mine' neither a relation of partes extra 
partes (as between physical things) nor an instrumental relation. To consider my 
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body as an instrument involves me in an absurdity. If it were an instrument, 
Marcel shows, then there would have to be a deep commanality of nature 
between it and the things on which it acts and between it and me, the 'subject' 
who 'has' it. But reflection shows that although there is a sejnse in which my 
body is an instrument for another (as in slavery), the object and my body do not 
share that deep commonality of nature - they are not of the same being. The user 
of an instrument; cannot at the same time be a user and be of the same nature as 
the instrument used. 
Thus, my body is something indubitable. It is the basis for all personal 
experience. And this is so not merely in a biological or instrumental sense but in 
the sense that the world only exists for me because I have feelings and can act -
and I can feel and can act only with my body. Being with my body is my basic 
way of being with and for others. 
Marcel believes that our existence, like our body, is something initially 
and indubitably given. And for us existing thmgs are, not through objective, 
detached, verifiable thought but through the same immediate participation by 
which we are with our bodies. To exist is to be with; to deeply experience the 
existence of something is to affirm the beings that we are and therefore to 
experience worth. Thus the more fully we open ourselves to the existence we are 
with, the more valuable, the more enriched, is our existence. The affirmation of 
existence is then, neither a matter of assigning a predicate to individual things 
nor an assertion about abstract existence in general. Fundamentally, existence is 
something, according to Marcel, that can only be felt and affirmed on a level 
where the affirmed and the affirmer are somehow together. 
Thus, according to Marcel, an individual can find his 'authentic 
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existence' in the act of faith. Because in the act of religious faith the individual 
constitutes himself as a person by affirming the infinite personality of God. It is 
a union of two freedoms; the free appeal to God and the free response and 
homage of man. The act of faith "fills the void which exists between my 
empirical and my thinking self, in the affirmation of their transcendent union, 
and from the idea of that God who has willed me I can then pass on to the idea 
of that God who has willed the world." (Reinhardt, 1952, p. 210) In 
understanding myself as a creature of God. I am ready to accept my 'being-in-
the-world' with all its limitations. I am ready to accept my being-in-the-world 
not because of my rational or objective knowledge but because of faith, that is 
the work of personal consecration of my life. In the act of faith the gulf between 
subject and object breaks down. 
Marcel hold that faith is an "absolute commitment, entered into by the 
whole self, or at least by something real in myself which could not be repudiated 
without repudiating the whole." (Marcel, 1965, p. 52) Here the cogito transcends 
itself and goes beyond 'I think' to 'I believe'. It cannot be so by any logical 
necessity because here we are in the realm of nonobjective. Absolute 
commitment can only be an act that is freely entered into by the whole person. 
But, Marcel says that, this free act is not arbitrary like a hypothesis. On the 
contrary, precisely because it is the most free act, it is the most rooted in being. 
It is the act by which the self transcends the gaps between feeling, thought, and 
faith and creates itself as a concrete, active, and living reality and not merely as a 
thinking subject. That is, it is the act by which the self makes itself what, at a 
profound level, it already knows itself to be. 
But despite the fact that faith may appear valid in this sense to the 
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believing subject, it is never a certitude. Because it is free, it must always 
contain an element of uncertainty. As Marcel says: 
"It goes beyond what has been given to me, what I have 
experienced, it is an extrapolation, a leap, a bet which, like all 
bets, can be lose." (Marcel, 1964, p. 135) 
Marcel admits that faith is not merely a free act, but it is also a response 
to grace. Faith or absolute commitment is mysteriously both a free act and a 
response to divine grace. That is, faith without grace would be mere subjective 
affirmation, and that is precisely what faith, if it is real, cannot be. 
Marcel declares that faith can only appear valid for those who open 
themselves to it in a free act. It never appears valid for thought in general. 
General validity would imply a universal abstract subject and the ability to 
substitute one person for another. This is precisely what is not possible with faith 
because faith is an act of personal participation by a concrete person in which the 
believer is not distinct from that in which he participates. Marcel says that, in 
true faith, the act of faith and the object of faith cannot be disconnected. He says: 
"The act by which I think faith must, therefore, be the act 
by which I deny this dissociation; but by which, in 
consequence, I also deny subjectivism as well as realism 
.... There is no internal distinction between them." (Marcel, 
1952, p. 39) 
Thus, faith, according to Marcel, is both a free act and a response to 
grace. So, it is identifiable with salvation. It cannot come from the human side 
alone but it is a gift of God involving "a mysteriously and indivisible unity of 
freedom and grace." (Marcel, 1960, II, p. 155) Similarly, secondary reflection, 
the negation of thought toward faith, "seems to be possible only by the 
intervention of a transcendent power." (Marcel, 1952, p. 50) 
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Marcel develops a dialectic of faith, freedom, and love to bring out the 
relation of faith to human freedom. According to this dialectic, faith must 
involve a relation of freedom between God and the person of faith. For faith God 
must be regarded as independent of the act of faith. Faith cannot be merely a 
subjective affirmation and remain faith nor can it be refused or denied. There 
must be a relation of freedom between the person of faith and God. But Marcel 
maintains further that the relation of freedom must be a relation of love. Thus, 
for faith there must be a divine love, which is another form of speaking grace. It 
does not mean that grace is somehow required or made necessary by any human 
act of faith. But it is rather that where there is faith, there is divine grace. If they 
are real the two cannot be separated. 
Marcel believes that when we are confronted with Grace we can either 
refuse it or open ourselves to it. But even the act of opening oneself to grace is 
seen as conditioned or made possible by grace. He writes: 
"To say that the act of faith is a free act is to put it 
ambiguously .... The truth is that it truly does depend on us to 
make an open place, that is, to rid ourselves of all the 
prejudices which bar the path to faith, or even to make 
ourselves available to grace.... But it must certainly be added 
that this reflection, which thus takes place before grace, 
implies, without doubt, something in its beginning which is of 
the same order as grace." (Marcel, 1960, II, p. 200) 
Marcel calls grace as unthinkable. He says that 'Sve can not really think 
grace, or rather we can think it only as unthinkable." (Marcel, 1952, p. 57) 
Through this unthinkableness of grace. Marcel indicates the gap between grace 
and objective knowledge. He says: 
"Grace remains the transcendent and nonobjectifiable 
postulate of the act of faith.... By the act of faith I posit 
between God and myself a relation which completely eludes 
the categories of my tiiought." (Marcel, 1952, p. 59) 
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Marcel refers to the presence of God in the depth of human being. The content of 
this awareness of absolute presence is an unspecifiable and uncharacterizable 
mystery. The awareness does not have a certain kind of certainty for it is a 
certainty that I am rather than a certainty that I have. The certainty of awareness 
of ultimacy does not guarantee the correctness of ideas or doctrine about God 
and does not guarantee the correctness of anything thought or said about God, 
but it does come as something unquestionably real. Marcel writes: 
"You feel confined. You dream of escape. But beware of 
mirages. Do not run or fly away in order to escape; rather 
dig into the place of confinement which is given to you, 
there you will find God and everything. God does not float 
on your horizon, he sleeps in your depths. Vanity runs, love 
digs. If you flee beyond yourself, your prison will run with 
you and will close in on you in the wind of your flight; if you 
plunge into yourself, it will open into paradise." (Marcel, 
1962, p. 28) 
Thus, the authentic existence, according to Marcel, can be understood 
only through the ideas of grace and gift. The bestower of that gift is the 'non-
identifiable' as such, which is experienced or apprehended as the 'absolute 
thou'. This absolute thou is seen in a light which is hailed as a presence. This is 
presence, of neither of something nor of someone, but an 'absolute presence'. 
Here the distinction between subject and object completely breaks down and is 
transcended. 
The presence of God is like a light within us. Without this light we would 
be unable to proceed on the road to our true being. Without uncreated light, we 
would have no being at all. But we always have being, even though we may only 
be aware of existing. There is always the presence of God in the depth of human 
being, even though it may be denied, distorted, or turned against. We are always 
on the road, because a person who is not on the road would no longer be a 
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person. 
Marcel maintains that, there is the presence of God in the depth of every 
human being. There is an ontological point m every person where the 
supernatural and the natural, the divine and the human, meet and are one. There 
is a point of identity between the two realms, a point where we participate in 
God and He is present to us. 
Marcel considers this point of identity as the basis of faith. It is the 
'unconditional' that cannot be repudiated without denying something essential to 
ourselves. God is known in faith not by any kind of awareness but by the fact 
that faith has to posit the reality of God in order to be realistic. But as Marcel 
denies the distinction of subject and object it follows that whenever there is 
genuine faith there is the felt presence of God. 
From the point of view of the mystery of being, the awareness of the 
point of identity between the divine and the human is a 'presentiment' of my 
authentic being. This is that part of me that we might call spiritual and that is 
beyond estrangement of the broken world of existence. Marcel says that, "the 
question that should concern us ... consists in knowing whether I can in some 
way experience myself as being in a sense other than that in which I grasp 
myself as existing." Just as the word 'exist' points to an emerging or arising, so 
being points to a turning inward. Marcel insists that "I can turn myself toward 
the interior, and this is what happens as soon as I recollect myself But it seems 
that this act would be bound up with a presentiment of a reality which would be 
mine, or perhaps more exactly, which would ground me in as much as I am 
myself" (Marcel, 1960, II, p. 35) 
Thus, Marcel maintains that there is no ultimate difference between 
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feeling the presence of God and being profoundly aware of being. He affirms 
that there is a correlation between metaphysics and religious life. There is a 
"hidden identity of the way which leads the metaphysician to the affirmation of 
being." (Marcel, 1965, p. 92) Ontology and religious life are identical because 
both have their initiation from the same place, and both metaphysics and 
religious life are grounded in and responding to an ontological intersubjective 
community in which God is present. 
Marcel believes that because of the technological mentality of the modem 
civilization, the act of faith has become foreign to us. Modem man does not only 
indulge in proving the existence of God endlessly, but even look upon the 
presence of other person as a working hypothesis. The others too, like God, are 
being considered as 'objects' or 'obstacles' depriving one from the sole 
domination over one's own environment. Most of our judgments are in the third 
person and, consequently, express the reflected image of those who in reality are 
present to us. With the pure consciousness of my being, my self is identical with 
a faith which is open to God as well as to the others. Marcel writes "By faith I 
affirm that God is the father of all men." (Marcel, 1952, p. 66) 
Marcel's approach to the problem of the existence of other men is 
somewhat phenomenological, and gives rise to the famous doctrine of 
disponsibility or availability. He emphasizes two general ways of comporting 
ourselves towards others that can be used as barometers for intersubjective 
relationships i.e. 'disponsibility' and 'indisponsibility'. Marcel himself translated 
this difficult notion in English as 'handiness' and 'unhandiness'. He writes: 
"Literally in English, one would render these as 
availability and unavailability; but it might sound more 
natural, if one spoke of handiness and unhandiness, the 
basic idea being that of having and not having, in a given, 
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contingency, one's resources to hand or at hand." (Marcel, 
1965, p. 201) 
Handiness and unhandiness refer to the availability of one's resources -
material, emotional, intellectual and spiritual. Thus, the term disponsibility refers 
to the measure in which I am available to someone. This is the state of having 
my resources at hand to offer. And this availability or unavailability of resources 
is a general state or disposition. In this sense. Marcel believes that, a self-
centered person is unhandy. He remains incapable of sympathizing with other 
people, nor even of imagining their situation in the world. He is imprisoned in 
his private experience. He is unhandy form this point of view. 
Marcel affirms that for the intersubjective relationship in which 
disponsibility is rooted is the outcome of only existential projection. This is the 
reason that I can never be disponsibie is rooted in the outcome of only existential 
projection. This is the reason that I can never be disponsibie to a man who is not 
with me or who is not thou to me. Marcel says that disponsibility is the basis of • 
every social relationship. But as long as the gulf between T and somebody else 
is not bridged by intimacy - communion or a kind of co-presence - there is no 
participation in the common process of transcendence, and so nothing would 
make us disponsibie to each other. 
When I treat the other person as him. I treat him, not as a presence, but as 
absent. However, when I treat the other as a He rather than a Thou, I become 
incapable of seeing myself as a Thou. Marcel says that in deprecating the other I 
deprecate myself. On the other hand, the person who is disponsibie or available 
to others, has an entirely different experience of his place in the world. He 
acknowledges his interdependence with others people.. Relationships of 
disponsibility are characterized by presence and communication between 
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persons quo other, qua freedom - a communication and communion between 
persons who transcend their separation without merging into a unity, that is, 
while remaining separate to some degree. 
All authentic communication, according to Marcel, is ontological. No two 
persons can, therefore convey their 'whole' to each other when they are 
indisponsible to each other. Marcel says: 
"I bind myself to you in order never to abandon you. Even 
when I could neither touch you nor see you, you would 
always be with me I would always be with you." (Marcel, 
Cited m Sinari, 1966, p. 112) 
Marcel believes that it is on the level of the mystery, of the 
metaproblematical and of secondary reflection that man can discover his 
authentic existence. And so it is only in a genuine I-Thou relationship, in that 
encounter or meeting on the plane of intersubjectivity that I can engage in such 
personal relationships as disponsibility, fidelity and love. 
For the integration of any two existing individuals it is essential that they 
both constitute an interpenetrable sphere, a collective consciousness founded on 
invocation. Ontologically speaking, invocation, disponsibility, cordially, 
sympathy and conjugal love are the allied expressions suggesting what Marcel 
has termed the creative fidelity. 
Creative fidelity is a spiritual tie that unites me and thee into an 
unbreakable cohesion. Marcel says that in fact "... it is a notion which is most 
difficult to grasp, above all, or to define conceptually, because of its underlying 
and unfathomable paradox and because it is at the very centre of the realm of the 
metaproblematical." (Marcel, 1952, p. 243) The others and myself while living 
amidst the contingent circumstances, must aspire to live together in a 
communion of love and amity which foster fidelity. There is nothing impersonal 
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in this aspiration. The only way to understanding love, according to Marcel, is to 
love; and the only way of being communicable is to communicate. The principle 
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Creating Meaning in a Meaningless World 
He was alone, enveloped in this monstrous silence, free and alone, 
without assistance and without excuse, condemned to decide 
without support from any quarter, condemned forever to be free. 
(Sartre, 1986, pp.242-243) 
For Sartre the source of all authenticity is human freedom. In the last 
section of Being and Nothingness, in the passage 'Ethical Implication' he 
proposes freedom in place of God as man's primary value. Similarly in 
Existentialism and Humanism, he states freedom as a moral judgment that men 
should accept as their ultimate goal. Similar statements have been made by 
Sartre in his entire philosophical and literary works. He says in an interview that 
"Everything that I have tried to write or do in my life was meant to stress the 
importance of freedom." (Cited in Anderson, 1979, p.42) Freedom as an ultimate 
value in Sartre's works has been emphasized and linked to his idea of 
authenticity for he uses freedom, commitment and authenticity interchangeably. 
In his essay Anti-Semite and Jew he says that authenticity "consists in having a 
true and lucid consciousness of the situation, in assuming the responsibilities and 
risks that it involves, in accepting it in pride or humiliation, sometimes in horror 
and hate". (Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, 1948, p. 90) Thus, an authentic 
individual, according to Sartre, is one who accepts his situation as it truly is; who 
does not flee from it in self-delusion. He accepts the responsibilities and dangers 
that his situation involves fiiUy conscious of the finality of his decision making 
for "he is what he makes of himself (Sartre, 1948, p. 28) in and through his 
actions within a situation. 
Sartre's authenticity does not consist, like Heidegger, in the faithfiil 
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revelation of Being but he makes it the task of the for-itself, which has brought 
the 'why' into the world, to supply the answers and the 'wherefore'. For a clear 
understanding of Sartre's ideas it would perhaps be worthwhile to begin with an 
explication of Sartre's notion of being. 
He takes the analysis of consciousness as his pomt of departure. In 
keeping with Husserl, he too, believes that 'all consciousness is consciousness of 
something'. Meaning thereby that consciousness which is intentional in 
character is always directed towards an object. Thus, consciousness is nothing 
but an intentional activity; it is not an object in itself or an object for itself It is 
nothing. For Sartre, this notion of consciousness, as nothing, leads to a 
distinction between two very different kinds of being - the being of objects for 
consciousness (being-in-itself) and the being of consciousness (being-for-itself). 
Being for the object of consciousness simply is. Throughout the Being 
and Nothingness, Sartre emphasizes that being-in-itself is, and whatever can be 
said about it is that it simply exists. It can never be anything other than what it is. 
It is full in itself. It is complete and full of positivity. "In it there is no negativity; 
this would imply a lack of perfect identity." (Sartre, 1957, p. ixxix) It is 
complete and plentiful being. Sartre explains it thus: 
"The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can 
be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to 
container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not 
the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip 
in."(Sartre, 1957,p.74) 
Thus, according to Sartre, the being-in-itself is determinate, complete, full 
of positivity in itself. It is an unconscious bemg and therefore lacks freedom. 
Thus being-in-itself is what it is, something opaque, solid, neither active 
nor passive, and without relation to itself; it is not created, bears no mark of a god 
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having brought it into being, but neither does it create itself; it is something which 
in itself cannot be attributed to or derived from something other than itself 
Everything existing in-itself is 'contingent'. It simply is, and therefore, can be 
neither possible nor impossible. 
The in-itself is de trop: it cannot be derived from anything, either from 
another being, or from a possibility, or from a necessary law. Sartre says: 
"Uncreated, without reason for being, without any 
connection with another being, being in itself is de trop for 
eternity." (Sartre, 1957, p. Ixvi) 
On the other hand, in contrast to the being of the object of consciousness; 
the being of consciousness cannot be characterized as objects are characterized. It 
cannot be characterized as given as such, or as having such and such fixed 
characteristics. To quote Sartre: 
"The being of consciousness does not coincide with itself in 
a full equivalence." (Sartre, 1957, p. 90) 
The being-for-itself is indeterminate. It is full of negativity. It is a lack in 
itself It is characterized paradoxically as "not being what it is and being what it is 
not." (Sartre, 1957, p. 93) Therefore, this indeterminacy, negativity and lack of the 
being-for-itself gives it; its unique character. And this unique character is its 
freedom. Being-for-itself is free. And this consciousness of freedom enables man 
to create meaning for himself through the choices he makes. 
Sartre declares that bad faith is a threat to being human and this is possible 
because consciousness, which although not the whole man is nevertheless his 
core, is at the same time in its essence what it is not and not what it is. "It is an 
immediate permanent threat to every project of the human being." (Sartre, 1957, 
p. 70) For Sartre bad faith occurs when one is insincere to oneself. 
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Bad Faith or Inauthenticity 
Sartre says that we are the creators of our own essence meaning thereby 
that we are what we are on account of the choices we freely make and hence 
become totally responsible for what we are. He affirms that we are our freedom 
and our 'whatness' is our choice. Bad faith or Mauvaise Foi arises when we treat 
the predicative 'is' as to what we are - we are a waiter, a soldier, a coward, a liar, 
- as if it were the 'is' of identity defming an essence, and abdicate our 
responsibility as to what we do by virtue of an explanation following from our 
supposedly fixed essential nature which is imposed upon us. The overarching 
exemplification of bad faith is thus to see ourselves as an object, as fixed; as a 
being-in-itself Thus, according to Sartre, it is bad faith to live as though values 
and attitudes were derived from the world and not our own selves. According to 
Sartre this attitude of man is inauthentic which opposes its own freedom. Because 
for Sartre authenticity consists in free choice while bad faith opposes it and 
therefore becomes inauthentic. Bad faith is an attitude in which the being-for-
itself deliberately wants to become in-itself in order to avoid the anguish of 
freedom and responsibility. Because "The reality of our freedom is so unbearable 
that we refuse to face it. Instead of realizing our identities as free conscious 
subjects we pretend to ourselves that we are mechanistic, determined objects. And 
reftising to freely make ourselves what we are, we masquerade as fixed essences 
by the adoption of hypocritical social roles and inert value system." (Priest, 2001, 
p. 204) 
The problem of bad faith is the problem of describing what it is to be a 
human being (the human condition), and thus demonsfrating the various modes of 
escape from what Sartre, has already described as 'absolute freedom'. For Sartre 
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the phenomenon of bad faith is clearly present in most or even all human 
activities, and the problem therefore, becomes a Kantian problem of explaining 
how such a phenomenon is possible. 
Sartre declares that 'bad faith is a lie to oneself.' It should neither be 
identified with the lie as such nor with falsehood. Bad faith is self-deception. It is 
a lie to oneself. He defends this position on the provision that lying to one self is 
distinguished from lying in general or falsehood. The essence of lie is that the liar 
is actually and completely in possession of the truth which he is hiding. One 
cannot lie about what he is ignorant of In a simple lie there is always two parties 
one is deceiver the other whom the deceiver; deceived. But Bad faith entails the 
unity of a single consciousness. There is no ontological duality between the 
deceiver and the deceived .The one who lies and the one to whom the lie is told 
are one and the same consciousness. 
Sartre offers us an example of a woman to provide a basic insight into the 
mechanism of bad faith. In this typical but amusing example when a woman 
consents to go out with a man for the first time. She understands very well the 
intentions of her companion towards her. She does not want to read the underlying 
meaning of phrases addressed to her, like, 'you look very charming', 'I find you 
so attractive', etc. She decides to take these phrases on their face value as merely 
respectful or admiring. Since she does not quite know what she wants. She sees 
only the explicit meaning of his utterances and completely strips them of their 
sexual undertones. She takes the utterance of her companion as objective and 
sincere as 'a table is round' or 'the wall is white' since she wishes neither to 
commit herself to a future relationship nor remove all possibilities of any 
involvement. In doing so she gives everything the quality of being-in-itself. She is 
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well aware of the desire she invokes in her companion. "But the desire cruel and 
naked would humiliate and horrify her." (Sartre, 1957, p. 97) She does not 
altogether want to get rid of that desire nor is she satisfied by the mere respect 
offered to her. The woman is clearly in two minds; she wants not only her 
freedom to be respected but also the charm and beauty of her body to be 
appreciated. But then suddenly her companion grasps her hand because he is 
unwilling to leave things as they are. Grasping of hand is to force a decision, i.e. 
to change the situation. Now this moment is very crucial for the woman. Because 
at this moment she is compelled to take a decision. Because leaving her hands in 
the warm hands of her companion implies a consent to engage herself: which she 
does not want. And to withdraw her hand means 'to break the troubled and 
unstable harmony which makes the hour charmflil.' In the conflict of decision 
making the woman leaves her hand there. She does not notice it, because as it 
happens, by chance at this moment she becomes not human but all intellect. She 
draws her companion upto the most lofty regions of the sentimental speculations. 
She speaks of life - of her life and shows herself in her essential aspect a 
personality, a consciousness. And during this time the divorce of the body from 
the soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her 
companion - "neither consenting nor rejecting a thing." (Sartre, 1957, p. 97) 
Sartre says that this woman is in bad faith. Because "She knows that it will 
be necessary sooner or later for her to make a decision. But she does not want to 
realize the urgency. She concerns herself only with what is respectful and discreet 
in the attitude of her companion. She does not apprehend this conduct as an 
attempt to achieve what we call the first approach." (Sartre, 1957, p. 55) 
Sartre says that the woman mterprets whatever her companion says as 
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devoid of sexual suggestiveness, and even responds to his physical advances by 
denying its intentional import. He takes her hand and she simply divorces herself 
from it and ignores the fact that her hand is with him. Sartre says: 
"We shall say that this women is in bad faith... she has 
disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to 
being only what they are, that is, to existing in the mode of 
the in-itself" (Sartre, 1957, p. 56) 
The woman is deceiving herself concerning the intentions of her 
companion, but Sartre does not want to say that she is simply deceiving herself 
about him. She is deceiving herself about her own desires and intentions as well 
as about her own sexual nature. She is pretending that her companion's advances 
do not have anything (sexual) to do with her. Sartre advocates that this woman is 
in bad faith primarily because she denies the necessity of her own choice in the 
situation. By treating herself as non-sexual, she has denied the situation in which 
she must choose to accept or reject her sexuality and her companion's advances. 
To describe this incident as self-deception leads to the following glib 
interpretation. The woman lies to herself; she knows that she is being treated as a 
sexual object but will not allow herself to realize this. She knows the truth, on the 
one hand, but refuses to disclose it to herself on the other. A lie is, in general, 
knowing the truth but refusing to disclose it, presenting some other proposition 
which one knows to be false instead, A lie to oneself, self-deception, is knowing 
something and hiding it from oneself 
Sartre's solution to the problem of bad faith is a careful phenomenological 
description of the phenomena commonly called self-deception. And the 
demonstration that these phenomena can be accounted for by the theory of 
absolute freedom of Being and Nothingness coupled with the observation that 
man tends to 'flee this freedom', or more accurately, 'flee the anguish of 
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recognition of freedom' by constructing excuses for himself and denying this 
freedom. Bad faith is a willftil refiisal to recognize oneself as both facticity and 
transcendence, as a man with a past and a future yet to be determined. The 
paradigm case of bad faith is thus the misinterpretation of choices which one 
makes for himself as facts which determine one. Bad faith is flight from anguish 
in the face of freedom, a denial of transcendence and of the attempt to look at 
oneselfasathing. 
Thus, Sartre holds the view that human being is at once a facticity and 
transcendence both, i.e. given and possible projects remain to be associated with 
his freedom. And the woman in the given example to her advantage uses this 
double property of human reality. Though aware of the first approach, i.e. 
facticity, she uses the second approach i.e. transcendence. "She is aware of the 
desire she evokes but purifies it of anything humiliating by acknowledging it only 
as pure transcendence. While attempting to transform facticity into transcendence 
and vise-versa, she feels that she is escaping all reproaches. But she does so at the 
price of arresting of gluyeing down, of thing if lying, her possibilities - of 
objectifying her transcending freedom." (Sartre, 1957, pp. 55-57) As Sartre points 
out in Being and Nothingness: 
"The basic concept which is thus engendered utilizes the 
double property of the human being, who is at once a 
facticity and a transcendence. These two aspects of human 
reality are and ought to be capable of a valid co-ordination. 
But bad faith does not wish either to co-ordinate them or to 
surmount them in a synthesis. Bad faith seeks to affirm their 
identity while preserving their differences. It must affirm 
facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being 
facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person 
apprehends to one, he can finds himself abruptly faced with 
the other." (Sartre, 1957, p. 56) 
The paradigm of bad faith is fleeing from my own freedom and 
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possibilities. The characterization of bad faith, however, is not restricted to this 
paradigm case, and it is one of the weakness of the Sartre's otherwise briUiant 
analysis of bad faith that he sometimes places inordinate stress on one kind of bad 
faith. Bad faith is generally characterizes as a 'refusal to recognize what I am' 
which is genuine and 'authentic existence', namely, a being who is both facticity 
and transcendence. Thus, bad faith does not solely consist of the denial of one's 
facticity and overemphasis on his transcendence. 
Sartre also accounts his theory of bad faith in his famous essay Anti-Semite 
and Jew. In this essay Sartre describes the anti-semite as a man in bad faith. He 
says: 
"The anti-semite has created the Jew from his need. 
Prejudice is not uninformed opinion. (Anti-Semitism) is an 
attitude totally and freely self-chosen, a global attitude which 
is adopted not only in regard to Jews but in regard to men in 
general... it is a passion and at the same time a concept of 
the world,... not of the Jews, of course, but of himself, of his 
conscience, of his instincts, of his responsibilities, of 
solitude, of change, of society, and of the world; of 
everything except the Jews. He is a coward who does not 
wish to admit his cowardice to himself; a murderer who 
represses and censures his penchant for murder without 
being able to restrain it and who nevertheless does not dare 
to kill except in effigy or in the anonymity of a mob; a 
malcontent who dares not revolt for fear of the consequences 
of his rebellion. By adhering to anti-semitism, he is not only 
adopting an opinion, he is choosing himself as a person. He 
is choosing the permanence and the impenetrability of the 
rock, the total irresponsibility of the warrior who obeys his 
leader...He chooses finally, that good be readymade, not in 
question, out of reach'.... The Jew is only a pretext; 
elsewhere it will be the Negro, The yellow race; The Jew's 
existence simply allows the anti-semite to nip his anxieties in 
the bud by persuading himself that his place has always been 
cut out in the world...Anti-Semitism, in a word, is fear of 
man's fate. The anti-Semite is the man who wants to be 
pitiless stone, furious torrent, devastating lightening: in 
short, everything but man." 
(Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, 1948, pp. 8,26-27) 
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For Sartre, sincerity too, which seems to be the mark of authentic 
existence, comes under the heading of bad faith. Therefore, it too is inauthenticity. 
Sartre mentions that sincerity is a sort of determination to be for oneself and for 
others to be what one already is. But this is precisely the definition of being-in-
itself Man cannot be what he is in the manner of the being-in-itself. This implies 
that the concept of sincerity cannot represent the constitutive principle of human 
reality because human reality cannot be, in Sartre's system of thought, what it is, 
it must be able to be what it is not. 
It therefore, follows that if man is what he is, bad faith is impossible 
forever and the project of sincerity ceases to be his ideal; it rather becomes his 
being. But man is not what he is because how can he be what he is, when he exists 
as consciousness of being. If sincerity is a universal concept, then its defmition 
'one must be what one is' cannot be the regulating principle for the judgements 
and concepts through which we express what we are. It is not an ideal of knowing 
but the ideal of being; it is an absolute equivalence of being-with itself as the 
prototype of being. In this sense it is necessary that we make ourselves what we 
are. But what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselves 
what we are, if our mode of being is having the obligation to be what we are. 
Sartre illustrates his point with the example of a Cafe-Waiter. The cafe-
waiter tries to reduce himself to a being-in-itself He is playing at being a waiter in 
a cafe. He is playing his role in order to realize it. Simultaneously, from within, 
the waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately a cafe-waiter in the sense that 'this 
glass is a glass'. It does not however, follow that he cannot reform the 'reflective 
Judgements or concepts', regarding his condition. But all his judgments and 
concepts refer to the 'transcendence - they are the matter of abstract possibilities'. 
171 
Chapter VII Jean-Paul Sartre: Creating Meaning in a Meaningless World 
And it is precisely this person who I have to be (if I am the waiter m question) and 
who I am not. It is not that he does not wish to be this person but rather there is 
no common measure between his being and mine. It is a representation for others 
and for myself which means that I can be only in representation. Sartre says: 
"But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated 
from him as the object from the subject, separated by nothing, 
but this moming isolates me from him. I cannot be he, I can only 
play at being him; that is imagine to myself that I am he. And 
thereby I effect him with nothingness. In vain do I fiilfiU the 
fiinctions of a cafe-waiter. I can be he only in the neutralized 
mode, as the actor is Hamlet...what I attempt to realize is a 
being-in-itself of the cafe-waiter." (Sartre, 1957, p. 60) 
Sartre, therefore, maintains that the Cafe-waiter is in bad faith because he 
has ignored his transcendence in the face of his facticity. The example furnished 
and analysed by Sartre is highly significant, because it brings out clearly the two 
roles of human existence i.e. its facticity and transcendence. 
Sartre illustrates his point by yet another example; that of a confidential 
meeting of a homosexual and his friend. The homosexual, in this example, suffers 
from a feeling of guilt that he absolutely denies of being a pederast. Since he has 
not chosen such a life, he declares that 'he is not really a pederast' even though he 
admits to having indulged, on occasion, in homosexual relations; Sartre says that 
"his case is always different, peculiar; there enters into it something of a game, of 
chance, of bad luck; the mistakes are all in the past;... Here is assuredly a man in 
bad faith who borders on the comic since, acknowledging all the facts which are 
imputed to him, he refuses to draw from them the conclusion which they impose." 
(Sartre, 1957, p. 63) 
The homosexual in this example is nothing different from the 'young lady' 
or 'the 'cafe-waiter' of the previous examples. They are all in the bad faith. All 
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the three i.e. the young lady, the caf6-waiter and the homosexual, are absolutely 
right in choosing to think of themselves only in terms of their freedom. 
Homosexual, in the above example, is right in holding that he is not a homosexual 
absolutely in the way that, this table is table; implying thereby that the established 
patterns of conduct cannot define a man's essence. But the homosexual is 
absolutely wrong in applying this freedom with respect to his past activities. 
Sartre holds that in so far as he has committed these acts in the past, he is a 
pederast because he cannot disown the responsibility of what he has done, but he 
cannot be said to be pederast in any absolute sense, that is with respect to his 
present and future. What the homosexual is trying to do is to use simultaneously 
and dishonestly the two meanings of to be. He understands 'not-being' in the 
sense of 'not-being-in-itself. He lays claim to 'not being a pederast' in the sense 
in which this table is a table. Therefore, he is too in the bad faith or in the 
inauthentic existence. 
There is another important form of bad faith i.e. treating one self as an 
other instead of treating one self as oneself To freat oneself as an other, according 
to Sartre, is to deny transcendence and turn oneself, not into a thing but 
nonetheless into pure facticity. Sartre argues that this form of bad faith is most 
primitive. It is through Being-with-others (Heidegger's Mitsein) that we first learn 
to reflect on ourselves at all, and it is the resultant Being-for-others which forms 
the basis of all bad faith. 
Sartre declares role playing too, as bad faith. Because a man in bad faith 
distracts himself from the recognition of his freedom. The most common form of 
his distraction is to be found, according to Sartre, in the notion of "role playing", 
or as he characterizes it, 'Being what I am not'. 
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He affirms that one is also in bad faith when he assumes a social role as his 
role and avoids questioning that role. Thus one pays attention to the details of his 
responsibilities and distracts himself from freedom to accept or not accept those 
responsibilities. The most obvious example of such type of bad faith is the petty 
bureaucrat, who focuses his attention to petty rules and regulations and simply 
refuses to consider even the intentions and basic principles underlying those petty 
roles. Attention of one's 'duties' and social role as a form of bad faith is famously 
illustrated in Sartre's brilliant description of the Cafe-waiter; 
"His movement is quick and studied, a little too precise, a 
little too rapid, He comes toward the patrons with a step a 
little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his 
voice, his eyes expresses an interest a little too solicitous for 
the order of the customer. Finally when he returns, trying to 
imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of 
automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a 
tightrope walker by putting it in a perpetually unstable, 
perpetually broken equilibrium which he perpetually re-
establishes by a light movement of the arm and hand. All this 
behaviour seems to us a game. He is trying to link his 
movements together as if they were mechanisms, the one 
regulating the other... He is playing, he is amusing with 
himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long 
before we can explain it; he is playing at being a waiter in a 
cafe... The waiter in the cafe plays with his condition in 
order to realize it." (Sartre, 1957, p. 59) 
What the waiter attempts to be is a being-in-itself; something which is only 
a waiter and could not be anything else. Accepting the role hides the possibility 
that one could be the rich businessman waited on; it is bad faith in that one denies 
that he could be anything other than a waiter. 
Heidegger understands the specific feature of himian existence to be a kind 
of standing out from the world, an ek-stasis^ ek-sisience. Sartre reckons with a 
three fold ek-stasis, the first being fulfilled with pre-reflective consciousness of 
things, the second with reflective consciousness, as in knowledge and the third in 
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man's ek-stasis as an object for another. In this latter case I 'stand out from' 
myself in so far as I see myself as object for another. 
Sartre's ontology is not limited to my consciousness and the objects of 
which I am conscious; there are also other people, other consciousness. He is not 
simply claiming that there are other people, but he claims that our relations with 
other people are based on bitter struggle - not necessary for each others lives but 
for the protection of our freedom. My relations with others are always a struggle 
to preserve my freedom, especially to preserve it from the objectifying looks of 
the others. And in order to preserve my freedom, I attempt to change the other 
into an object-for-me. Human relations, according to Sartre, are based on the 
others attempts to reduce me to an object in his eyes. And as an object, 1 cannot at 
the same time be viewed as a free subject with whom I can have true contact. 
Thus, my relations with other people constitute a threat to my freedom, for the 
other has the ability to make me into an object. I also have the ability to turn him 
into an object, and thus become an equal threat to him. For Sartre, the encounter 
with the other is a struggle for recognition, in particular recognition as freedom 
the realization of which is the simultaneous realization of authenticity. The other 
attempts to 'reduce me to an object, to define me as a fixed self; I try to do the 
same to the other. Thus, it leads us into bad faith, which is a departure from an 
authentic world into a perpetual struggle continuously leading us away from 
anything we may term as truth. 
Part three of Being and Nothingness, entitled being-in-others is estimated 
as one of the most brilliant and intriguing sections. It has three sections. The first 
devoted to the existence of others, the second to the body and third to the concrete 
relations with others. And undoubtedly the most unportant is the third and 
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conclusive section where Sartre spells out the concrete implications of his theory 
of intersubjectivity. 
Sartre's description of the being of the being-for-itself and its relation to 
the being-in-itself had repercussions that Sartre could explicate only the being of 
one's consciousness with no bridge established to relate with the consciousness of 
others. The problem is that he has followed so closely the idealistic conception of 
self consciousness as of transcendental origin and 'creator' of all being that he 
constantly faces the danger of transcendental solipsism. In dealing with the 
problem of solipsism he analyses the existence of the other and the relations 
between my being and the being of the other. In his analysis of the Reef of 
solipsism Sartre, before presenting his own view, takes into consideration the 
notion of the 'other' as dealt by Husserl, Hegel and Heidegger. 
Sartre observes that, for Husserl, the reference to the other is a necessary 
condition for the existence of the world. He says that Husserl has defined the 
other as an 'absence'. Sartre asks the question: "how can one have a full intuition 
of an absence?" (Sartre, 1957, pp. 234-235) unless I arbitrarily presuppose that the 
other is identical with me, true knowledge of the other escapes me. 
The inadequacy of the Husserlian theory of the other is that 
phenomenological method operates only through reducing the object via the self s 
analysis and through intending the object via the self s acts of intending. But since 
we cannot penetrate beyond the core of the self, the other escapes us. As Sartre 
puts it "Husserl has reduced being to a series of meanings, the only connection 
which he has been able to establish between my being and that of the other is a 
connection of knowledge. Therefore, Husserl cannot escape solipsism any 
more..." (Sartre, 1957, p. 235) 
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For Hegel the problem of the other is the problem of the consciousness of 
self. Sartre quotes Hegel: "The consciousness of the self is real only in so far as it 
knows its echo (and its reflection) in another. For Hegel, Sartre claims, the 
existence of my consciousness as consciousness of self depends on the appearance 
of the other. Self consciousness appears with the exclusion of the other. Such 
exclusion takes a double form: by the very fact of being myself, I exclude the 
other; by the very fact of being himself, the other whom I exclude me.... 
consciousness becomes as object for the other at the same time as the other 
becomes an object for my consciousness." (Sartre, 1957, p. 238) 
Sartre says that "We shall marshal against Hegel a two fold charge of 
optimism" (Sartre, 1957, p. 240) first of epistemological optimism and second of 
ontological optimism. Sartre says that "it appears to Hegel that the truth of the 
consciousness of self can appear that is, that an objective accord can be realized 
between the consciousness under the name of recognition of me by the other and 
of the other by me." (Sartre, 1957, p. 240) The ontological optimism in the 
Hegel's philosophy is even more "For Hegel...truth is truth of the whole." (Sartre, 
1957, p. 243) And Hegel believes that truth of all already exists. Sartre says that 
this optimistic assertion of Hegel permits him the claim that the truth regarding 
the other is possible to obtain. 
The failure of Hegel's optimism is the failure to produce the basis of 
intersubjective knowledge. Sartre claims that he deals with a mere plurality of 
consciousness which cannot be properly connected. His optimism is an illusion 
that such a connection has been established in his arguments concerning the other. 
"If we are to refute solipsism, then my relation to the other is first and 
fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge." 
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(Sartre, 1957, p. 244) Hegel's failure on this particular level, according to Sartre is 
that... he identifies knowledge and being." (Sartre, 1957, p. 244) 
Sartre says that, for Heidegger, the question of the other arises for a person 
only when the person has achieved authentic existence. And authenticity is 
achieved, according to Heidegger in the resolute decision the individual makes 
regarding his possibility of death. At the moment that the individual chooses his 
authenticity, he is disclosed to himself in authenticity, and the others around him 
are at the same moment elevated toward the authentic. 
Sartre states that Heidegger's description of the other is an 'ontic' and 
psychologistic description and not a true ontological explanation, since he claims 
there is no warranty for passing from the idea of being-with (mit-sien) to the 
ontological structure of being-in-the-world. Sartre hold that Heidegger, like 
Husserl and Hegel, has failed to produce an acceptable theory of the other and that 
Heidegger leaves the problem unsolved: it leaves the self isolated in the dungeon 
of solipsism - as 'solitary'. 
In his critique of Husserl, Hegel, and Heidegger, Sartre primarily wants to 
demonstrate the error which these philosophers made in affirming that my 
fundamental connection with the other is realized through knowledge. Indeed, the 
other is not purely a phenomenon of our consciousness. But through the 
consciousness of the other I become truly myself. Thus, Sartre asserts that neither 
idealism nor realism has been able to give an intelligible account of my relation to 
another. He says that it is not primarily a relation of knowledge and it is because 
they have treated it as such that these philosophies have been condemned to 
failure. 
Sartre confers the solution of this problem of solipsism through the 
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dynamics of Look. As always, here too, he begins with cogito. A cogito which is 
simultaneously both the existential as well as epistemological in character. Sartre 
commits himself to the position that any consideration of the other must begin 
with the being of the self He holds that the rapport with the other will be a 
relationship of being to being and not one of understanding to understanding, 
Husserl failed by measuring being through understanding, Hegel failed on account 
of identifying understanding with being. Sartre, to the contrary, proposes to give 
an explanation of the relationship between my being to the Being of the other. 
The basis of the original relation to the other lies in the very appearance of 
the other in my world. He appears to me and a shock accompanies the 
presentation of the other in my world. The appearance among the objects of my 
universe of an element of disintegration of this universe is what I call the 
appearance of a man in my universe. The other shocks my world in an original, 
unique and irreducible manner: he looks at me. At each instance the other looks at 
me. The basis of the solution to the problem of the other will be the look. 
Sartre selects the phenomenon of shame to illustrate his theory of the look. 
He gives an example in Being and Nothingness of a man who is standing in a 
corridor looking through a key hole into a room. In so far as his whole being is 
engaged in the look he is not aware of himself as a physical presence located on 
this side of the door. Rather he has already transcended himself. He is akeady 
beyond himself in the room in which his gaze is situated. But suddenly he hears 
the sound of foot steps approaching the corridor in which he is present. The sound 
effects a transformation of his relation to himself In so far as the implied presence 
of the other makes him ashamed of himself, he ceases to be a pure transcendence 
and becomes a transcendence transcended. A transcendence transcended by the 
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implicit presence of the one who is looking at him looking through the key hole. 
And he experiences this transcending of his transcendence in shame. (Macann, 
1993, pp. 142-43) 
Pure shame is the feeling of being an object through not necessarily some 
particular object. Shame exists when I recognize myself as degraded by and 
dependent upon the other. Sartre says: 
"Shame is the feeling of original fall, not because of the fact 
that I may have committed this or that particular fault but 
simply that I have 'fallen' into the world, in the midst of 
things, and that I need the mediation of the other in order to 
be what I am." (Sartre, 1957, p. 289) 
Through the experience of shame, I seek the overthrow of the other by 
appropriating him as an object for my subjectivity. But in this appropriation I 
hope to achieve more than simply the objectification of the other. What I seek is 
no less than the discovery in the other of an aspect of myself: my objectivity. 
Shame reveals to the self the look of the other. The other looks at me and 
in the look, shocks or hemorrhages my inner unity, my inner world, my 
subjectivity. The recovery of this inner world of the self is possible by a relation 
against the other; i.e. by making the other the object of my look and destroying his 
inner unity. By the look of the other I have been made an object for his 
subjectivity, and he knows me only as object and never as subject. In the same 
manner, I know the other as object and never as subject. 
Sartre says that I cannot be an object for an object. I must be on object for a 
subject. But if my being-for-other has revealed the necessity for the other, the 
question remains: what is the Being of the being-for-others? Sartre claims that the 
being-for-other is not an ontological structure of the pour-soi. We cannot even 
think of deriving, as a consequence of a principle, the being-for-other from the 
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being-for-self, nor, reciprocally, the being-for-self from the being-for-other. 
Thus, Sartre illustrates that because of the basic epistemological character 
of the consciousness, I can never attempt to prove the subjectivity, my proof 
founders on the reefs o f the limits of my knowledge; and if I accept the facticity 
of the other as object, I fail to penetrate to his care. 
But the other is for me not just the one through whom I lose my 
subjectivity, the one who takes me be what I am. In so far as I become aware of 
my being for the other, the other becomes the one through whom I regain my 
objectness, through whom I acquire a kind of being. Moreover, unlike the quasi-
being which I try to make myself to be through self-objectification, the being 
which I acquire through the other is real being -1 really am an in-itself for the 
other consciousness, and therefore I can be an in-itself for myself too, in so far as 
I am aware of myself as being for the other. But this being (in-itself) which I 
acquire through the other will turn out to be an 'unhappy consciousness'. For I 
can only become something for the other in so far as I cease to be for myself what 
I really am, namely, a for-itself (Macann, 1993, pp. 143-44) 
The notion of freedom and living an authentic life in the awareness of that 
freedom, are central to Sartre's existentialism. The notion of an 'authentic' life 
one lived in awareness of freedom - is increased in proportion as we are not 
aware of ourselves fixed as objects by others. But the strategy of evading the 
fixity ensuing from the look of others by in turn objectifying others is in the end 
self-defeating. For as I regard others as objects, so I come to regard myself as an 
object like them, which, according to Sartre, is the paradigm of bad faith or 
inauthenticity. 
The passing of responsibility for what we do to something other than 
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ourselves is, Sartre says, inauthentic or living in bad faith. The abdication of our 
responsibility for what we are and do Sartre sees as a kind of self-deception; it is 
as if we are aware that we are responsible for what we are, through what we 
choose to do, but we often fail to face that uncomfortable truth. Freedom is not 
something we can avoid, for it is an inseparable part of being human. We cannot 
divorce ourselves from the situations in which choices are made, but there is 
always room for a free choice - even if it only consists of dissent and saying 'no'. 
Thus, for Sartre, living with consciousness of the truth of my freedom is to live 
with authenticity. 
FREEDOM: (Authenticity) 
At the end of Being and Nothingness Sartre rejects the notion of God as 
man's ultimate value and proposes freedom alone as the source of all value. In 
contrast to the man in bad faith who is considered as inauthentic because he wants 
to flee from the anguish of freedom and responsibility, Sartre designates the 
authentic individual as one who is in clear awareness of his freedom as the source 
of all value, accepts his responsibility and chooses freedom as his ultimate value. 
Thus, Sartre's distinction of authenticity and inauthenticity is rooted in man's 
attitude towards freedom. Recognition of one's freedom as the source of all values 
and accepting responsibility arising out of this freedom is authenticity and its 
denial is inauthenticity. Thus, for Sartre, freedom is the only source through 
which an individual can make his life genuine or authentic. 
Freedom is the central concept in the existentialist literature. The entire 
philosophy of existentialist thought revolves around this central concept. 
Kierkegaard insisted that human being, subjectivity and freedom were equivalent, 
similarly Heidegger interprets Dasein as freedom. And Sartre makes the concept 
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of freedom the defining 'structure' of the for-itself or human consciousness. He 
says: 
"What is at the very heart and centre of existentialism is the 
absolute character of the free commitment, by which every 
man realizes himself....." (Sartre, 1948, p. 47) 
He further says that 'only freedom can account for man in his totality'. 
Maurice Natanson in his book named A Critique of J.P. Sartre's Ontology, has 
summarized Sartre's concept of freedom in the following lines: 
"Freedom is the condition of the Pour-Soi, and since the 
Pour-Soi exists as "lack", its freedom is the expression of its 
nothingness. The pour-soi is what it is not and is not what it 
is. This instability defines its' freedom. Again, since this is 
the condition of the pour-soi, man is condemned to this 
freedom. Man is condemned to be free because man is 
freedom." (Natanson, 1973, p. 75) 
Sartre's concept of freedom is unique, like all other concepts, his concept 
of freedom too, is grounded in is distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-
itself Sartre affirms that being-in-itself has no possibility of extension or 
detaching itself from what it is; being-for-itself or consciousness, having an 
absolute possibility of nihilation, is in a continuous search of itself which it never 
attains. The search, through negation of itself, at each and every breath of its 
existence, is nothing but a continuous activity of consciousness. This activity, this 
necessity of choosing at every instant a perspective for viewing the world 
constitutes freedom. 
Freedom is, therefore, a condition of pour-soi. It however constitutes 
nothing other than the negation of itself by for-itself. It is through this freedom 
that man is not what he is and is what he is not. Only the awareness of freedom 
forces man to surpass towards an exploration of his possibilities. He says: 
183 
Chapter VII Jean-Paul Sartre: Creating Meaning in a Meaningless World 
"To say that the for-itself has to be what it is, to say that it is 
what it is not while not being what it is, to say that in it 
existence precedes essence... all this is to say one and the 
same thing: to be aware that man is free." (Sartre, 1957, p. 
439) 
What Sartre wants to establish is that the very existence of man implies his 
freedom. Freedom is not something which is given to him or that it has an 
accidental character which is assigned to him. But he is freedom, "Man is free, 
man is freedom" (Sartre, 1948, p. 34) both are synonymous. He lives it from birth 
till death. Freedom, therefore, become inevitable to man. It is 'indefinable' and 
'unnamable'. For-itself is always in the process of'making', hence it refiises to be 
confined to any definition. That is why Sartre identifies consciousness with 
freedom. But freedom is not being but the being of man' that receives nothing 
from outside or from inside. 
"He was free, free from everything, free to act like an animal 
or like a machine, free for accepting, free for reftising, free 
for shuffling... He cold do what he wanted to do, no body 
had right to advise him. There would be neither right nor 
wrong unless he invented them. He was alone in a monstrous 
silence, free and alone, without assistance and without 
excuse, condemned to decide without any possible recourse, 
condemned for ever to be free." (Sartre, 1986, pp.242-243 ) 
Thus, for Sartre living with the consciousness of the tnith of my freedom is 
authenticity, and to take refiige in the external circumstances and denial of 
freedom is inauthenticity. 
Sartre proposes that man is absolutely free. But the absolute freedom is not 
the exaggerated popular claim that 'a man can do anything he wants to do', but 
rather that man is always free within his situation to confer significance upon that 
situation. Absolute freedom is thus, according to Sartre, the freedom of intention. 
Freedom is limited by one's situation, and freedom is absolute only within these 
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limitations: As Merleau-Ponty says: 
"Our freedom does not destroy our situation, but gears, itself 
to it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 442) 
The choice we make within the situation depends on how we see that 
situation, how we interpret it, what significance we place on it. The significance 
we impose on our situation would be the determinant of our choice within our 
situation. The significance we impose and the choices we make are inseparable. 
It is our ultimate choice of projects or ends which determines our view of 
the situation. There is no 'brute existent' which presents itself to us for 
interpretation and subsequently as a basis for choice. Sartre says: 
"[The] Situation.... Is revealed to this freedom only as 
already illuminated by the end which freedom chooses." 
(Sartre, 1957, p. 596) 
Our situation is an interpreted text with goals and demands for action 
imposed on it by us. This interpreted situation is found by us as a complex of 
facticity and imposed possibilities. It makes no sense to say we are in an 
'unfortunate' situation apart from any projects of our own which make this 
situation unfortunate for us, and it makes less sense to have projects in isolation 
from the situation in which these projects can be realized. 
Thus, Sartre asserts that man has absolute freedom. But the absolute 
freedom does not mean that we can act wildly or capriciously. These acts are only 
one of the choices which one can make. What is important is that whatever choice 
we make is accepted as our choice; we must take responsibility for it and its 
consequences. It is in this way an individual's life is said to be authentic 
according to Sartre. 
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Absolute freedom is the freedom of choice, freedom of intention, or 
freedom of significance and not freedom of success in action. 
"To be free does not mean to obtain what one has wished but 
rather 'by oneself to deteraiine oneself to wish (in the broad 
sense of choosing). In other words, success is not important 
to freedom." (Sartre, 1957, p. 591) 
There is no denial that external circumstances may thwart action or cause 
actions to formulate, but Sartre does maintain that all such external circumstances 
are such only in view of the goals we seek to achieve. 
"Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and 
obstacles which it has not created, but these resistances and 
obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice 
which human reality is." (Sartre, 1957, p. 599) 
Absolute freedom thus refers us to choice; trying, and adopting a conduct. 
My freedom is my awareness that nothing can compel me to adopt that 
(particular) conduct. One choice of conduct which is almost always open to us, of 
course, is the choice of oblitering our situation by killing ourselves. Even such 
'desperate' conduct is always a matter of choice and a matter of the projects we 
choose for ourselves: 
"If nothing compels me to save my life, nothing prevents me 
from precipitating myself into the abyss. The decisive 
conduct will emanate from a self which I am not yet." 
(Sartre, 1957, p. 39) 
Sartre asserts that it is in the acts of nihilations, specially acts of self-
nihilation in which human freedom is bom. It is because consciousness - human 
freedom - is nothing that he is 'outside' of the causal order of the world. Man is 
not an object in the world. But he moulds the world or interpret it in his own way 
through the freely made choices. 
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Sartre bases his nihilism on the rejection of the belief in God, just as 
Nietzsche does in his Thus Spake Zarathnstra. Like Nietzsche, Sartre sees the 
incredible consequences of atheism, and in Existentialism and Humanism, he 
reinterprets the concept of abandonment. 
"(by abandonment). We only mean to say that God does not 
exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequences of his 
absence right to the end... Dostoyevsky once wrote, "if God 
did not exist, everything would be permitted"; and that for 
existentiaUsm, is the starting point." (Sartre, 1948, pp. 32-33) 
It is in the basis of this absence of transcendent meaning or value that 
existentialism becomes a form of nihilism, but this nihilism is to be replaced by 
a new source of values, for the existentialists, this new source is himian freedom. 
The ethics based on human freedom is an ethics of commitment and not an 
ethics of whim or caprice; 
"Even if my choice is determined by no a priori value 
whatever, it can have nothing to do with caprice." (Sartre, 
1948, p. 48) 
"Life has a meaning if we really wish to give it one First of 
all we must act, dirough ourselves into some enterprize. 
Then, if later we reflect on it, the die is already cast we are 
committed." (Sartre, 1965, p. 148) 
Thus, for Sartre authenticity means to assume ones responsibility and 
engage in actions. "By February 1940 Simone de Beauvoir felt compelled to 
note in her diary an important change of which she and Sartre had come to feel 
that they could no longer remain aloof from political involvement. The concept 
of authenticity at which he had arrived demanded that he assume his situation in 
the world, and he could do so only by transcending it and engaging in action. 
Simone de Beauvoir found herself in fiiU agreement, and the deliberations of the 
two friends were followed by Sartre's engagement in political activities. Though 
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the very concept of existential authenticity prevented him from adhering to any 
rigid party-line, it led him directly towards his view of literature as 'engage'." 
(Cited in Kern, 1963, p. 12) 
Thus, the authenticity at the basis of Sartre's existentialism is essentially 
the freedom of choice, freedom of intention, the freedom to interpret the world 
and assign values to it of one's own choosing. 
The freedom of which Sartre has been concerned with is the 
freedom of pre-reflective consciousness. Consciousness is freedom even before 
it has been made aware of its freedom. It is in anguish that man becomes 
conscious of his freedom. 
"It is in anguish that man becomes the consciousness of his 
freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is the mode of being of 
freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that 
freedom is, in its being, in question for itself" (Sartre, 1957, 
p. 35) 
"It is important to emphasize that the experience of anguish 
depends upon freedom... anguish has not appeared to us as a 
proof of human freedom; the latter was given to us as the 
necessary condition for the question." (Sartre, 1957, p. 40) 
In other words, we must presuppose freedom in order to describe the 
feeling of anguish. Sartre says: 
"We wished only to show that there is a special 
consciousness of freedom, and we wished to show that this 
consciousness is anguish." (Sartre, 1957, pp. 40-41) 
Sartre credits the centrality of this concept of anguish to Kierkegaard, 
who precedes him in "characterizing it as anguish in the face of freedom." He 
also notes that Heidegger's concept of 'anguish' appears very different as the 
'apprehension of nothingness'. Because Sartre has argued that freedom and 
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nothingness are equivalent, he concludes that -
"These two descriptions of anguish do not appear to us 
contradictory; on the contrary the one implied the other." 
(Sartre, 1957, p. 35) 
Sartre distinguishes anguish from ordinary fear by noting that fear' is fear 
of particular objects while anguish is, according to Kierkegaard, a nameless 
dread, and according to Sartre, anguish is the fear of being oneself. 
"Anguish is anguish before myself Vertigo is anguish to the 
extent that I am afraid not of falling over the precipice but of 
throwing myself over. A situation provokes fear if there is a 
possibility of my life being changed from without: my being 
provokes anguish to the extent that I distrust myself and my 
own reactions in that situation." (Sartre, 1957, p. 35) 
Sartre says that anguish occurs as we recognize our own responsibility -
for what we do and what we are. Anguish also occurs, however, at our own 
responsibility for our values and projects, and for the absence of such values as 
absolutes; 
"There is ethical anguish when 1 consider myself in my 
original relation to values....It is the anguish before values 
which is the recognition of the ideality of values." (Sartre, 
1957, p. 46) 
Sartre affirms that because anguish arises with (or is) the recognition of 
one's freedom, and because freedom is consciousness and consciousness always 
must have the ability to know itself, there can be no escape from the possibility 
of anguish. For Sartre, as for Kierkegaard and Heidegger, anguish is an essential 
characteristic of man. This is not to say that it is a constant experience. On the 
contrary, Sartre maintains that it is rare, but nearly all the existential 
philosophers agree that anguish is not simply one more human emotion, but 
entwined in the definitive structure of human being. As Tillich says in Courage 
189 
Chapter VII Jean-Paul Sartre: Creating Meaning in a Meaningless World 
To Be: 
"The anxiety which is despair is not always present. But the 
rare occasions on which it is present determine the 
interpretation of existence as a whole." (Tillich, 1952, p.51) 
For Heidegger, it is confrontation with the possibility of death which 
ensures the manifestation of angst even in the most rigidly inauthentic people. 
For Sartre on the other hand, death plays little role in the recognition of freedom 
and the experience of anguish. Rather this recognition is forced upon us in any 
number of choice situations, situations in which our everyday routines will not 
suffice but which require a reconsideration of our entire perspective on our 
world. 
The discomfort of anguish drives man to attempt to 'flee from anguish', 
and it is in this flight that man searches for excuses for himself, interpretations 
of his situation which limit his freedom and responsibility. It is in this search for 
excuses that bad faith is bom which according to Sartre is inauthenticity. 
Because the possibility of anguish is always with us, the tendency to bad faith is 
always with us as well. The attempted escape from anguish takes on the 
character of the attempt to see ourselves as things to see ourselves not as 
ourselves but as an other would see us; 
"Thus we flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend 
ourselves from without as an other or as a thing." (Sartre, 
1957, p. 52) 
"The peculiar character of human reality is that it is without 
excuse." (Sartre, 1957, p. 679) 
Thus, in his notion of authenticity Sarfre wants to demonsfrate that no 
rule or criterion or any ideal personality (may be God) has so far been 
discovered which could tell us what is ultimately most dear to man. He says that 
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we can not decide an issue by merely obeying our inclinations and feelings, 
because we can neither measure nor verify them. It is ultimately, the choice of 
our inner being that can decide the issue. The moment we choose, we become 
responsible for our act, because it is our being that chooses to become what it 
has not been till now. If we choose what our most inner being prompts us to do, 





^tuakening ^om £josiness in 
the ^ e y 
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
Awakening From Lostness in the They 
...Dasein is authentically itself only to the extend that , as 
concemful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects 
itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the 
possibility of the they-self (Heidegger, 1973, p. 308) 
Martin Heidegger together with Jean-Paul Sartre left an indelible mark in 
the twentieth century philosophy. Sartre acknowledges the wisdom of Heidegger 
in stating that "philosophy in the twentieth century without Heidegger was 
unthinkable and, for any philosopher writing after Being and Time, impossible". 
(Stassen, 2003, p. IX) Heidegger has exerted an enormous influence on 
contemporary thinking, reaching beyond the limits of philosophy proper to 
include such diverse fields as psychology, theology, linguistics and modem 
theories of the text - most notably the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer and 
Ricoeur and the deconstructive theory of Derrida. 
Heidegger's philosophy has proved both contentious and controversial. 
He has been dismissed by some as a 'mystificatory wizard of wordplay' and 
placed in great esteem by others as the most original thinker of the century. 
Hannah Arendt described him as the 'secret king of thought' and the George 
Steiner as 'the great master of astonishment'. Either way, however, Heidegger is 
acknowledged by all, followers and adversaries, as a pivotal figure in the history 
of philosophy. Following Husserl's lead, Heidegger recalled modem philosophy 
to the basics, alerting it to the dangers of an era which had lost the power to 
question deeply, and thus pointing towards the possibility of a new begirming. 
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Heidegger soon discovered his philosophical vocation on reading 
Brentano's thesis on Aristotle's inquiry into the multiple meanings of Being. In a 
short study entitled ''My Way to Phenomenology' Heidegger declares: 
"Ever since 1907 Brentano's dissertation, 'on the manifold 
meaning of Being, according to Aristotle' had been the first 
help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into 
philosophy. The following question concemed me in a quite 
vague manner: if being is predicted in manifold meanings, 
then what is its leading fundamental meaning: what does 
Being mean?" (Stassen, 2003, p.70) 
Thus, for Heidegger, the chief concern of philosophy is to clarify the 
meaning of Being. He wants to re-open this age old question because, as Walter 
Biemel observes, "he challenges the tradition, and he calls upon us to think this 
tradition through". (Biemel, 1977, p. 29) Therefore, he initiated his enquiry by 
tracing the entire history of western philosophy and saw that neither Greek nor 
modem and not even his teacher Husserl addressed the age old question 
coherently. So, in working out the question of Being Heidegger re-interpreted 
the history of ontology. He gave phenomenology an 'existentialist' orientation 
which gained it international acclaim and attracted such talented and original 
young minds as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Hannah Arendt, Marcuse and many 
others. 
Heidegger revised Husserl's phenomenological method so that it might 
properly respond to the question of Being, He re-opened the brackets to create 
room for existence once again. Existence was now to be understood neither as 
mere subjectivity nor mere objectivity, but as a fundamental openness to the 
Being of beings. 
Husserlian phenomology had operated largely at the level of 
epistemology, that is, of an inquiry into the origin of knowledge as it is 
193 
Chapter VIII Martin Heidegger: Awakening From Lostness in the They 
constituted by our intentional experience. This had required, Husserl believed, a 
suspension of the ontological question of Being in order to focus on the 
workings of consciousness. Heidegger goes a step beyond his master; he shifts 
the emphasis from the meaning of consciousness to the meaning of Being. He 
accepts nonetheless the overriding conviction of phenomenology that an analysis 
of the essential structures of meaning necessitates a movement beyond the 
subject-object dualism in order to lead us back to our originary experience of the 
world, that is, to 'the things themselves'. But where Husserl identified this 
originary experience as a consciousness-of-the-world, Heidegger interprets it as 
a being-in-the-world. Thus Heidegger graduates phenomenology from the 
epistemological question - what does it mean to know? - to the ontological -
what does it mean to be? 
Heidegger champions phenomenology as a means of recovering and 
restating the fiindamental question of Being: why is there something rather than 
nothing? This question goes beyond the certainties of dogmatic speculation or 
science; it is not concerned with determining what things are so that they may be 
classified, objectified or controlled. It inquires instead into the ultimate why of 
being, restoring a sense of wonder that things should be at all rather than not be. 
While recognizing that this ontological question has become irrelevant for our 
contemporary culture and no longer commands our attention, Heidegger 
proclaims the possibility, indeed the necessity, of reviving this question by 
'deconstructing' western metaphysics and thereby 'retrieving' the original 
existential experience of Being similar to the metaphysical questioning when it 
first arose. 
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In Being and Time, Heidegger employs phenomenology to redirect our 
attention away from traditional metaphysics to the 'fundamental ontology' 
which originally founds it. The ontological question reactivated by a concrete 
description of man's being there (Dasein) in the temporal world. Being and Time 
opens with the question 'what does it mean to be?' And it proceeds on the 
assumption that since man is the only being capable of asking this question, our 
inquiry into Being as such must first engage in a phenomenological analysis of 
human being as it concretely exists in the everyday world. 
Thus, Heidegger states that Being can be understood only in terms of 
beings. Because Being reveals itself only through being. He says that in order to 
work out the question of Being the right entity must be picked up. "To formulate 
and to work out the question of Being adequately, we have first of all to make 
the questioning entity (Dasein) transparent in its Being". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 
27) And Heidegger says that "this entity which each of us is himself and which 
includes inquiry as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the 
term 'Dasein'". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 27) 
Dasein is the right entity which provides the access to the question about 
the meaning of Being because according to Heidegger, it has some priority over 
other entities. He states threefold priority of Dasein over other entities. These 
three fold priorities are: ontological, ontical and ontico-ontological, an extremely 
lucid discussion of which has been made by Venus George in his book The 
Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence. 
Ontological priority : Dasein has an ontological priority because he is able to 
understand Being. Dasein (The 'Da' of 'Sein') points to the fact of how the 
comprehension of Being is fundamentally rooted in Dasein's Being. And this 
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primordial comprehension of Being constitutes Dasein's ontological structure. 
That is why Heidegger remarks: "understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein's Being". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 32) This quality of 
Dasein's comprehension of Being is that which makes Dasein ontically distinct 
from all other entities, even though Dasein, like any other entity, is an entity in 
the world. Heidegger says that "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it [he] is 
ontological". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 32) 
Ontic priority : Dasein has an ontic priority, in the sense that he is existence, 
i.e., he is ecstatic, stands out fi-om and transcends other beings, besides his 
openness to Being. It has an ontic priority "because its essence lies rather in the 
fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own". (Heidegger, 
1973, p. 32) The expression refers to the two special characteristics of Dasein 
that is 'existence' and 'mineness'. 
Existence : According to Heidegger "the essence of Dasein lies in its [his] 
existence". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 67) Dasein, as existence, is ek-static, which 
literally means: standing beyond the static entities of this world. For Heidegger 
all other things are but they do not exist. He says "Man (Dasein) alone exists. 
The rock is, but it does not exist. The tree is, but it does not exist. The horse is, 
but it does not exist. The angel is, but it does not exist. God is, but he does not 
exist". (Heidegger, 1959, p. 16) But it does not mean that Heidegger deny the 
reality of other entities like tree, rock, horse etc. but only he points to the unique 
type of being which Dasein, as existence is. Dasein, as existence, "is set apart in 
the realms of beings as the only existing being which can undertake an enquiry 
into Being in terms of his peculiar existence". Thus, according to Heidegger, 
Dasein is not a mere thing, but is 'to be' or existence. He is not something static, 
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but a reality that is to be achieved. To exist is to be on the way. Dasem is always 
stretched forward towards his still-to-be-realized being. It is an existence which 
is "already-begun-still-to-be-achieved". (Venus, 2000, p. 71) So, an existence, 
Dasein is a being which stands out above other entities present-at-hand and 
moves towards actualization, its possibilities, thereby ever remaining on the 
way. 
Mineness: Dasein is always someone's own existence. And it is "that entity 
which in its [his] being has this very being as an issue..." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 
68) Therefore, unlike other entities, human existence cannot be a matter of 
indifference and he can never be substituted for another. So Dasein "... is in 
each case mine". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 68) Thus, according to Heidegger, the 
essence of Dasein lies in the fact "that in each case it [he] has its [his] being to 
be and has it as its [his] own". (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 32-32) 
Heidegger asserts that Dasein's mineness is to be seen in relation to its 
'existence'. As Heidegger states that Dasein is primarily existence or having-to-
be, it has constantly to choose from the possible ways for it to be. Dasein is 
never a finished product, without having to choose from its possibilities. He 
points out "that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, 
composts itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility". (Heidegger, 1973, 
p. 68) And when Dasein chooses itself as its ownmost possibility, it is said to be 
'authentic', it can have lost itself and been 'inauthentic'. As Heidegger says "As 
modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity... are both groimded in the fact 
that any Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness" (Heidegger, 1973, p. 
68) which means, he says "that Being which is an issue for this entity (Dasein) 
in its very being, is in each case mine". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 67) Thus, 
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combining both 'existence' and 'mineness', we can say that Dasein is in each 
case mine-to-be in one way or another. 
Ontico-ontological priority: Ontico-ontological priority according to Heidegger 
is that, Dasein by his understanding of Being, understands his own being. And 
not only his own being but that of other Daseins and that of entities. Heidegger 
says that "in such understanding Dasein provides the ontico-ontological 
conditions for the possibility of any other ontologies". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 34) 
Thus, Dasein is the worldly human being, which provides in himself an opening 
for Being to be revealed. Human existence is the questioner of Being and, in 
posing the question about Being, he creates an opening that transcendentally 
grounds all other realms of enquiry. 
Thus, Fundamental ontology, as visualized in Being and Time, stood to be 
Heidegger's philosophical enterprise. His sole aim has been to work out the 
question about the meaning of Being in general. As he points out "the analytic of 
Dasein ... is to prepare the way for the problematic of fundamental ontology -
the question of the meaning of Being in general". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 227) But 
it does not mean that there are two separate stages: the study of man and the 
study of Being. It is not even the case that one begins with man and ends with 
Being, nor vise versa. We can rather say that a study of man is itself a study of 
Being; and to this, from Heidegger's later perspective we can add that a study of 
Being is itself a study of man. To quote Heidegger: 
"Every philosophical - that is, thoughtfiil - doctrine of man's 
essential nature is in itself alone a doctrine of the Being of 
being [entities]. Every doctrine of Being is in itself alone a 
doctrine of man's essential nature" (Heidegger, 1968, p. 79) 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world: The preliminary Analysis: Division I of his 
magnum opus. Being and Time, presents a "preparatory fundamental analysis of 
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Dasein", and interprets Dasein's Being as "Being-in-the-word". Being-in-the-
world is the fundamental way through which, Dasein primarily shows itself. It is 
a unitary phenomena, a primary datum' which 'must be seen as a whole'. We 
can look at this unitary phenomena in three ways. We can look at the side of 
'world', that is, the idea of 'worldhood'; or at the side of the 'who' of Dasein; or 
at the relationship between the two - the 'Being-in'. 
"Heidegger...transposes Husserl's intentionality of 
consciousness on to the plane of 'Being'. For Husserl, the act 
of consciousness is a unitary phenomenon out of which we 
can discriminate the subject (ego), the intentional object 
(noema), or the mode by which the subject grasps the object 
(noesis). Heidegger rejects the terminology of 
'consciousness', 'subject' and 'object' on the grounds that it 
confines itself to the psychical by its ontological 
presuppositions, and so can never see the 'world' as anything 
more than a projection of the individual consciousness. 
Instead Heidegger's ontology starts with the understanding I 
have in everyday life, namely that T am in the world, and on 
that basis alone am 1 able to ask about the nature of the world 
(for me), about myself, and about the relationship between 
myself and the world". (Waterhouse, 1981, p. 68) 
Because Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon, the first existential, 
the primary structure of Dasein, is its 'Being-in' - that is its relatedness to world. 
Although 'Being-in-the-world' is a unitary phenomenon, in the 
phenomenological language it consists of two complementary aspects: noetic 
(Being-in) and noematic (the world) aspects. Through the special meaning of 
'in', that centers the phrase 'Being-in-the world', Heidegger makes it clear that 
Dasein's relation to the world is ontological, rather than epistemological. He 
does not use the very word 'in' in the meaning of 'insideness' of an entity with 
respect to another, or like an object in the box. But he takes it as the meaning of 
'to be familiar with', 'to be accustomed to', 'to dwell', etc. The relation between 
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Dasein and world is not one of the subject and object or one of knowing; but it is 
an existential relation of dealing with things and being with persons. 
In order to arrive at the Being of Dasein it is necessary to give an 
exposition of noematic and noetic aspects that is the world and Being-in. 
The World: Noematic aspect: Heidegger considers 'world' neither 
cosmologically as an objective entity, nor epistemologically as the object of 
knowledge, but ontologically as the horizon of Dasein's existence as Being-in-
the-world. Since world is to be seen in relation to Dasein, he distinguishes it 
between the environmental and the communal world. 
The Environmental World (Unwell) 
The 'Environmental world', Heidegger takes it as the complex which is 
opposed to Dasein, but 'wherein' factual Dasein lives. In this sense, the term 
'world' has a pre-ontological existential significance. Here, 'world' stands for 
the 'we-world' (Wir-welt) with others and one's own closest world of 
environment (umwelt). Dasein's ordinary relation to the entities within the world 
can be either one of theoretical cognition or one of practical dealings. For 
Heidegger the practical or existential dealings are more basic than theoretical 
observation. In practical dealings the entities show themselves as ready-to-hand 
(zuhamden) and in theoretical observation as present-at-hand (vorhanden). An 
entity shows itself as ready-to-hand in respect to its in-order-to, and to some 
Dasein for whose sake it is what it is. Hence only in relation to some Dasein that 
an entity can show itself as such a thing. Heidegger asserts that an environmental 
entity (equipment) does not stand by itself, but in the network of referential 
relationships - the maker, the user, the purpose, the whereof etc. Thus, for 
Heidegger, Dasein is the final center towards which all involvements are 
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directed. Since all such equipmental involvements find their destination in 
Dasein, it would mean that the worldhood of the world belongs to the being of 
Dasein himself. To say it in the words of Heidegger : 
"but the totality of the involvements itself goes back 
ultimately to a 'toward which' in which there is not further 
involvement: this 'toward-which' is not an entity with the 
kind of being that belongs to what is ready to hand within a 
world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-
in-the-world [Dasein], and to whose state of being the 
worldhood itself belongs". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 116) 
Then, for Heidegger, world is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed 
'there' wherein there being (Dasein) encounters the purposeful beings with 
which it is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the world-about. 
The Communal World (Mitwelt) 
In Dasein's existential Being-in-the-world it meets not only with 
environmental equipments of concemful dealings but also a communal world of 
other Daseins. Heidegger says that Dasein is essentially Being-with (Mitsein). 
He asserts that Dasein is Being-with even in his loneliness. To quote Heidegger: 
"The other can be missing, only in and for a being-with". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 
157) Heidegger's understanding of Being-with is more fundamental than the 
theory of 'intersubjectivity', according to which an T necessarily involves 
'than'. For Heidegger to be Dasein means to-be-with, which points to the 
'relation' rather than the 'related', namely, the subjects. As Being-with Dasein is 
essentially for the sake of others. Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of others 
to the extent that it is freed for some Being-with. Thus, Dasein is related to the 
environmental as well as communal entities (persons). Its relation to the 
environmental word is guided by 'practical concern' (Besorgen) and to the 
communal word, by 'personal concern' or solicitude (Fursorge). 
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Being-in (Disclosedness): The noetic aspect 
The 'Da' of Dasein speaks for its disclosedness. Heidegger states that 
Dasein is essentially disclosive in the world. As he puts it "in the expression 
'there' we have in view... [its] essential disclosedness. By reason of this 
disclosedness, this entity (Dasein) together with the Being-there of the world, is 
'there' for itself. There are three basic ways in which Dasein discloses itself 
State-of-mind : Dasein in its Thrownness 
For Heidegger, the state-of-mind is an existential of Dasein, which is 
prior to all psychological moods. It belongs to Dasein's existential structure. The 
existential structure of Dasein's state-of-mind is revealed through its ontic 
moods. Thus, according to Heidegger, "Mood is the lived expression of the 
state-of-being". (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 172-173) Dasein as state-of-mind, is 
never free of moods and is attuned to the world in one way or other. With the 
help of the moods Dasein discovers that he is in a particular way. 
State-of-mind discloses the 'being-in' of Dasein, with its ontic expression 
- the moods in three ways: (i) in Dasein's being delivered over to his moods, (ii) 
in concemful dealing with entities and (iii) in his being submissive to the world. 
Dasein always finds himself as Being-in-the-world, the world which is 
not choosen by him but it is always given to him, Dasein does not start his 
existence, but finds himself as already existing, whether it be in a given situation 
or from his origins. His existence has already started without his ever knowing 
or choosing. It is Dasein's non-theoretical awareness of himself as being 
revealed in his moods, as an essent that is delivered and according to Heidegger 
which is 'naked fact', Heidegger calls 'thrownness'. Therefore, Heidegger 
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asserts that Dasein is 'thrown'. Its thrownness must be conceived as the 
"facticity of its [his] being delivered over." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 174) 
In Dasein's thrown existence not only his own existence is revealed, but 
also the existence of other Dasein's and the world with all its entities are 
disclosed. It would mean that in the state-of-mind, Dasein's 'being-in-the world' 
is disclosed, by which Dasein shows not only that he is, i.e., a thrown Dasein 
among other entities, but also 'that has to be'. Thus, in the state-of-mind, Dasein 
finds himself as 'way to be', which is the basic condition for the possibility of 
discovering the world, with its entities, by moving towards them dynamically. 
Through Dasein's openness to the world, Dasein discloses himself as 
thrown to the submissiveness to the world. Since he is open to the world, Dasein 
can be affected, impressed and threatened in his 'Da' by entities and other 
Daseins. Thus, the world outside, by bringing about various moods in Dasein 
and changing his attitudes towards existential situations, affects Dasein, and 
thereby makes him submissive. Heidegger says: 
"The fact that this sort of thing [entity present-at-hand] 
'matters' to it [Dasein] is grounded in one's state-of-being; 
and as a state-of-being it [he] has already disclosed the world 
as something by which it [he] can be threatened for instance. 
Only something which is in the state-of-being of fearing (or 
fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally 
ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openness to the world 
is constituted existentially by attunement of a state-of-being". 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 176) 
Understanding: Dasein in its projection 
For Heidegger understanding is the mode in which Dasein can overtake 
his thrown existence of the state-of-being. It implies the ability to stand Dasein's 
thrownness, in the sense that it can be actively developed. Understanding is not a 
property of Dasein, but is rooted in Dasein's 'ability to be'; it is a basic mode of 
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Dasein's being. "Dasein' says Heidegger, "is in every case what it can be and in 
the way in which it is its possibility". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 183) Understanding 
is not merely a theoretical grasp of Dasein's possibilities but a capacity to 
achieve these possibilities, Heidegger says "understanding is the existent being 
of Dasein's own potentiality for being; and it is so in such a way that this being 
discloses in itself (himself) what its (his) being is capable of." (Heidegger, 1973, 
p. 184) 
Heidegger's account of authenticity and inauthenticity is largely based on 
a fundamental crisis. This crisis is, the crisis of the forgetfulness of the question 
of Being. He equates the forgetfulness with 'inauthenticity' while on the other 
hand, the overcoming and recollection of this forgetfulness is 'authenticity'. In 
the other words, the crisis is connected to the inauthenticity of forgetfulness and 
the overcoming of the crisis to the authenticity of recollection. But one cannot 
simply assert that, on the one hand, authenticity is somehow a life without crisis, 
a life of no forgetfulness, a life of pure self-possession, and that, on the other 
hand, inauthenticity is a life of crisis, separation and distance of the self from the 
true self. From the very outset of Being and Time, Heidegger makes it clear that 
authenticity and inauthenticity are not descriptions of moral states. Nor does the 
inauthenticity of Dasein signify a 'lesser' or a 'lower' degree of Being. Both 
authenticity and inauthenticity are possible ways for Dasein to be in the world. 
Dasein as to-be-in-the-world, is inclined to be content with things, lose itself 
among the things of the world, forget itself as that unique being which has a 
special opeimess to Being. As Dasein is a being of fallenness, it will never fully 
escape from this tendency. At certain moments however, Dasein obtains a sense 
of the uniqueness of its own being, of the finite opeimess to Being that Dasein is. 
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It is this self comprehension which marks the overcoming of the crisis of 
forgetfulness. 
The understanding of the tradition as both triumph and defeat is not 
merely an accidental two-sidedness which could just as well have been a one-
sidedness. Rather, this two-sidedness accounts for the way the tradition must be 
in order to be a tradition. If, there were only loss and forgetfulness of Being, 
there would indeed be no tradition of questioning about Being, for then nothing 
at all, including both the question and the tradition, could be. But at the same 
time, if there were no forgetfulness of Being, there would also be no tradition. 
Thus, the forgetfulness is constitutive for gaining a sense of self It is essential 
for being a self 
In personal life, forgetfulness can be said to open a space for the 
possibility of personal identity. It creates a 'gap' in the person. But it is this 
'gap' which allows the possible sense of continuity from which arises the sense 
of being a self In the tradition of reflection on Being, there is also what 
Heidegger calls a forgetfulness, but this forgetfulness can be seen as playing a 
'creative' role similar to its function in personal life. Heidegger calls this 
forgetfulness a part of the "richness of the tradition of metaphysics". (Heidegger, 
1977, BW, p. 133) This forgetting consists primarily of an overlooking of the 
difference between beings and Being, a forgetting that the Being of beings is not 
itself a being. It is a forgetting of what Heidegger calls the ontological 
difference. 
For both Husserl and Heidegger, the crisis is not something new which 
has suddenly come upon us. But this crisis has a history. For Husserl, the key 
player in this history has been modem science with its variant forms of 
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positivism, naturalism, and objectivism which uhimately can be seen as 
impoverished versions of true, scientific rationality. Heidegger too is critical of 
the out sided standpoints of science, but suggests that in order to understand this 
one sidedness, one must come to terms with the history of ontology, with the 
history of the questioning of Being. These differing histories can be said to lead 
to different crises. For Husserl, the crisis is ultimately one of science, of 
certainty, of knowing, of the moral obligation to know what one does and why 
one does what one does. For Heidegger, the crisis is not ethico-epistemological, 
but ontological, having to do with a forgetfulness of the ways in which Being 
itself is open to questioning. 
Heidegger affirms that the tradition of ontology has both loss and gain, 
the story of laudable efforts and incorrect formulations, a forgetting and a 
recollecting of the question towards the sense of Being. The tradition is not 
simply the continual story of decay from a proper formulation of the question, 
nor is it the story of continual progress. It is both ground of possibility for 
recollection of the question towards being and impediment to that questioning. 
The tradition is both a point of departure for the questioning of Being, but also 
the departure from such authentic questioning. 
The life of Dasein is largely one of indifference, it is life in the tranquility 
and inauthenticity of the They. On account of its fallenness, Dasein has a 
tendency to dwell in the They, in an indifference to the questioning of Being 
which is its own most possibility. This inauthenticity covers itself up, it is truly a 
forgetting, a self-forgetting, a forgetting that there is even such a thing as 
forgetfulness. From the standpoint of authenticity, this forgetting is revealed for 
what it is, as a forgetting of possibilities, as a forgetting of one's own 
206 
Chapter VIII Martin Heidegger: Awakening From Lostness in the They 
possibilities, as inauthenticity. What becomes evident in authenticity is that life 
in the everyday is inauthentic, that it is life in the 'they' and not fully Dasein's 
own. 
Falling : The inauthentic existence : Heidegger characterizes falling as the 
'inauthenticity'. But before going to deal with the nature of the fallen Dasein, it 
is necessary to ask the question of the 'who' (wer) of Dasein in this fallen state. 
On this point Heidegger says: "The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not 
oneself.... Not some people...,and not the sum of all. The 'who' is the neuter, 
the 'they'. (Heidegger, 1973, p. 64) The German term Dasman is often 
rendered in English as 'the one', 'the they', the they self and 'the anonymous 
one'. Though inauthentic, 'the they' belongs to Dasein's essential constitution). 
In section twenty seven of Being and Time (Sein and Zeit) Heidegger offers a 
remarkably detailed analysis of the they' in its inauthentic relations to others. He 
attributes many characteristics to the 'they'. 
Distantiality: In distantiality the everyday Dasein stands in subjection to others 
and the 'they' determines the everyday possibilities for Dasein. Here Dasein is 
not his self, but is taken over by the 'they'. Distantiality consists in Dasein's 
'being-with-one-another'. It dissolves one's own identity completely into the 
being of the other, to such an extent that the distinction between the other and 
oneself is destroyed and, thereby, the total control of the 'they' is established. 
Thus, Dasein takes pleasure reads, judges and is shocked based on the standards 
set by the they, says Heidegger. 
Mediocrity: Distentiality is found on the second characteristics of the fallenness 
that is 'mediocrity'. Having brought about the loss of identity of Dasein, by 
distantiality the they maintains this loss in mediocrity. Here, everything 
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exceptional and extraordinary is done away with. Every type of priority is 
suppressed and all possibilities of Dasein are leveled down. 
Publicness: All these features - distantiality and mediocrity - together 
constitutes the third characteristics of the 'they' which Heidegger calls 
publicness. In publicness, all genuineness and speciality that essentially belongs 
to Dasein is bloated out and obscure. Only the superficial in things are touched 
upon. The 'they' controls the way in which the world is interpreted. It presents 
every judgement and decides upon it and takes away Dasein's responsibility. 'It 
was always the 'they' who did it, and it can be said that it has been no more". 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 165) Thus, in publicness Dasein is fully disburdened by 
the 'they', and in this disburdening of responsibilities he finds a sense of 
security. Besides, the 'they' constantly accommodates Dasein by the 
disburdening and retaining subtly its 'stubborn domination'. The net result is, 
Heidegger says, "everyone is the other and no one is himself. This involvement 
in the publicness threatens to level all decisions to the lowest common 
denominator of what is acceptable and well adjusted. It restricts "the possible 
options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the 
respectable - that which is fitting and proper". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 239) There 
is a firmly established tendency, then, to go along with the flow, content with 
"satisfying the easily handled rules and public norms or the 'they'." (Heidegger, 
1973, p. 334) And thereby being disburdened of all "responsibility" for 
ourselves. "Dasein, as a they-self, gets 'lived' by the commonsense ambiguity of 
that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has already 
made its decision". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 345) The result is a "dimming down of 
the possible as such". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 329) Inauthenfic Dasein is dispersed 
into a multiplicity of everyday routines, drifting with the latest fashions, 
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tranquility assured that "everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are 
open". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 222) "This 'leveling dovm' of all possibilities 
obliterates the kind of two-tiered sense of life that lets us distinguish higher from 
lower, crucial from trivial, central from peripheral. Taking the familiar demands 
of the public world as of consummate importance - as 'the only game in town' -
we can become highly effective strategic calculators, convinced that everything 
is possible, yet lacking any overarching sense of what makes life worth living". 
(Guignon, 1993, p. 227) 
So far as the nature of the state of fallenness is concerned, it signifies 
Dasein's state of absorption in or immersion in the world of his concern. 
Fallenness consists mostly in being lost in the publicness of the 'they'. It is the 
losing sight of the truth about one's own being, or a dimming of one's 
understanding of oneself, of one's possibilities and limitations. In other words, 
fallenness is a state in which one fails to grasp one's being with transparency and 
clarity. Falling is a state in which, not only has Dasein lost his vision about 
himself, but also he understands himself in terms of others. One hardly realizes 
that one's thoughts, feelings, beliefs and ideals are shared by others even though 
they might appear to be one's own. In fact, Dasein begins to guide his life in fiill 
conformity with everything the other expects of him. Thus, in falling, Dasein 
loses his individuality, i.e., being-one's self and allows his life world to be 
guided by the 'crowd' or the 'impersonal' self 
There are four conditions that belong to the state of falling; temptation, 
tranquilization, alienation and entanglement. 
Temptation: With Dasein's being caught up in the publicness and losing itself 
in the 'they', it falls into groundlessness. This domination of the 'they' becomes 
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for Dasein a constant temptation to be led into falling. Since Dasein is constantly 
tempted towards falling, he is gradually led to believe that in such a state he is 
secure and genuine and that the fiilfillment of his possibilities are guaranteed, 
Tranquilization : The supposition that Dasein's life is genuine and he is 'in the 
best of order' brings to Dasein tranquility. Heidegger says, "Falling 'being-in-
the-world' which tempts itself, is at the same time tranquilizing". (Heidegger, 
1973, p. 222) 
Alienation: In tempting and tranquilization, the falling is aggravated as Dasein 
is not at peace or at rest. As falling becomes aggravated, Dasein is moving 
towards an alienation in which his own potentiality -for-being is hidden from 
him. Heidegger states that "Falling being-in-the-world is not only tempting and 
tranquilizing, it is at the same time alienating". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 222) 
Entanglement: Alienation does not tear down Dasein from itself, but rather 
closes off from Dasein his authentic possibilities. It results in Dasein falling into 
an entanglement with himself 
Though, in falling, Dasein takes a 'downward plunge' out of himself into 
himself into his groundlessness, he is under the impression that his way of 
living is an 'ascending', as the truth about his own true self is hidden from him. 
Heidegger uses 'whirl' (wirbel) as the symbol to indicate Dasein's falling. In 
falling Dasein is 'thrown' into the bottomless living of everydayness and 
continues to be in this thrown state, totally whirled by the 'they'. 
The Motive of Dasein's Fallenness : Having considered the nature of falling, it 
is necessary to point out as to why Dasein has the tendency to fall and remain 
inauthentic in his everyday existence. The motive behind Dasein's tendency to 
falling, Heidegger says, is that the flight from Dasein's own self and absorption 
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in entities of the world and with others is due to Dasein's experience of his own 
being as inherently dissatisfying. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is the ground of 
all his encounters; but this ground itself is experienced as groundless. Heidegger 
refers to this groundless and unsettling dimension of Dasein's being-in-the-
world as guih. Thus, this basic guilt, for Heidegger, is the motive of Dasein's 
falling. 
Heidegger does not use the term guilt in its ordinary usage. But he uses it 
in a more original and ontological sense. 'Being guilty' is a mode of Dasein and 
this notion must be freed from the moral and legal concepts. The notion of guilt, 
for Heidegger, is not something emerging from the violation of moral norms or 
an offence committed, but, on the contrary, the latter itself is grounded in the 
more fundamental 'not' or 'nullity', that is characteristic of Dasein's being, viz., 
guilt. To quote Heidegger: "Being-guilty does not first result from an 
indebtness..., but on the contrary, indebtness becomes possible only on the basis 
of primordial being guilty". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 329) thus, in the notion of 
guilt, taken in the primordial sense, lies the character of the 'not' or 'nullity'. 
Therefore, guilt is something that fundamentally belongs to Dasein. As 
Heidegger says, "Being guilty belongs to Dasein's being and signifies the null 
being-the-basis of a nullity". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 353) 
In order to understand guilt in this original sense Heidegger analyses the 
two existential limitations of Dasein. These two existential limitations are the 
two different ways in which Dasein's being is dissatisfying to him and lead 
Dasein into falling. 
The first existential limitation Heidegger speaks of is Dasein's facticity or 
thrownness. It refers to the way Dasein already finds himself in the world, i.e., in 
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a particular complex of equipmental system. Dasein finds himself in the world, 
that he has not choosen. The significant aspect of this existential limitation 
consists in Dasein's inability to be his own ground or to change the state-of-
being into which he is thrown. Dasein must choose the situation in which he is 
thrown and make the best of it. Heidegger states that "As existent, it (Dasein) 
never comes back behind its (his) it (he)-is-and-has-to-be' fi-om its (his) 'being-
its (his)-self and leads it (him) into the there". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 330) This 
ontically and factically implies that one has no control on the situation that went 
before his birth, early growth and development of skills, as most of these are 
determined for him by his thrownness. It means that Dasein never has power 
over his ownmost being from the ground-up, and he is never the cause of his 
own being. This thrownness, as an inability in Dasein to generate a world for 
himself and as an inability of Dasein to choose the basis responsible for his own 
choices, constitutes the first existential limitation in Dasein. 
The second existential limitation consists of the limitations that constitute 
these choices themselves. In choosing one of the possibilities, Dasein has to give 
up the other. Dasein has no fi-eedom to choose all possibilities. By nature, choice 
involves preferring one alternative to another. So, this inevitable preclusion of 
various possibilities, which is inherent in the nature of choosing, is the second 
existential limitation that belongs to Dasein's projective way of being. 
Heidegger states that "the nullity (existential limitation) we have in mind 
belongs to Dasein being-free for its (his) existential possibilities. Freedom, 
however, is only in the choice of one possibility - that is, in tolerating one's not 
having choosen the others and one's not being able to choose them". (Heidegger, 
1973, p. 331) 
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These two existential limitations - Dasein's thrown projective 
understanding on which he cannot ground himself and the limitation that is 
imposed in Dasein's freedom to his own possibilities - together constitutes the 
guilt, in its primordial sense. Thus, guilt is the essential 'lack' in Dasein's nature 
which he does not want to face up to in his everyday existence. 
The existential limitations which constitute Dasein's guilt are essential 
conditions of his being-in-the-world which disturbs Dasein. Falling is nothing 
else but a flight from the recognition of these disturbing conditions. Dasein is 
always aware of his guilt; but in the special state-of-being called anxiety guilt, 
the motive of falling, gets explicitly and directly recognized. The anxious Dasein 
feels uncanny and not-at-home because, in anxiety he comes into face-to-face 
contact with these existential limitations which constitute the guilt and which are 
essential to Dasein being challenged by his own guilt. In this situation, Dasein 
tries to get away from himself In other words, Dasein flees from the direct 
recognition of these contingencies of his being, viz., his fundamental 
groundlessness, and drifts into everydayness. Falling, thus, amounts to Dasein's 
way of avoiding an existential grasp of his guilt and an attempt to maintain his 
immersion among entities and others by merely preoccupying himself in 
existential possibilities in a given equipmental system. So, in falling, Dasein not 
only fails to face his true being, but also whole heartedly identifies himself with 
the particular situation and accepts it as the true reality by ignoring all other 
alternative ends and choices. 
Heidegger says that Dasein looses out on being his genuine self on 
account of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity which happens to be the three 
modes responsible for the fall of Dasein. 
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Heidegger regards curiosity Dasein's as attitude towards the world and 
entities within it in the fallen state. This is a tendency towards 'seeing'. In 
curiosity, Dasein allows himself to be carried away by the looks of the world. 
Here one sees for the sake of seeing, and what is seen is not seen in order to 
understand Curiosity "concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand 
what is seen... but just in order to see". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 216) Curious 
Dasein leaps from one new thing to another. What is aimed at, in seeing, is not 
the truth of reality, but just novelty for the sake of novelty. Heidegger says, "It 
seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty". (Heidegger, 
1973, p. 216) Therefore, curiosity is characterized by a 'not abiding' or 'not-
tarrying' along-side that is closest to Dasein. In curiosity Dasein is restless about 
novehies, constantly seeking excitement and changing encounters. This, in turn, 
leads him to continuous distraction and dissipation, thereby, always scattering 
into ever new possibilities. Being caught up in distraction, Dasein loses the sense 
of wonder or beholding the world with admiration. Curious Dasein, by his 
inability to dwell and to wonder about, and by his constant distraction, lives a 
life of 'never-dwelling anywhere', as curiosity takes Dasein everywhere and yet 
nowhere. Curiosity uproots Dasein in his genuine being. Thus, what is 
superficially seen in curiosity is expressed or given out in idle talk. 
The German term Gerede is often translated as 'chatter', 'gossip', 
'prattle' and idle talk. It comes about as a result of one's gossiping or passing the 
word alone. In idle talk what is talked about is heard only in a random manner, 
but not understood. In other words one is not fiilly involved with the content of 
the talk, but rather superficially and vaguely hears what is said. Thus, in this 
mode, speech becomes its own end, and diction, pronunciation and the style of 
the speaking becomes the criteria to decide about the genuineness and relevance 
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of the speech. It involves a constant repetition. Even though it is superficial and 
ungrounded, by repetition it appears to be authoritative. It is not just limited to 
vocal chatter, but consists also of a written form which is based on the hearsay 
that feeds on superficial reading. Though groundless, idle talk easily becomes 
public and hence is often taken for genuine discourse. It closes off what it 
pretends to disclose and thereby discourages any new enquiry, understanding, 
interpretation and communication. 
Ambiguity is closely related to curiosity and idle talk. It takes away the 
genuiness in both of these modes. It mars the truth of not only the world, and 
Dasein's being-with-others, but also gives a false impression of Dasein's own 
understanding of himself. Ambiguous Dasein finds himself in the state of 
publicness and is unable to decide whether what has been disclosed is genuine or 
not. Being caught up in the whirl of daily activity, fallen Dasein is no more 
'straight-forward'. As ambiguity takes hold of Dasein, no genuine knowledge is 
possible, as everything is based on hearsay and without taking into consideration 
what is really happening. Ambiguity also dominates Dasein's being-with-one-
another. Everyone fixes his eye on the other watching how the other will 
comport himself. ' Being-together-with-the other' is characterized by a tense 
watching of one another, and by an ambiguous spying on each other, which 
involves a mutual over-hearing. Heidegger remarks: "under the mask of 'for one 
another' an 'against one another' is in play" (Heidegger, 1973, p. 219) in the 
mode of ambiguity. All these three modes constitute Dasein's falling, and they 
are interconnected in their being. Heidegger says: 
"Dasein is always ambiguously 'there' - that is to say in that 
public disclosedness of being-with-one-another whose the 
loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 
'things moving' where, in an everyday manner, everything 
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(and at the bottom nothing) is happening". (Heidegger, 1973, 
pp. 218-219) 
The sole aim of the whole analysis is to work out the question about the 
meaning of Being in general according to Heidegger. For this purpose, an 
analysis of a privileged entity - Dasein, for which alone the question of Being is 
relevant - has been taken up. The preparatory analysis of the everyday Dasein 
depends upon a primordial interpretation, by considering its hermeneutical 
situation or fore-structure-Dasein in its totality and authenticity. So, the analysis 
now, must be directed in such a way that it brings to light existentially, how 
Dasein is approached and analysed as a whole and in what way can it be 
authentic - i.e., Dasein in its 'totality' and 'authenticity'. Heidegger unfolds 
these aspects of 'totality' and 'authenticity', developing them on a two level 
interpretation: on an ontologico-existential and an ontico-existential level, in the 
analysis of death and conscience respectively. 
The Ontological Dimension is a discovery of death and anticipation. In 
order to arrive at 'anticipation' as the authentic Being-towards-death, it is 
necessary to carry out the Heideggerian analysis of death from different points of 
view dealt with as follows: 
Death as a 'Not yet': A Preliminary Conception 
Care forms the unity of Dasein's structural whole. In terms of its primary 
constituent, 'existentiality' or 'ahead-of-itself, Dasein comports itself towards 
its potentiality-for-Being, Although, this 'ahead-of-itself remains hidden, it has 
a thorough impact on shaping Dasein's Being. Since 'care' is the Being of 
Dasein, and 'ahead-of-itself is an essential constituent of care, Dasein cannot be 
without an 'ahead-of-itself. Thus, Heidegger points out that, there is in Dasein, 
as long as it exists, something still outstanding, something which has not yet 
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become actualized. Once the 'ahead-of-itself is liquidated, the Being of Dasein 
is annihilated. Hence as long as Dasein is, it will never have reached its 
wholeness; and the gain of 'wholeness' amounts to the loss of its to-be-in-the- * 
world. This is the paradox that"... if Dasein is alive it is always incomplete, and 
if dead it has ceased to be Dasein." (Waterhouse, 1981, p. 95) 
This constant 'lack of totality' in Dasein comes to an end with death, 
which is the not yet realized something, the still outstanding. To put it in 
Heidegger's words, "to be still outstanding means that what belongs together is 
not yet all together." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 286) 
Thus, according to Heidegger, the ultimate 'not yet' of Dasein is its death. 
With the actualization of 'not-yet', i.e., once the 'not-yet' is no more, there is no 
more a Dasein. Hence as long as Dasein is, it will have never reached its 
wholeness. Death as the 'not-yet' is already always present as soon as and as 
long as Dasein is. As death is the ultimate 'not-yet', Dasein is essentially Being-
towards-death. It constantly faces the possibility of the impossibility of itself 
Death is the ultimate end - an 'end' not in the sense of the term of a process as 
in the cases of 'the rain ends' (no more), 'the road ends' (no further), 'the 
painting ends' (fmishedness) etc. But for Dasein ending refers to the 'not-yet' 
that is 'already' present. "Like Tolstoy who holds in his The Death of Ivan 
Illitch, that death is something that dwells in us." (Puthenpurakkal, 1987, p. 40) 
Heidegger asserts that Dasein as already its end, is Being-towards-the-end. 
Death is Dasein's way of Being. As Being-towards-its-death, Dasein is Being-
towards-its-limit. Thus, as applied to Dasein, Heidegger uses the term 'ending' 
in a different meaning. To quote Heidegger: 
"... Just as Dasein is already its not yet, and is its 'not yet' 
constantly as long as it is, it is akeady its end too. The 
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'ending' which we have in view when we speak of death, 
does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end [Zu-Ende-Sein] 
but a Bring-towards-the-end [Sein zum ende] of this entity. 
Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is 
'as soon as man comes to Hfe, he is at once old enough to 
die." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 289) 
Dying is a unique experience. Because I cannot experience my own 'not-
yet' or death. Since in the very act of experiencing it, I cease to be. As I have not 
so far experienced my own death, others death becomes all the more important 
to me. "Dasein can thus gain an experience of death, all the more so because 
Dasein is essentially Being with others". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 281) From the 
experience of the death of the others, Dasein realizes it "as a change-over of an 
entity from Dasein's kind of being (or life) to no-longer-Dasein". (Heidegger, 
1973, p. 281) In this sense the entity, the corpse which still remains, is not 
merely a corporeal thing like any other entity but "this something which is 
present-at-hand-and-no-more is 'more' than a lifeless material thing. In it we 
encounter something unalive, which has lost its life". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 282) 
Thus, death reveals itself as a 'loss' only as experienced by those who remain 
behind. We have no possibility of access to the loss-of-Being which the dying 
man experiences. Hence the death of others is not something that we experience 
genuinely. We have to die our own death. No body can die for me. There is no 
substitution. As Heidegger puts it "No one can take the other's dying away from 
him". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 284) So, 'mineness' and 'existence' are ontologically 
constitutive of death. Death is something that every Dasein has to take upon 
itself. 
Death: Inauthentically considered: Before going deep into the analysis of 
death in its existential and authentic interpretation, it is necessary draw a contrast 
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as to how death is pubUcly interpreted by the 'they', the inauthentic everyday 
Dasein'. 
For the inauthentic Dasein, death is a 'mishap', a 'case of death' that is 
constantly occurring. Death is taken for granted as an ordinary, inconspicuous 
occurrence Uke any other happening in the world. For him, someone or other 
dies, it matters little, who dies. This attitude of inauthentic Dasein towards death 
can be expressed in the words of Heidegger like this: "Someone will die one of 
these days, but right now, it has nothing to do with me'. When I say, 'one 
dies...', I do not mean anybody; that means, the 'one' is the 'nobody'". 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 253) The inauthentic Dasein tends to consider death as an 
event of a moment in the distant future. 
As constantly facing death, Dasein is thrown back into its very existence, 
its genuine self As falling Dasein tries to conceal this thrown possibility and 
lives in an imagined ignorance of it. Dasein falls away from its ownmost 
possibility. The inauthentic Dasein is constantly tempted to cover up from itself 
death as a distinctive possibility of its own. The 'they' keeps on talking to the 
dying. For them there is a constant 'tranquilization' about death both for the 
dying and for those 'consoling them'. The 'one' does not permit us the courage 
for anxiety in the face of death. The courage for anxiety in the face of death is 
done away with by creating a respectful public acceptance that to think of death 
is a sign of cowardly fear in the face of an oncoming event. Even this fear is 
passed off as a weakness, and what remains, is only an indifferent tranquility as 
to the fact that one dies. "The cultivation of such a 'superior' indifference 
alienates Dasein from its own most, non-relational potentiality-for-Being". 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 298) 
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The Existential-Ontological Conception of Death 
We can define the full existential - ontological conception of death in the 
words of Heidegger: 
"Death as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility 
- non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be 
outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the being of this 
entity towards its end". (Heidegger, 1973, p. 303) 
For Heidegger Being-towards-death is a structural determination which 
serves the function of gathering Dasein into its total existential unity. Being 
towards death is grounded in 'care' which is the 'ahead-of-itself that primarily 
makes Being towards the end possible. So, if death belongs to the very being of 
Dasein, it must be possible to interpret it in terms of its fundamental structures 
namely, existentiality, facticity and fallenness. 
Death is a 'not-yet', a still 'outstanding', which has the character of 
something towards which Dasein comports itself And at the same time "Death 
is not something not-yet present at hand; nor is it that which is ultimately still 
outstanding but which has been reduced to a minimum. Death is something that 
stands before us - something impending." (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 293-294) The 
death which impends does not have the kind of being like that of present at hand, 
or ready-to-hand, but "It is a possibility of Being (Seinsmoglichkeit) that Dasein 
itself has taken over in every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 294) Dasein's 'to-be-in 
the world' is at stake, since 'its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-
to-be-there." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 294) When Dasein stands before itself as this 
possibility all its relations to the other Daseins are done away with. This is the 
utmost possibility that Dasein alone has to face, and it cannot be outstripped. As 
Heidegger puts it "Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of 
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Dasein." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 294) Thus, when interpreted in terms of Dasein's 
essential disclosedness to itself as 'ahead-of-itself, "death reveals itself as that 
possibility which is one's own most, which is non-relational and which is not to 
be outstripped." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 294) 
Heidegger says death as a possibility is not something that Dasein exists, 
it has already been thrown into this possibility." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 295) 
Thrownness into death is revealed in a more primordial manner in the basic 
state-of-mind that is anxiety. Death shows itself as that in the face of which 
Dasein has anxiety. 
"Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety 'in the face of that 
potentiality-for-Being which is one's ownmost, non-
relational and not to be outstripped. That in the face of which 
one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world itself that about which 
one has this anxiety is simply Dasein's potentiality-for-
Being." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 295) 
Anxiety in the face of death is not same as fear in the face of one's 
demise. Heidegger uses death (Tod) in an existential sense, whereas demise 
(Ableben), in the sense of a biological termination of life. As factically existing, 
Dasein is disclosed by anxiety as thrown into Being-towards-death. 
Being-towards-death belongs essentially to Dasein's thrownness. But 
mostly Dasein in its everydayness tries to conceal it, and lives, so to say, in 
blissful ignorance. Factical ignorance or forgetfiilness of death is no proof that 
Being - towards - death does not belong to Dasein universally. On the contrary, 
it shows that "Proximately and for the most part Dasein covers up its ownmost 
Being-towards-death, fleeing in the face of it. Factically Dasein is dying as long 
as it exists, but proximally and for the most part it does so by way of falling;" 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 295) because it gets totally absorbed in the world of its 
concern. 
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Thus, existentiality, facticity and fallenness are constitutive of an 
existential conception of death. Death belongs to each of the structures 
separately and to all of them as a unity. "As regards its ontological possibility, 
dying is grounded in care." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 296) 
Anticipation "The Authentic Being-towards - Death 
Being-towards-death is a Being towards a possibility - a distinctive 
possibility of Dasein itself 'Being towards a possibility' signifies, 'to be out for 
something possible' in order to make it actual. "In concemfully Being out for 
something possible, there is tendency to annihilate the possibility of the possible 
by making it available to us." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 305) This cannot be done in 
the case of death, since the annihilation or the actualization of this possibility 
would mean the annihilation of oneself 
There are two modes in which Dasein comports itself to something 
possible. These are expecting and anticipation. 
Expecting: To expect something involves a knowledge with regard to whether, 
when and how it will actually be present-at-hand. Expecting does not mean an 
occasional looking forward to the possible actualization of the possibility, but it, 
as Heidegger says, "is essentially a waiting for that actualization (ein Warten auf 
diese)." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 306) In expecting one tries to leap away from the 
possible and to get a foothold in the actual. By expecting, the possibility is 
drawn to the actual; and it is for this actuality that what is expected is expected. 
Anticipation: Unlike expecting, the authentic and concemfiil looking forward 
to Dasein's own most possibility is called 'anticipation of this possibility. It is 
not a passively 'waiting for' the actualization of a possibility. But it has to be 
understood in the sense of actively and constantly rurming headlong into one's 
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ultimate and ownmost possibility, that is death. And Being-towards-death is 
meaningful, only with this notion of 'anticipation'. By anticipation or running 
ahead into a possibility, we come closer to the possibility. To quote Heidegger: 
"The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards 
death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything 
actual. The more unveiledly this possibility gets imderstood, 
the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as 
the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all." 
(Heidegger, 1973, pp. 306-307) 
Anticipation of this possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being, since it reveals that distinctive possibility, in which its 
very Being is the issue. This ownmost possibility is non-relational as well, 
because I alone have to face it. It is in anticipation that the non-relational 
character of death is fully revealed, by individualizing Dasein down to itself. To 
quote Heidegger: 
"Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, 'as' 
concemful Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it 
projects itself upon its own most potentiality-for-Being, 
rather than upon the possibility of the 'they-self." 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 308) 
In anticipation, Dasein becomes free for its own death. By being free for 
one's own death, one is freed from one's lostness in those possibilities that may 
accidentally thrust themselves upon one. It is by being so liberated, that one can 
authentically understand and choose that possibility, which is not to be 
outstripped. Only in the anticipation of this possibility, do I get the certainty 
about death. Death as a possibility is disclosed, because it is made possible in 
anticipation; and to be certain of what has been disclosed, entails that one should 
anticipate. Nothing can be more certain than one's ovm death. But, to be 
genuinely holding death to be true and certain has to show itself m the full 
authenticity of one's existence, and not merely in an occasional behaviour. The 
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certainty of death goes with the indefiniteness as to its 'when'. "In anticipation 
the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising 
out of its own 'there'." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 310) 
This constant threat is genuinely disclosed in an understanding, 
accompanied by the basic state-of-mind, 'anxiety', in which "Dasein finds itself 
face to face with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence." 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 310) "Death is the presence of the 'not' in the Being of 
man." (Puthenpurakkal, 1987, p. 49) Since Dasein is utterly individualized in 
anticipation, the authentic Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety. 
The characterization of authentic Being-towards-death can be summed up 
as follows: 
"Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, 
and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, 
primarily unsupported by concemful solicitude, but of being 
itself, rather, in an impassioned FREEDOM TOWARDS 
DEATH - a freedom which has been released from the 
illusions of the 'they' and which is factical, certain of itself, 
and anxious." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 311) 
In anticipating my final and irrevocable limit of Being-in-the-world, I am 
made to realize that all my actions and moments of life are destined to the same 
all dissolving end - that my ontic exercise of fi-eedom is limited by my fi-eedom 
towards the ontological possibility. "To live authentically is to project all one's 
possibilities on to the screen of death, which is man's possibility par excellence." 
(Puthenpurakkal, 1987, p. 49) 
Conscience and Resoluteness: The Ontic Dimension 
The authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is made ontologically 
possible for Dasein by its freedom toward or anticipation of death. This 
ontological possibility of Dasein's totality and authenticity has to be verified and 
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realized ontically. Heidegger looks into this question by an analysis of 
conscience. His analysis of conscience is different from the traditional 
philosophy that has thematized it. For him, conscience, as such, does not pertain 
to the realm of knowledge, but to the realm of existence. It is an existential, 
which belongs to Dasein in his concrete being-in-world. His analysis traces 
conscience back to its existential structures which make it an existential of 
Dasein. 
Conscience : A Call - Conscience is a structural mode of Dasein's being, which 
manifests in Dasein's factual existence. It is not a present-at-hand fact or event 
which occasionally occurs and to the justification of which inductive empirical 
proofs might be given. Conscience is revealed as a call. The call of conscience 
has the character of an appeal to Dasein, to be his own inner most potentiality-
for-being. To this call of conscience, there is the corresponding hearing or 
listening. The inauthentic Dasein, losing himself in the publicness and the idle 
talk of the 'they' fails to listen to his own self, and listens to the 'anonymous 
they'. The only way of freeing oneself from the self-forgetful giving of Dasein to 
the 'they' is to listen to the voice of his own conscience. The call of conscience, 
by its appeal, breaks Dasein's listening to the 'they' and calls him out of this 
anonymous mode of existence. 
The call of conscience has the mode of discourse (Rede). Just as in 
discourse the vocal expression is not essential to Dasein, so also the call of 
conscience is often a soundless call which is a giving-to-understanding. The call 
is unaffected by curiosity and idle talk, causes a jolt and an unsettling shake up 
in the one who wants to be brought back from the sway of the 'they'. 
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Thus, according to Heidegger, the call of conscience is of the mode of 
discourse. It has a number of characteristics. 
Firstly, what is spoken about, in the call of conscience, is the average 
everyday Dasein himself. The call itself is not vague or indifferent, but is 
presented in a way that Dasein, though caught up in his everyday care, can 
understand. 
Secondly, what is appealed in the call of conscience is not what Dasein is 
expected to be, able to do, has achieved or stood for in public everyday life; not 
is it the self, which can become for itself an object of self-criticism and 
introspection, and which is separate from the outer world and caught up in 
analytically gazing at psychical conditions. The call of conscience passes over 
all these and appeals only to that self which is in the mode of being-in-the-world. 
Thirdly, the appeal in the call of conscience, i.e., the content of the call is 
strictly nothing. The call does not assert anything or give any information; 
neither is it a soliloquy. But it is the summoning of the self, i.e., to his ownmost 
potentiality-for-being-his-self In other words, what the call gives Dasein to 
understand is the fundamental groundlessness of his being-in-the-world, viz., 
Dasein's guilt. 
Fourthly, the call of conscience does not show itself in loud talk, but in 
the mode of silence and in it alone. The fact that what is called is not expressed 
in words or spoken aloud, does not make this call of conscience indefinite or 
mysterious, but only point to the fact that 'what is given to understand' by the 
call does not depend on external articulation or communication. Neither does it 
make the call of conscience and its appeal less effective, because often silence is 
more affective than loud talk. 
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Finally, though there is an apparent vagueness regarding the content of 
the call, what the call discloses is clear and unambiguous, viz., the direction of 
the self must take to move from the 'they' and to be 'authentic'. 
Conscience: The Call of Care: The content of the call or what the call gives to 
understand is Dasein's fundamental groundlessness, i.e., his primordial guilt. 
Now the question we must ask our selves is the 'who' of this call or the caller of 
the call of conscience. Heidegger holds that the caller of the call of the 
conscience conceals himself in a peculiar indeterminateness and indefmability. 
The caller cannot be known, as entities in the world are known, by name status, 
origin or repute. There is nothing specific that we can observe or say about the 
caller. One who calls holds himself aloof so that his identity cannot be known. 
The only characterization that we can give him is that he calls. We may say that 
Dasein is the caller and that he calls 'himself to himself. Even if this is so, there 
is some peculiar impersonal character about the call, because the call comes 
unexpectedly, unwished for and independent of Dasein himself Dasein himself 
never plans, neither is prepared for, nor voluntarily performs this call. At the 
same time it is clear that the call does not come from some other Dasein in the 
world. Heidegger states that "The call comes from me and yet beyond me and 
over me." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 322) So, there are some who hold the view that 
the call comes from some alien power, viz., God, while others explain away 
conscience in terms of some biological theory. Heidegger does not approve of 
such theories because the basic assumption behind them is that whatever exists 
must be present-at-hand reality. According to Heidegger, only the analysis of the 
existential constitution of this entity who calls can give us the clue to 
understanding him who does the calling. 
227 
Chapter Mil Martin Heidegger: Awakening From Lostness in the They 
Heidegger asserts that in thrown mode of existence, the 'why' of Dasein's 
thrownness is hidden from him, while 'that-it-(he)-is' is disclosed to Dasein. The 
fact is that Dasein's thrownness is revealed to himself in the state-of-being. 
Dasein often reacts to it by fleeing, because it brings Dasein face-to-face with his 
isolated being-in-the world, which makes him feel not-at-home. Anxiety is the 
most fundamental state-of-being, which reveals Dasein fundamentally as the 
thrown object. Heidegger suggests that the caller of conscience is this anxious 
Dasein in his not-at-wholeness. To quote Heidegger: 
"The caller is Dasein in its (his) uncanniness: primordial, 
thrown being-in-the-world as the 'not-at-home' - the bore 
'that-it (he) - is' in the 'nothing of the world'. The caller is 
unfamiliar to the everyday the self; it is something like an 
alien voice." (Heidegger, 1973, p. 321) 
Thus, existentially understood, the call of conscience sees to it that it 
constantly makes Dasein feel 'not-at-home' and anxious about his existence, 
thereby posing a constant threat to Dasein's lostness in the 'they' and his 
forgetfulness of himself in his everydayness. Thus, the call of conscience shows 
itself as the call of care. To quote Heidegger: 
"Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is 
Dasein, which in its [his] thrownness [in his being-already-
in], is anxious about its [his] potentiality-for-being. The one 
to whom the appeal is made is the very same Dasein, 
summoned to its [his] ownmost potentiality-for-being [ahead-
of-himself...] Dasein is falling into the 'they' [in being-
already-alongside the world of concern], and it is summoned 
out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience - that 
is, conscience itself - has its ontological possibility in the 
fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its [his] being, is care." 
(Heidegger, 1973, pp. 322-323) 
Resoluteness: The readiness of Dasein to be called to its essential Being-guilty 
is termed 'resoluteness' (entschlossenheit]. It is the authentic response by Dasein 
to the presence of nullity in its Being, In the call of conscience Dasein is made to 
228 
Chapter VIII Martin Heidegger: Awakening From Lostness in the They 
understand the authentic and total that-it-is of Dasein. In resoluteness Dasein 
gets a genuine grasp of itself Thus, in the call of conscience Dasein is called 
forth not to an empty ideal existence, but to the existence of its situation, to the 
Dasein that is thrown into its essential Being-guilty. Dasein's understanding of 
the call of conscience is accompanied by the state-of-being, anxiety, which 
brings to the fore the homelessness of Dasein's own self The mode of discourse 
is not expressed aloud, but in silence, which the inauthentic Dasein must listen to 
in silence. So to the one who is caught up in idle-talk and curiosity, the call of 
conscience, in its silent manifestation would appear as non-existent. The pre-
eminent and authentic disclosedness of Dasein, attested by Dasein's wanting-to-
have-a-conscience, shows itself as the silent and anxious self-projection 
Heidegger calls resoluteness. To quote him: 
"The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a 
conscience is thus constituted by anxiety as the state-of-
being, by understanding as the projection of oneself upon 
one's ownmost being guilty and by discourse as reticence. 
This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested 
in Dasein itself [himself] by its [his] conscience - this 
reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty in 
which one is ready for anxiety - we call resoluteness." 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 343) 
Thus, resoluteness, for Heidegger, is the authentic mode of disclosedness 
of Dasein. Since the disclosedness of Dasein is the primordial truth and the way 
in which Dasein is in truth, and resoluteness being the authentic mode of 
Dasein's disclosedness is the truth of Dasein which is the most primordial and 
authentic. Thus, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, recalls Dasein 
from his inauthentic everyday pre-occupation to an authentic disclosedness. In 
fact, it does not change Dasein's world, but rather transforms Dasein's 
awareness of his world and others. In other words, Dasein's authentic being-his-
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self does not mean that he has a self that is unattached and cut off from the 
world, but Dasein's 'being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand' and his 'being-with-
others' "are given a definitive character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-
for-being-their-selves" (Heidegger, 1973, pp. 343-344) So, in resoluteness, 
Dasein does not stop taking care of his environmental world, nor does he stop 
dealings with the community to which he belongs, but only changes his attitude 
towards these, from one of inauthenticity to that of authenticity. To quote 
Heidegger: 
"Resoluteness, as authentic being-one's self, does not detach 
Dasein from its [his] world, nor does it isolate it [him] so that 
it [he] becomes a free-floating]. And how should it, when 
resoluteness, is authentically nothing else than being-in-the 
world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its [his] current 
concemful being-alongside what is ready-to-hand and pushes 
it [him] into solicitous being with others." (Heidegger, 1973, 
p. 344) 
Resoluteness, therefore, frees Dasein from himself for his world, in the 
light of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of his own potentiality-for-being. It also 
frees Dasein in his relationship with others in the sense that resoluteness enables 
him to allow than to be themselves. A resolute Dasein, thereby, becomes, as it 
were, the conscience of others, which, in turn, brings about the disclosure of 
mutual potentialities to each other. This, in turn, helps them to be authentically 
'being-their-selves' and authentically to 'be-with-one-another'. 
Anticipatory Resoluteness: The Ontologico-oiitieal: The existential analysis 
of Dasein's totality and authenticity in the ontological and ontical dimensions 
has given rise to two notions - anticipation and resoluteness. Heidegger shows 
that they constitute the unitary notion of anticipatory resoluteness. In 
anticipation the ontological possibility of Dasein as total and authentic is 
revealed. This ontological possibility is ontically assumed by Dasein in 
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resoluteness. Only as anticipating can Dasein be resolute for its essential Being-
guilty. Resoluteness is made possible by anticipation, and anticipation is 
meaningless without resoluteness. Both speak of the radical finitude of Dasein 
from the ontological and ontical perspectives. As a unitary phenomenon 
anticipatory resoluteness brings Dasein into the full self possession of its Being -
Dasein in its totality and authenticity. 
In anticipatory resoluteness we have arrived at the genuine self of Dasein. 
According to Heidegger, the self is not to be taken as substance or as subject, but 
as a noetico-noematic unity, as expressed in its 'Being-in-the-world', which 
implies its essential relatedness to the things and persons, 'care' unifies the 
various ways of Dasein's Being; but in. this notion we do not arrive at the Being 
of Dasein that is total and authentic. Hence it is in anticipatory resoluteness that 
we have the genuine picture of Dasein. 
231 
Chapter -IX 
JA. Summing Up: 
teaching Authentic 
A SUMMING UP 
Reaching Authentic Existence 
For I ... am a man and every man must find out his own way. 
(Sartre, 1968, p. 311) 
The deepest concern of existentialist ethics is perhaps to foster an 
authentic stance towards the human, groundless, values without which no project 
is possible. It is a concern that s expressed in the notions of engagement and 
commitment. The existentialists advocate that free commitment is ethical. As 
Sartre puts it in Existentialism and Humanism: 
"One can choose anything, but only if it is upon the plane of 
free commitment." (Sartre, 1948, p. 48) 
Existentialism like Kantian ethics, evaluates the person as well as the act. 
To be a good existentialist is to recognize one's freedom of commitment and 
thus to take responsibility for whatever one does or is. As Simone De Beauvoir 
says: 
"He bears responsibility for a world which is not the work of a 
strange power, but of himself, where his defeats are inscribed, 
and his victories as well." (Beauvoir, 1967, p. 16) 
Existentialist ethics ironically is oriented around the conception that there 
can be no ethics. This contradictory proclamation is based on the distinction of 
the two different senses of ethics - normative and metaethics. The existentialists 
do not propose a normative ethics instead they propoimd a metaethics which is 
based on human freedom. According to them, normative ethics provides us with 
concrete prescriptions and specific principles instructing us what we ought to do. 
On the contrary, metaethics is the formulation of an ethical framework and the 
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establishing of a logic and a discourse for delimiting the kinds of principles 
which are open to consideration and the kinds of arguments which are 
acceptable. Metaethics simply stated is literally talk about ethics. But it does not 
mean that metaethics is normatively unimportant. On the contrary, it is 
metaethical considerations which determine what our normative ethics will be 
like. Thus all the existentialists whether theist or atheist are involved in 
metaethics. 
Existentialist ethics is based on nihilism, often with the Nietzschean -
Dostoevskian argument that 'if God is dead, then everything is permitted.' 
Freedom is the ontological heart of existentialism. And it is also its ethical 
foundation. There is no criterion of normative ethics which can be defended as 
'correct'. But it is the principle of freedom which is defended as 'correct' on the 
metaethical level. In other words, what normative system of values one chooses 
is not open to judgement, but whether or not he chooses it in freedom is open to 
judgement. A man cannot, therefore, make a wrong choice of values, but he can 
make his choice wrongly. As Kierkegaard puts it 'it is not what you choose, but 
how you choose that is important.' This is the basis of modem existentialist 
ethics. As Simon De Beauvoir says'. 
"To will oneself moral and to will-oneself free are one and the 
same decision." (Beauvoir, 1967, p. 24) 
Thus, existentialists ethics does not criticise another person's action. But 
it criticizes the way of choosing of the choices. As Sartre says in Existentialism 
and Humanism: 
"People say to us 'you are unable to judge others'. This is true 
in one sense and false in another. It is true in this sense, that 
whenever a man chooses his purpose and his commitment in 
all cleamess and in all sincerity, whatever that purpose may be 
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it is possible for him to prefer another.... We can Judge 
nevertheless... that in certain cases choice is founded upon an 
error, and in others upon the truth. One can judge a man by 
saying that he deceives himself" (Sartre, 1948, p. 42) 
Existentialism does not give us any instruction or a set of values guiding 
action for it is driven by a conviction to act in keeping with a choice made 
freely. Thus it refuses to lay down any prescriptions leading to any specific 
course of actions. However, this does not make the principle empty, for the 
ethical principle of freedom tells us not only that we are free, but that freedom 
has significance only when translated into an action that is bom out of 
commitment. As Simon De Beauvoir observes: 
"One of the chief objections leveled against existentialism is 
that the precept 'to will freedom' is only a hollow formula and 
offers no concrete content for action. But that is because one 
has begun by emptying the word freedom of its concrete 
meaning; we have already seen that freedom realizes itself 
only by engaging itself in the world: to such an extent that 
man's project toward freedom is embodied in him in definite 
acts of behaviour."(Beauvoir, 1967, p. 78) 
Existentialist ethics insists that a man is absolutely free both in his 
freedom from the causal determination of his intentions and decisions and in his 
freedom from 'outside authority' instructing him what course of actions correct. 
The belief in freedom from causal determination has been a recurring theme in 
each existentialist, and their insistence upon freedom from authority is what 
sharply distinguishes them from Kant. Kant argues that men are causally free to 
choose but not rationally free to choose their own values. Existentialism, 
however, teaches that there is no standard of correctness for one's choices. If 
reason is argued to be the ultimate justification of morality' one is free to be 
'irrational'. If God is posited as the ultimate source of all true values, one is free 
to be ureverent, if patriotism is taken as the ultimate duty, one is free to be 
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treasonably undutiful; and if human nature is cited as support for a principle, one 
is free to act unnaturally. This is not to say, of course, that one is free from the 
consequences of his freedom to reject a value; the irreverent may still be 
damned, the treasonous may still be hanged, the 'unnatural' may become ill. 
One is always free to reject whatever values one chooses to reject, often with the 
understanding that his rejection will be met with disapproval or punishment 
from others. 
The crux of the existentialist theory of value can be based expressed in 
saying that all that has any value is a man and his manner of choosing. Not only 
is it through man that values enter the world: ultimately, it is only man that is 
valuable. 
All the existentialists whether theist or atheist are in their on ways ethical 
radicals. They are radical not only in the sense that they reject the Kantian idea 
of a 'foundation' for morality, but also in the sense that they reject in some way 
the content of Kant's bourgeois morality. In a strict sense existentialism is a 
nihilism that has no 'content', least of all 'contents' of morality, or other ethical 
codes. It can, however, attack and destroy the grounds upon which people base 
such codes. But it does not mean that existentialism is a purely destructive 
philosophy. On the contrary, existentialists themselves typically adopt a strong 
moral and radical stance. They differ from traditional moralists in their 
unwillingness to procure rational justifications in favour of ethics. 
They have been highly critical of the philosophical and ethical traditions 
they inherited. Their views are as diverse as they are. They strive to offer an 
alternative to the overtly rational, and what they like to coin, an 'inhuman' 
philosophical approach. Their aim is to provide a better account of what it is to 
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be a human being in this world. This task necessarily offers some ethical 
developments regarding our being-in-the-world as acting, encountering, socially 
living beings. They try to elaborate a viable alternative to traditional ethical 
views. 
Kierkegaard develops the problem of existence in the context of his 
radical approach to Christian faith, and Nietzsche did so in the light of his thesis 
of the death of God." Though neither Nietzsche's nor Kierkaggard's thought can 
be reduced to a single strand. Both took an interest in what Kierkegaard termed 
'the single individual'. Both of them were convinced that this singularity, what 
is most my own, 'me' could be meaningfully reflected upon while yet, precisely 
because of its singularity, remains invisible to traditional philosophy, which lays 
emphasis either on unerring objective laws of nature or else conformity to the 
universal standards of moral reason. 
In Kierkegaard, the singularity of existence comes to light at the moment 
of conflict between ethico-religious stage. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard 
argues that for philosophy my life becomes meaningful when I 'raise myself to 
the universal' by bringing my immediate natural desires and inclinations under 
the moral law, which represents my telos or what I ought to be. In doing so I 
loose my individuality but my actions become meaningful in the sense of being 
understandable and governed by a norm. Now a person whose sense of 
following God's will is what imparts meaning to his life will become intelligible 
just to the extent that his action conforms to the universal dictates of ethics. In 
the case of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice of his son, where Abraham breaks 
the societal norms in his readiness to end his son's life. Kierkegaard believes 
that Abraham's life is supremely meaningful. Because here God's command 
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cannot be seen as a law that would pertain to all. But it addresses Abraham in 
his singularity. In Abraham's case the 'single individual is higher than 
universal.' 
In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard says that 
'subjectivity is the truth'. This is the idea that prefigures the existential concept 
of authenticity. Abraham has no objective reason to think that the command he 
hears comes from God; indeed, based on the content of the command he has 
every reason, as Kant pointed out in Religion within the Limits of Reason 
Alone, to think that it cannot came from God. His sole justification is what 
Kierkegaard calls ihe passion of faith. Such faith is, rationally speaking, absurd, 
a leap, so if there is to be any measure of truth it is a standard that measures not 
the content of Abraham's act, but the way in which he accomplishes it. To 
perform the movement of faith subjectively is to embrace the paradox as 
normative for me in spite of its absurdity, rather than to seek an escape from it 
by means of objective textual exegesis, historical criticism, or some other 
strategy for translating the singularity of my situation into the universal. Because 
my reason can not help here, the normative appropriation is a function of my 
inwardness or passion. In this way I 'truly' become what I nominally already 
am. To say that subjectivity is the truth is to highlight a way of being and not a 
mode of knowing for truth measures the attitude or passion with which I 
appropriate, or make my own, an 'objective uncertainty' in a 'process of highest 
inwardness.' 
In contrast to the singularity of this movement, for Kierkegaard, stands 
the crowd; "the crowd is untruth" (Kierkegaard, 1962, p. 113), the crowd is, 
roughly, public opinion in the widest sense - the ideas that are taken for granted; 
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the ordinary and accepted way of doing things; the complacent attitude that 
comes from the conformity necessary for social life - and what condemns it to 
'untruth' in Kierkegaard's eyes is the way that it institutes itself into an 
individual's own sense of who he is, relieving him of the burden of being 
himself. The objective truths of science and history, however well-established, 
are in themselves matters of indifference; they belong to the crowd. It is not 
insofar as truth can be established objectively that it takes on meaning, but rather 
insofar as it is appropriated 'passionately' in its very uncertainty. To 'exist', 
according to Kierkegaard, is always to be confronted with this question of 
meaning. 
For Kierkegaard existence emerges as a philosophical problem in the 
struggle to think the paradoxical presence of God; but for Nietzsche it is found 
in the reverberations of the phrase God is dead, in the challenge of nihilism. 
Responding in part to the cultural situation in nineteenth - century 
Europe - historical scholarship continuing to erode fundamentalist readings of 
the Bible, the growing cultural capital of the natural sciences, and Darwinism in 
particular - and in part driven by his own investigations in the psychology and 
history of moral concepts, Nietzsche sought to draw the consequences of the 
death of God. It means there is the collapse of any theistic support for morality. 
Nietzsche's overriding concern is to find a way to take the measure of human 
life in the modem world. Unlike Dostoevsky, however, Nietzsche sees a 
complicity between morality and the Christian God that perpetuates a life-
denying, and so ultimately nihilistic stance. Nietzsche's idea behind his moral 
prescriptions is driven towards the will to power. The account in the Genealogy 
of Morals says that the Judeo-Christian moral order arose as an expression of the 
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resentment of the weak against the power exercised over them by the strong. A 
tool used to thwart that power, it had over time become internalized in the form 
of conscience, creating a 'sick' animal whose will is at war with its own vital 
instincts. Thus, Nietzsche arrived at Kierkegaard's idea that 'the crowd is 
untruth'. The so called autonomous, the self legislative individual is nothing but 
a herd animal that has trained itself into docility and unfreedom by conforming 
to the 'universal' standards of morality. The normative is nothing but the 
normal. 
If the autonomous individual has so far signified nothing but herd 
mentality - if moral norms arose precisely to produce such conformists the 
individual nevertheless has the potential to become something else, the sick 
animal is 'pregnant with a future.' Nietzsche saw that in the nineteenth century 
the 'highest values' had begun to 'devalue themselves.' For instance, the 
Christian value of truth-telling, institutionalized in the form of science, had 
undermined the belief in God, disenchanting the world and excluding from it 
any pre-given moral meaning. In such a situation the individual is forced back 
upon himself. On the one hand, if he is weakly constituted he may fall victim to 
despair in the face of nihilism, the recognition that life has no intrinsic meaning. 
On the other hand, for a 'strong' or creative individual nihilism presents a 
liberating opportunity to take responsibility for meaning, to exercise creativity 
by transvaluing his values, establishing a new 'order to rank'. Through 
Zarathiistra, Nietzsche imagined such a person as the overman, the one who 
teaches 'the meaning of the earth' and has no need of other worldly supports for 
the values he embodies. The overman represents a form of life, a mode of 
existence that is to blossom from the communalized, moralized 'last man' of the 
nineteenth century. He has understood that nihilism is the ultimate meaning of 
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the moral point of view, its life denying essence, and he reconfigures the moral 
idea of autonomy so as to release the life affirming potential within it. 
Thus, for Nietzsche, existence emerges as a philosophical problem in his 
distinction between, moral autonomy and an autonomy 'beyond good and evil. 
But if one is to speak of autonomy, meaning, and value at all, the mode of being 
beyond good and evil cannot simply be a lawless state of arbitrary and impulsive 
behaviour. If such existence is to be thinkable there must be a standard by which 
success and failure can be measured. Nietzsche indicates such a standard in his 
references to 'health', 'strength', and 'the meaning of the earth.' His most 
instructive indication, however, comes from aesthetics, since its concept of style, 
as elaborated in the Gay Science, provides a norm appropriate to the singularity 
of existence. To say that a work of art has style is to invoke a standard for 
judging it, but one that cannot be specified in the form of a general law of which 
the work would be a mere instance. Rather, in a curious way, the norm is 
internal to the work. For Nietzsche, existence falls under such an imperative of 
style: to create meaning and value in a world from which all transcendent 
supports have fallen away is to give unique shape to one's immediate 
inclinations, drives, and passions; to interpret, prune, and enhance according to a 
unifying sensibility, a ruling instinct, that brings everything into a whole that 
satisfies the non-conceptual, aesthetic norm of what fits, what belongs, what is 
appropriate. 
With Kant, Sartre teaches that 'the only thing unqualifiedly good is a 
good will'. For Sartre, the 'good will' is not one that makes correct or rational 
choices; but one that sees itself as always making choices. A 'bad will' or an act 
in bad faith is not one that chooses incorrectly or irrationally, but one that does 
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not see itself as a choice. However, Sartre insists that he is simply describing' 
the human condition, there can be no doubt that he believes bad faith to be bad 
and good faith to be good. These 'existential values' carry with them - in any 
meaningful sense of the term - moral weight. In his defence of the bourgeois 
morality that Sartre despises, Kant had written that the heart of morality lay in 
the responsible and freely chosen act. For Sartre as well, morality can lie only in 
the act of free responsible choice, but such an insistence entails, for him, the 
destruction of the content of Kant's 'morality'. There is no point in talking of 
'free responsible choice' if the values that are choosen are 'a priori given'. 
Sartre cases very much for the conceptions of 'good' and 'bad', but seeks only 
to continue Kant's shift in the locus of these values from 'moral facts' to acts of 
choice. Like Kant's morality, Sartre's ethics is the very antithesis of an ethics of 
an arbitrariness or irresponsibility. Everything a man does, even where we might 
sometimes say 'he had no choice', is his responsibility. And Sartre's neglect of 
the consequences of the action as irrelevant to moral worth is not to be construed 
as a condoning of action without regard for consequences. But the purpose of 
such neglect of consequences serves only to eliminate grounds for excuse and 
further place the burden of responsibility on the choice itself, whatever its 
consequences. 
Sartre often returns to traditional Cartesian dualism where Heidegger and 
Merleau - Ponty take the same dualism to be the source of traditional problems. 
Here, we find that Sartre freely accepts a relatively sharp distinction between 
facts and values, facticity and transcendence, everyday 'given' bourgeois values 
and existentially choosen values. Heidegger and Merleau -Ponty on the other 
hand, argue at length that there are no such things as 'values' or 'facts', because 
there is no such viable distinction between 'fact' and 'value'. Heidegger's 
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critique of 'values' occupies a central role in Being and Time, but it must not be 
supposed that he is attacking the idea of there being values as well as facts. For 
Heidegger, Being-in-the-World does not involve both facts and value. The very 
idea of his 'primitive' analysis of world as equipment is intended to destroy all 
such Cartesian and Husserlian dualisms. 
Heidegger pursues a campaign which is largely directed against the 
traditional philosophical distinction between 'practice' and 'theory'. He rejects 
the notion of 'things' as our primitive conception of entities in the world and 
replaces it with a notion of equipment. He rejects the Cartesian cogito as the 
starting point of phenomenological investigation and substitutes it with Being-
in-the-world, a notion which does not pretend to restrict, its scope to cognitive 
matters. Thus, the notion of intentionality in Husserl, which so often appears as 
a cognitive attitude towards objects, is replaced by care which has clear 
practical connotations. 'Knowledge of the world' is moved to a secondary 
position in Heidegger's philosophy while involvement, design, utility, moods, 
and concern become primitive human attitudes towards the world. With this 
breakdown in the distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' and a parallel 
breakdown between the traditional philosophical categories of metaphysics and 
ethics is expected. If there is no clear distinction between theory and practice, 
between what the world is and what we aspire to make of it, then these two 
traditionally very different philosophical enterprises, the search for truth and the 
search for values, are indistinguishable. 
A discussion of Heidegger's ethics becomes very difficult because 
Heidegger repeatedly insists that he is not doing ethics. Philosophy, according to 
Heidegger has no room for ethics, and that his concepts are purely 'descriptive' 
242 
Chapter IX A Summing Up: Reaching Authentic Existence 
and contain no moralizing criticism or negative value judgement. In Being and 
Time Heidegger declares that ethical matters are existentiell or ontic matters, 
and that they, therefore, have no place in philosophy because philosophical 
problems are ontological. As he says: 
"In spite of all expressly given warnings not to take it as an 
ontic characterization of man - as a philosophy of life or an 
ethics which appraises "human life" then everything will be 
thrown into confusion". (Heidegger, 1962, p. 213) 
He tells us that values are of strictly ontic concern, and that ontology has 
nothing to say about what ought to be done. He insists that we do not know 
values at all, either on the basis of natural facts or on the basis of specifically 
evaluative intuitions as Husserl and Scheller advocates. Values according to 
him, are creations of 'human subjectivity', and are mere 'objectifications of 
individual wants'. 
Thus, Heidegger refuses to give us an ethics. As from Kierkegaard, all 
existentialists turn himself from universal ethics in favour of an ethics of 
'authenticity'. They refuse to give us a specific life - programme or life - style. It 
is the nature of these philosophies that 'becoming authentic' essentially requires 
that we each give up the quest for a set of 'given' values, whether these be given 
from God, from society (Dasman), or fi-om philosophers. Kierkegaard's each 
spheres dictates its own life-style, but 'authenticity' the 'existential value' 
depends on an 'arbitrary' or 'irrational' choice of spheres. Similarly for 
Heidegger, who does not attempt to distinguish distinct life styles, it is 
impossible for the philosopher to give a criterion for the correct choice of a way 
of life. For any such criterion would directly violate the basic 'existential' 
principle that Dasein must choose his own mode of existence. The ethics of 
243 
Chapter EC A Summing Up: Reaching Authentic Existence 
Being and Time does not signify the rejection of values as such, but it only 
indicates the rejection of universal values, values imposed on Dasein by others. 
Being and Time is as much a treatise on human values as a treatise on 
ontology, and that the products of Being and Time are not only descriptions of 
Dasein, but instructions for Dasein too. The primary instruction, of course, is 
that we should strive to be authentic. Inauthenticity or fallenness is to be fought 
against and overcome. Heidegger stresses that, because Dasein existentially has 
tendencies to both authenticity and inauthenticity, no one could ever attain 
complete authenticity, nor could anyone 'fall' to complete inauthenticity. The 
demands of every day and the public will always cause a certain amount of 
inauthenticity and failure to treat oneself according to one's Existenz. Similarly, 
the approach of death and the Angst which is encountered in certain instances 
will jar even the most 'average everyday man out of his inauthenticity to a 
shocking recognition of his own true individuality. The ethics of Being and Time 
can thus be simply stated; one must strive to be authentic, and to be authentic is 
to ask the question of Being regarding oneself 
Thus, Heidegger's ethics does not provide a source of guidance that we 
expect from an ethics. However, any philosophy which so heavily stresses 
individual autonomy of choice will fmd itself forced to be noncommittal as to 
correct life programmes. It is in spite of this ethics of authenticity that Heidegger 
turns to National Socialism as a 'correct' moral choice, as it is in spite of his 
similar philosophy that Sartre defends communism. 
Merleau - Ponty attacks the dualism of fact and value by placing for more 
stress than Sartre on the notion of the situation. Where Sartre is quick to 
degrade 'everyday' and 'given bourgeois' values, Merleau - Ponty sees that 
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these values deserve the central place in our ontology - not strictly as moral 
facts, but not as choosen value either. To be a worker, a bourgeois, French, 
Jewish, black, is already a source, not only of 'facticity' upon which we base our 
choices, but of intentions and interests and possibilities. Sartre often writes as if 
'I am a worker, now I have to freely decided whether to be a cooperative 
labourer or a revolutionary' But Merleau - Ponty sees that one's situation cannot 
be separated from his interests. Finding myself as a worker is already finding 
myself 'thrown' into a set of choices -and preferences. Everyday values are 
neither strictly 'given' nor are they strictly choosen, since one is 'thrown' into 
them before one has any chance to 'choose'. According to Merleau -Ponty, one 
cannot, in Sartre's terms, 'wrench himself away' from his situation, but must 
always make his less-than-absolute choices within the limited perspective and 
the prejudicial atmosphere of his situation. 
In contrast to the Sartre's notion of the impossibility of intersubjectivity, 
religious existentialists, like Jaspers, Marcel, and Buber advocate that man can 
live a meaningful life only in a subject to subject relationship, Jaspers says that 
communication is an essential aspect of existenz. For him intersubjectivity is a 
fact whose ontological exploration is one of the fundamental tasks of 
philosophy. He wrote in his seventieth year: 
"From my school days on, the question of communication 
between human beings was to me the basic question of our 
life. Man can only come to himself with his fellowmen." 
(CitedinKelly, 1967,p. 154) 
Jaspers affirms that truth has its origin in communication. He says that 
the only reality with which man can reliably and in self - understanding join 
hands in the world, is his fellow man. It is through communication that 
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companions find the road to truth. Whereas: 
"The road is lost to the man who shuts himself off from others 
in stubborn self-will, who lives in a shell of solitude." (Jaspers, 
1950, p. 48) 
Communication is the fundamental feature of authenticity in Jaspers 
philosophy. Like him, Marcel too believes that "togetherness makes 
disponsibility workable...it is on the level of the mystery, of the 
metaproblematical and of secondary reflection that man can discover his 
authentic personhood. And so it is only in a genuine I-Thou relationship in that 
encounter or meeting on the plane of intersubjectivity that I can engage in such 
personal relationships as disponsibility, fidelity and love." (Sayeed, 1998, p. 
109) He explains that when I enter into communion with another, I thereby 
transcend the level of having, i.e., the level of object, and I rise to the sphere of 
Being. 
Buber defines the ethical as the affirmation or denial of the conduct and 
actions possible to one not according to their use or harmfubiess for individuals 
and society, but according to their intrinsic value and disvalue. And the criterion 
by which the distinction and decision are made may be traditional one or one 
perceived by the individual himself. What really matters, he says, "is that the 
critical flame shoots up ever again out of the depths" and the truest source for 
this critical flame is "the individual's awareness of what he 'really' is, of what in 
his unique and no repeatable created existence he is intended to be." (Buber, 
1952, p. 125) 
The foundation of Buber's definition of ethics is his philosophy of 
dialogue with its emphasis on wholeness, decision, presentness, and uniqueness 
on the one hand, and on the other, it is his philosophical anthropology with its 
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emphasis on the potentiality which only man has and on the direction which 
each man must take to become what only he can become. This emphasis on an 
inner awareness which gives one the power of distinguishing and deciding 
between right and wrong is a type of moral autonomy which contradicts the 
dialogical nature of the rest of his philosophy. He makes it clear that 'he is 
talking about neither 'moral autonomy' nor 'moral heteronomy', neither self-
created morality nor morality imposed from without". (Buber, 1952, p. 129) He 
affirms that pure moral autonomy is a freedom that is simply 'freedom from' 
without any 'freedom for'. Pure moral heteronomy is a 'responsibility' that is 
simply imposed moral duty without any genuine freedom or spontaneity. The 
narrow ridge between the two is a freedom that means freedom to respond, and a 
responsibility that means both, an address from without and free response from 
within. 
The thorough-going moral autonomy destroys all concepts of morality 
because it destroys all notion of value. For this reason, Buber, criticizes, Sartre's 
definition of value as the meaning of life which the individual chooses. He says: 
"One can believe in and accept a meaning or value... if one 
has discovered it, not if one has invented it. It can be for me an 
illuminating meaning, a direction-giving value, only if it has 
been revealed to me in my meeting with being, not if I have 
freely chosen it for myself from among the existing 
possibilities and perhaps have in addition decided with a few 
fellow creatures: This shall be valid from now on." (Buber, 
1952, p. 93) 
The failure to see moral problems in terms of the relation of I and Thou 
ends in submission of I to the world of it. Through his dialogical philosophy 
Buber avoids not only the 'objectivism' of the moral absolutists but also the 
'subjectivism' of the cultural relativists. If values do not exist for him apart from 
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persons, neither can they be reduced to subjective feeling or 'interest'. The value 
lies in the between in the relation of the I to a Thou which is not an It yet is 
really other than the I. 
Buber's philosophy of dialogue not only finds the narrow ridge between 
the subjectivist identification and the objectivist sundering of the 'is' and the 
'ought', but it also radically shifts the whole ground of ethical discussion by 
moving from the universal to the concrete and from the past to the present - in 
other words, from I-It to I - Thou. Buber does not start from some external, 
absolutely valid ethical code which man is bound to apply as best as possible to 
each new situation. Instead he starts with the situation itself. He says: 
"The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from the 
province of specialized ethics, of an 'ought' that swings free in 
the air, into that of lived life. Genuine responsibility exists 
only where there is real responding." (Buber, 1947, p. 16) 
Most of the traditional ethical values - not killing, stealing, committing 
adultery, lying, cheating, and so forth are useful and suggestive, but one may not 
for all that proceed from them to the situation. Rather one must move from the 
concrete situation to the decision as to what is the right direction in this instance. 
Buber says: 
"No responsible person remains a stranger to norms. But the 
command inherent in a genuine norm never becomes a maxim 
and the fulfillment of it never a habit. Any command that a 
great character takes to himself in the course of his 
development does not act in him as part of his consciousness 
or as material for building up his exercises, but remains latent 
in a basic layer of his substance until it reveals itself to him in 
a concrete way. What it has to tell him is revealed whenever a 
situation arises which demands of him a solution of which till 
them he had perhaps no idea. Even the most universal norm 
will at times be recognized only in a very special 
situation There is a direction, a 'yes', a command, hidden 
even in a prohibition, which is revealed to us in moments like 
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these. In moments like these the command addresses us really 
in the second person, and the Thou in it is no one else but 
one's own self. Maxims command only the third person, the 
each and the none." (Buber, 1947, p. 114) 
We find the most important key to the ethical implications of Buber's 
dialogue in experiencing the relationship from the side of the other. Only 
through 'seeing the other' can the I-Thou relationship become ftiUy real, for 
only through it can one be sure that one is really helping the other person. To 
deal lovingly with thy neighbour means to recognize that he is not just another I 
but a Thou, and that means a really 'other' person. Only if we see a man in his 
concrete otherness is there any possibility of our confirming him in his 
individuality as that which he must become. 'Seeing the other' is for this reason 
of central significance, not only for ethical action, but for love, friendship, 
teaching, and psychotherapy. 
The Thou, Buber says, "teaches you to meet others", but it also teaches 
you 'to hold your ground when you meet them." (Buber, 1937, p. 33) Ethical 
action is not altruism and self denial. Nor is it an impartial objectivity which 
adjudicates conflicting interests as if from the standpoint of a third person. It is 
the binding of decision and action in the relation of I and Thou. 
One can only be 'responsible' if one is responsible to someone. Since the 
human Thou must constantly become an It, one is ultimately responsible to the 
Eternal Thou who never becomes an It. But it is just in the concrete that we meet 
the Eternal Thou, and it is this which prevents dialogue from degenerating into 
'responsibility' to an abstract moral code or universal idea. The choice, 
therefore, is not between religion and morality but between a religion and 
morality wedded to the universal and a religion and morality wedded to the 
concrete. He says: 
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"Only out of a personal relationship with the Absolute can the 
absoluteness of the ethical co-ordinates arise without which 
there is no complete awareness of self. Even when the 
individual calls an absolute criterion handed down by religious 
tradition his own, it must be reforged in the fire of the truth of 
his personal essential relation to the Absolute it f it is to win 
true validity. But always it is the religious which bestows, the 
ethical, which receives" (Buber, EG, 1952, p. 129) 
It is always the religious which bestows and the ethical which receives is 
to be found in the nature of good. The good for Buber is not an objective state of 
affairs nor an inner feeling, but a type of relationship - the dialogue between 
man and man and between man and God. This means that the good cannot be 
referred back to any platonic universals or impersonal order of the cosmos, nor 
can it be founded iij any general system of utility or justice. It grows instead out 
of that which is most particular and concrete, not pseudo concreteness of the 
'empirically verifiable' but the actual present concreteness of the unique 
direction toward God which one apprehends and realizes in the meeting with the 
everyday. As Buber says: 
"Good conceived thus cannot be located within any system of 
ethical co-ordination, for all those we know came into being 
on its account and existed or exist by virtue of it. Every ethos 
has its origin in a revelation, whether or not it is still aware of 
and obedient to it; and every revelation is revelation of human 
service to the goal of creation, in which service man 
authenticates himself" (Buber, IGE, 1952, p. 83) 
Tillich, on the other hand professes a theory of iheonomy as the moral 
law. A theonomous ethics, according to Tillich, is neither something we impose 
on ourselves nor something imposed on us by another will or power. It means he 
neither believes in autonomy nor in heteronomy. He argues that true freedom is 
theonomous; the moral law of God is nothing else than our true or genuine 
being. Tillich says that theonomy refers to those persons or cultures "in which 
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the ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and 
actions' the culture is transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual 
content." (Tillich, 1957, p. xii) Morality is thus essentially religious for Tillich. 
Through theonomous morality, it is possible for the unconditional, infinite 
(Being) to 'break through' the cultural institutions of a given period. 
Autonomous ethics by contrast, appears only in its finite relationships with 
beings. 
The courage to love, as the uniting of persons in a meaningfiil 
relationship, is stronger the death for Tillich. Avoiding the pit falls of the 
humanistic existentialism of Sartre, Tillich's religious existentialism does not 
get caught in the quagmire of death-talk and fundamental anxiety over one's 
isolation. He asserts that "love overcomes separation and creates participation in 
which there is more than that which the individuals involved can being to it. 
Love is the infinite which is given to the finite." (Tillich, 1957, p. 160) Love is 
seen as beifig coexistent with authentic help, concern, and attempts to make 
whole again the fallen self Courage, love, justice, and power are all "ethical 
realities, but (they) are rooted in the whole breadth of human existence and 
ultimately in the structure of being itself (They) must be considered 
ontologically in order to be understood ethically." (Tillich, 1952, p. 01) A 
Theonomous ethics is rooted in the notion of agape, or Christian love. Agape, 
for Tillich, "points to the transcendent source of the content of the moral 
imperative" and unifies our actual nature with our essential being. (Tillich, 1963, 
p. 40) Against the existential situation of estrangement, agape overcomes fallen 
existence from the goodness of created essential being. This version of love also 
draws within itself the concept and reality of justice, as the acknowledgement of 
the other person as person, and the power to act. The courage to love is 
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inextricably linked to an act of faith. Religious existentialist ethics is rooted in a 
God-relation. The faith-foundation in an all-loving, all-knowing, all powerful 
creator grounds the existential individual in the world as an ethical, inquisitive, 
and loving manner. Thus, the religious existentialist, by searching for the 
meaning of Being, enters into an ethical relationship with the other. Ethical 
human relationships require a level of passion, of striving, of struggling. And 
relationships, for Tillich require faith. 
Existentialism has always been identified as the philosophy with the 
pessimistic view of man. But it is evident here that it is existentialism which 
places its highest confidence in humanity - that people will choose to be 
humane as well as human. They do not look at their 'nihilism' as a gateway to 
disaster. But all apparently believe that the fi-eedom they seek will lead not to 
murder and chaos, but to artistic sensitivity, deeply feU religion, secreatic ethics, 
or new political and social conscience. Existentialism does not replace morality 
and humane values but places them on surer ground. To give up belief in 
'morality' as a set of a priori or empirically practical principles is not to take the 
role of the 'fanatic'. It is to set aside invalid justifications and become moral for 
the right reasons - because one commits himself. Existentialism gives us 
perhaps the most optimistic view of man ever advanced in western philosophy: 
man will, without being ordered, instructed, forced by man or nature, choose to 
be humane. Sartre's 'existential hero' and camus 'Absurd hero' are not madmen, 
and it is more than -clear that Nietzsche's nihilist overman is not a Nazi 
prototype. The existentialists may begin with Dostoevsky's concern, 'if there is 
no God, all is permitted," but they soon leave Dostoevskian worries behind. 
Why should we suppose that man will do 'evil' if we remove the forces of 
authority of 'good'. Perhaps there is no reason, and the existentialists do not 
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even argue the point. In every existentialist, there is the optimistic and almost 
simple-minded presupposition that man's freedom is desirable without 
qualification. 
Each existentialist is 'radical'. Kierkegaard rejects traditional Christianity 
to replace it with his own notion of becoming 'becoming a christian'. Nietzsche 
rejects the whole of Judeo-Christian morality to replace it with an ethic of 'self-
realization'. Sartre and Merleau - Ponty became Marxists. In no case, however, 
it morality simply rejected, but reinterpreted in a personal and often more 
consistent way. Kierkegaard retains the moral side of Christianity, but makes 
personal commitment to God the defining work of his moral life. Nietzsche 
brutally degrades 'morality', which he says is 'immoral' but retains the moral 
virtues of courage, loyalty, integrity. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty place politics 
and revolutionary necessities above every day morality, but they do not simply 
reject morality out of hand. In each case, the existentialists reject the authority of 
'morals' not to reject morality but to make it their own ethics. And where there 
is contradiction between their own morality and the old, the old morality is not 
simply dismissed, but necessarily recognized as an ever-present alternative 
choice: 
"If I occupy myself in treating as absolute ends certain 
choosen persons, my wife, my son, my friends, the poor man I 
meet on my way. If I wear myself out in fiilfilling my duties 
towards them, I shall have to pass in silence over the injustices 
of the age, the class-struggle, anti-Semitism, etc. and finally I 
shall have to profit from oppression to do good...But on the 
other hand, if I throw myself into a revolutionary enterprise, I 
take the risk of having no leisure for personal relations, and 
worse still of being brought by the logic of action to treat the 
greater part of men and even my comrades as means." (Sartre, 




In conformity with the given nature of a work such as this it becomes a 
requirement to lay out the main arguments and review its cogency in order to 
examine and thereafter clearly state the conclusive bearings which may point 
towards a definite objective thesis. In the case of this dissertation the above 
procedure would not only be inappropriate but totally antithetical to its spirit. 
For the formulations of authenticity we have brought into consideration have 
been most decidedly 'unscientific' (to use a Kierkegaardian term) and open-
ended - for the posture of authenticity acquired by the philosophers under 
consideration is forbidding of any presumed conclusion, thereby encouraging 
each person to choose a path unique to one self. As Nietzsche had said through 
Zarathustra, 'If you would go high, use your own legs'. At best the various 
formulations we have studied can serve as prescriptions, as there is no single 
infallible route to authenticity; nor can there be one. 
However culling out of the themes of authenticity under 
consideration a unanimity of conviction and its concerns are clearly visible 
which are translatable into the general idea that the actualization of authenticity 
is by no means a solitary pursuit to be achieved outside a social context. Away 
from a social void or an underground an attunement with a committed and active 
life within a community has to be achieved. Authenticity becomes an unceasing 
call for significant actions, for it is actions alone that provide the content for this 
singular norm. A large number of accounts of authenticity modeled around the 
ideal of creativity, spell out the spontaneous creation of one's life, the 
crystallization of which achieves a possibility only if situated in a context that 
pertains to that which is social and cultural in nature. For in this are deeply 
Postscript 
Steeped those conventions, ideas and institutions against which an individual has 
to enter into a continuing struggle to achieve authentic selfhood. Societal 
existence acquires great significance for on the one hand it is the fountainhead of 
all the ethical norms and on the other a potential source of a self-identity that 
must freely and consciously be overcome, modified or internalized for the 
realization of what one wants to become. 
In most cases it is 'boundary situations' in which a determined struggle 
followed by a caring forging of one's authenticity takes place. These situations 
are moments that are set in a larger social canvass. On a desert island human life 
can at best be assessed according to the physical criteria of survival making any 
idea of authenticity as completely redundant. For authenticity is not about factual 
life but about life worth living. 
Literature on authenticity is replete with descriptions of conflicts between 
individuals acting on different ethical maxims. These conflicts press the need for 
resolute and authentic decisions and spontaneous actions which can take place 
only in a social context which is the indispensable locale of authenticity. 
The thinkers on authenticity unanimously accepted that an ethic of 
authenticity cannot be constructed a priori for it was their strongest conviction 
that authenticity manifests itself through the willing acceptance of the subjective 
pathos without the support of any rigorous ethical code. 
Today the danger of the death of authenticity has become most palpable 
with the 'postmodernist' attempt to dissolve the subjective pathos of authenticity 
which lies at the heart of existentialist concern. Yet the fact that this ideal 
demands serious consideration and the mterest it has evoked in prominent 
philosophers and writers over the past two centuries and most importantly the 
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urge it has aroused in the readers to experience this pathos is a clear indication 
that in authenticity as an ideal there is much more than just empty 'jargon' as 
Adomo had argued (Adomo, 1973 p. 10). For the deepest yearning to create 
ones own individuality and remain true to one self can ultimately not be 
suppressed. 
The decline of the ethic of objectivity created an appeal for authenticity. 
Likewise the decline of the ethic of subjectivity in the postmodern era and with 
multinational markets and mass media thwarting individuality, a zealous quest 
for authenticity as a personal and corrective ideal is bound to be invigorated. 
Only the revival of the authentic pathos can arrest the decay of what is most 
precious in us - our ownmost self. And as Jacob Golomb writes, in the 
introduction to his book In search of Authenticity: 
"If authenticity is madness, we should all be a little crazy in 
order to become what we cherish most, our own true selves" 
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